Essays On Customer Relationship Management In Social Networks by Zhao, Ping
  
 
ESSAYS ON CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT IN  
SOCIAL NETWORKS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Ping Zhao 
January 2014
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2014 Ping Zhao
 ESSAYS ON CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT IN  
SOCIAL NETWORKS 
 
Ping Zhao, Ph. D.  
Cornell University 2014 
 
 The past decade has witnessed an explosive growth of social media. It has 
never been so easy for customers to connect and interact with each other within 
various forms of social networks. This trend provides companies with unprecedented 
opportunities to enhance firm-customer relationships by leveraging the power of social 
influence among customers. However, it also poses potential risks when negative 
word-of-mouth gets viral on customer networks. 
 The traditional customer relationship management (CRM) research treats 
customers independently, which might no longer apply to today’s networked 
customers. Therefore, this dissertation investigates approaches to embed social 
network analysis components into customer relationship management techniques, thus 
finding a way to harness the power of social influence to improve the efficiency of 
companies’ CRM efforts.  
 Essay 1 of this dissertation studies the “group-to-one” social influence of 
strong and weak ties within a social network, with a framework of a social interaction 
model, a social influence model, and a tie strength measure. It is found that the social 
influence mechanism through strong and weak ties is complex. Sharing and 
reciprocity play an important role in the way social influence affects customers’ 
purchasing behaviors. It is also found that, as a whole, weak ties are more influential 
 than strong ties. 
 Essay 2 attempts to model customers’ defection decisions within a social 
network. By jointly estimating a dyadic level tie strength model and an individual 
level defection decision model, it is found that customers who actively interact with 
others tend to have strong ties with them. Also, customers with strong ties tend to have 
stronger influence on other customers’ defections than customers with weak ties. In 
this essay, a new approach to measure customers’ social network value is also 
proposed.   
 Essay 3 discusses the promising research opportunities in integrating social 
network analysis (SNA) components into customer relationship management (CRM). 
It briefly reviews the four critical aspects of CRM: acquisition, retention, growth, and 
firm-customer relationship dynamics. Within each aspect the discussion focuses on the 
possible impact of social network components on CRM models, and how to combine 
CRM and SNA in modeling efforts.  
 
 
 iii 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
Ping Zhao was born in Jilin and grew up in Shanghai, China. In 1994, Ping got 
his bachelor’s degree in automotive engineering from Tsinghua University in Beijing, 
China. Since then he had been working for nearly five years at Baosteel Group, as a 
mechanical engineer and technical administrator. He then moved on to become a data 
analyst and consultant on management information system. In 2003, Ping went to 
America for advanced business education. In 2005 he got his M.B.A. degree from the 
Goizueta Business School of Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. After graduation 
he worked as a research analyst at Zyman Institute of Brand Science (ZIBS) for a year. 
During his days at ZIBS Ping had opportunities to work with renowned marketing 
faculties on various research projects. With developed interest in marketing science, 
Ping joined the Ph.D. program at the Johnson School of Cornell University in 2006. In 
2013, Ping started working at Wilfrid Laurier University in Waterloo, Ontario Canada, 
as an assistant professor of marketing.       
  
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my family, for their unconditional love and support 
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my committee chair, 
Professor Vithala Rao. Without his guidance, encouragement, patience, and persistent 
help this dissertation would not have been possible. 
I would like to thank my committee members, Professor Martin T. Wells and 
Professor Vishal Narayan, for their support and help. 
I also thank Professor Sriram Venkataraman. His encouragement is the main 
reason I took the arduous but rewarding path to the Ph.D.  
 
  
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Biographical Sketch …………………………………………………………………..iii 
Dedication …………………………………………………………………………….iv 
Acknowledgements …………………………………………………………………....v 
Table of Contents ……………………………………………………………………..vi 
List of Figures ………………………………………………………………………..vii 
List of Tables ………………………………………………………………………..viii 
 
CHAPTER 1 UNDERSTANDING CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP STRENGTH 
AND PROFITABILITY IN AN ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORK ..................... 1 
1.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 2 
1.2 Literature Review ................................................................................................. 6 
1.3 Data ....................................................................................................................... 9 
1.4 Models ................................................................................................................ 15 
1.5 Estimation ........................................................................................................... 29 
1.6 Robustness Tests, Cross-Validation, Causality Inference, and Policy 
Simulations ....................................................................................................... 45 
1.7 Discussion ........................................................................................................... 51 
References ................................................................................................................ 54 
 
CHAPTER 2 MODELING CUSTOMERS’ DEFECTION IN A SOCIAL NETWORK
 .......................................................................................................................... 57 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 58 
2.2 Literature Review ............................................................................................... 61 
2.3 Data ..................................................................................................................... 65 
2.4 Models ................................................................................................................ 69 
2.5 Estimation and Results ....................................................................................... 77 
2.6 Tests, Cross-Validation, and Policy Simulation ................................................. 81 
2.7 Discussion ........................................................................................................... 91 
Appendix .................................................................................................................. 93 
References ................................................................................................................ 96 
 
CHAPTER 3 CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL 
NETWORK ANALYSIS: POSSIBLE SYNERGY OPPORTUNITIES ......... 99 
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 100 
3.2 CRM and SNA – A Brief Review .................................................................... 101 
3.3 Acquire New Customers through Social Network and Social Media .............. 112 
3.4 Leverage the Power of Social Influence to Retain Customers ......................... 116 
3.5 Grow Customers within a Social Network ....................................................... 122 
3.6 Capture Firm-Customer Relationship Dynamics within a Social Network ..... 125 
3.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 128 
References .............................................................................................................. 131 
  
 vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1 Monetary Contribution by In-Sample Customers and Out-of-Sample 
Customers .................................................................................................. 13 
Figure 1.2 Sharing and Purchasing Behaviors of a Typical Customer ......................... 14 
Figure 1.3 Research Framework ................................................................................... 15 
Figure 1.4 Cohesion Subgroups ................................................................................... 17 
Figure 1.5 Time-Diminishing Effects ........................................................................... 20 
Figure 1.6 The Identification of Strong/Weak Ties ...................................................... 26 
Figure 1.7 The Impact of Dyad Duration on Customers’ Sharing Decision and 
Frequency .................................................................................................. 36 
Figure 1.8 Comparison of Strong and Weak Ties in Sharing Behaviors ..................... 38 
Figure 1.9 Comparison of the Sizes of Strong Tie Network and Weak Tie Network .. 43 
Figure 1.10 Policy Simulation Results ......................................................................... 51 
Figure 2.1 The Research Framework ........................................................................... 69 
Figure 2.2 The MCMC Algorithm ............................................................................... 70 
Figure 2.3 Incremental Impacts of Customers’ Defection Decisions ........................... 85 
Figure 2.4 Measuring Customers’ Social Network Values .......................................... 86 
Figure 2.5 Model Can Predict Defection Time with Higher Accuracy ........................ 89 
Figure 2.6 Retention of Influential Customers Can Largely Increase Revenues ......... 90 
 viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1 Descriptive Statistics of Sampled Customers ............................................... 12 
Table 1.2 Overlap between the Sharing Network and the Friendship Network ........... 12 
Table 1.3 Models .......................................................................................................... 21 
Table 1.4 Covariates Used in Models 1 and 2 .............................................................. 22 
Table 1.5 Covariates Used in Models 3 and 4 .............................................................. 28 
Table 1.6 Model Estimation Results ............................................................................ 30 
Table 1.7 Sharing Decision Model (Model 1D) Estimation Results ............................ 32 
Table 1.8 Sharing Frequency Model (Model 2D) Estimation Results ......................... 34 
Table 1.9 Cash Payment Decision Model (Model 3D) Estimation Results ................. 39 
Table 1.10 Cash Payment Amount Model (Model 4D) Estimation Results ................ 41 
Table 1.11 Results of Cross-Validation ........................................................................ 47 
Table 1.12 Endogeneity Tests on Subgroup Payment Covariates ................................ 50 
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics of Sampled Regular Customers ................................. 68 
Table 2.2 Overlap between the Interacting Network and the Friendship Network ...... 68 
Table 2.3 Scenarios of Incremental Effects .................................................................. 74 
Table 2.4 Estimation Results of Tie Strength Model and Defection Decision Model . 79 
Table 2.5 Estimate Results of Benchmark Models ...................................................... 83 
Table 2.6 Estimation Results of Robustness Test ........................................................ 84 
Table 2.7 Results of LOO Validation ........................................................................... 87 
Table 3.1 Research on CRM ...................................................................................... 103 
Table 3.2 Social Network Analysis (SNA) Research in Marketing ........................... 107 
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1  
UNDERSTANDING CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP STRENGTH AND 
PROFITABILITY IN AN ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORK 
 
Abstract 
 We study the “group-to-one” social influence of strong and weak ties within a social 
network in the context of virtual product purchasing. We propose a comprehensive framework 
combining social interaction models, social influence models, and tie strength measures. We use 
customer data provided by an online gaming company to test our framework, which is built with 
four generalized linear mixed models. We find that the social influence mechanism through 
strong and weak ties is complex. Sharing and reciprocity play an important role in the way social 
influence affects customers’ purchasing behaviors. We also find that, as a whole, weak ties are 
more influential than strong ties. We run policy simulations to demonstrate the utility of our 
framework and discuss how companies can use it to increase their revenues. Our research 
findings are also applicable to other industries, particularly the eBook and online music industry.  
Keywords Social Interactions, Social Influence, Tie Strength, Virtual Products, CRM 
  
 2 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 The past decade has witnessed explosive growth within the online video gaming1 industry 
in the United States and other countries. In 1999 online video games produced no revenue. Ten 
years later, World of Warcraft, the largest massive multiplayer online game (MMOG), generated 
nearly $1.2 billion in revenue for its publisher (Schmidt 2012). Zynga, a social online game 
company founded in 2007, earned $850 million in revenue in 2010, increasing more than 200% 
over the year before (Austin 2011). This young company had already attracted 59 million 
average daily active users by the second quarter of 2011 (Ovide 2011). According to Schmidt 
(2012), the revenue from online game subscriptions increased at an annual rate of 40% over the 
period from 2008 to 2012 and is estimated to reach $5.9 billion in 2012. Schmidt also projects 
that the providers of online games will become even more profitable in the future. The same 
trend is also seen in emerging economies such as China. The PRC’s Ministry of Culture (2011) 
reports that in 2010 China’s total online game revenue reached $5.1 billion, increasing 26.2% 
from 2009. The number of game players exceeded 120 million in 2010, growing more than 37.0% 
from 2009. 
An important feature of modern games is the social network function that enables players 
all over the world to socialize and interact through the Internet. Gaming companies painstakingly 
record customers’ social connections and behaviors in databases. These online gaming data 
provide researchers a precious opportunity to observe customers’ behaviors within a social 
network. Moreover, one “run” of a game on one server usually lasts merely a few months.2 Thus, 
a customer’s complete lifecycle in a game can be observed, making this an ideal platform for 
                                                 
1 We define “online video game” as a video game played on personal computers without using a console. Multiple 
players can play together through the Internet.  
2 To attract new business, companies usually shut down the old server after a certain period of time and open a new 
server so new players can start afresh together. 
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research on customer relationship management (CRM) within a social network. 
Another important feature of modern games is the “free-to-play” business model. Due to 
intense competition among companies and low switching costs for customers, players can play 
most online video games free of charge. With this business model, gaming companies have two 
ways to generate revenues: running advertisements and selling virtual goods to customers for 
real money. Some companies directly display advertisements in their games. Some promote 
other companies’ applications in the games and charge for the number of installs and clicks 
(Chang and Mendelson 2010). Recently, selling virtual goods has become the most important 
revenue source for gaming companies. According to Greengard (2011), in 2010 virtual goods 
sales generated 60% of revenues, and “the demand for virtual goods hit $7.3 billion in 2010, up 
from $2.1 billion in 2007.... [T]he figure will reach $14 billion in 2014” (p. 19).   
Even with the huge and fast-growing demand for online games, gaming companies find it 
hard to earn customers’ money. Convincing customers to pay real money for virtual products 
that can only be used within the game is a challenge. The gaming industry has a well-known “95-
5” rule: only about 5% of the customers actually purchase virtual goods with real money; the 
remaining 95% never pay a nickel. Therefore, building a large customer base and motivating 
customers to pay more is critical for companies’ profitability. Consequently, some leading 
companies have started collecting and analyzing customer data to find ways to increase profits. 
For example, behind Zynga’s impressive success is its relentless effort to analyze and understand 
its customers’ virtual product preferences. Zynga’s vice president in charge of its data analysis 
team said it best: “We’re an analytics company masquerading as a games company” (Wingfield 
2011, para. 5). 
Knowledge of how customers influence each other’s purchasing behavior within the 
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game is still very limited. To generate more profits, gaming companies need to understand the 
factors that affect their customers’ spending habits, especially high-value customers. Given the 
social network nature of these games, social connections, interactions, and influence might all 
play important roles in the value-contribution process.  
In this study, we attempt to answer the following two questions: (1) How can we identify 
strong and weak ties within a social network, based on customer social connection and activity 
information? (2) Do social influence patterns differ among customers with strong and weak ties? 
To answer these questions, we develop a comprehensive framework that combines social 
interaction models, social influence models, and tie strength measures.  
Our framework is built with four generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs), which we 
test using customer data across a four-month period provided by a gaming company in China. 
We first use social interaction models to analyze customers’ sharing behaviors, from which we 
uncover the factors that influence their relationship strength. Based on these findings, we 
calculate directional, continuous, and time-varying tie strength measures for all customer dyads 
in each week. With this tie strength information, we are able to remap the social network as a 
valued, directional graph evolving over time.  For every week, we categorize each customer’s 
active social ties into four cohesion subgroups based on the direction and strength of the 
relationship. Finally we use social influence models to investigate the aggregate social influence 
of cohesion subgroups on an individual customer’s purchasing decisions.  
To the best of our knowledge, our research is the first to analyze the “group-to-one” 
social influence through strong and weak ties. This study is also the first to model social 
influence in the context of virtual product purchasing. We find that the social influence 
mechanism of strong ties and weak ties is complex. Sharing and reciprocity play an important 
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role in the way social influence affects customers’ purchasing behaviors. We also find that weak 
ties, as a whole, are more influential than strong ties.   
This research also illustrates that “behavioral” network characteristics outperform 
“nominal” network characteristics in explaining the variation in customer’s social interactions 
and monetary contribution.3 We find that actively interacting customers have stronger influence 
on each other than customers who merely register as friends or who are members of the same 
online groups.    
To demonstrate the benefits of our framework, we use two policy simulations to 
showcase how our models can help increase a gaming company’s revenue. We find that by 
increasing actively interacting dyads by 10% or increasing customers’ online time by 10%, the 
gaming company can boost its revenue by more than 40%.  
The benefits of our framework go beyond the gaming industry. Our findings shed light on 
customers’ social connections, interactions, and influences in the physical world. Prior research 
has shown that customers have similar motivations and behaviors in the virtual world of games 
and in the physical world of their daily lives (Bartle 2003; Malone 1981; Williams, Yee, and 
Caplan 2008). Researchers also have found that people tend to treat virtual products and physical 
products in similar ways and that the basic laws of supply-and-demand still apply. This explains 
why people are willing to pay real money for virtual products (Greengard 2011).4 Hence, our 
findings can help companies improve their CRM efficiency in the physical world by leveraging 
the power of relationships in a social network.  
Our findings are particularly relevant to the marketing of non-gaming digital products 
                                                 
3 “Behavioral” network characters are calculated from customers’ social interaction records, while “nominal” 
network characteristics are calculated from customers’ self-inputted registration records. Detailed explanation of 
these two concepts is given in the “Models” section. 
4 In fact, recently some companies have begun implementing multiplayer online games to train employees (Reeves 
and Read 2009) or motivate people to solve the real-world problems (McGonigal 2011). 
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such as eBooks and MP3 music tracks. Fairfield (2005) and Lehonvirta (2009) point out that 
virtual gaming products and non-gaming digital products are different in terms of the change of 
ownership that takes place during transactions. For instance, when a gamer gives or sells a 
virtual product to another gamer, she loses ownership of this product. However, when a customer 
gives or sells an MP3 track to another customer, she still owns the track after the transaction. 
Aside from this ownership issue, these two categories are similar in terms of product distribution 
and consumption. Especially for products for which sharing is allowed, our research can provide 
valuable insights into consumer purchases of these non-gaming digital products within a social 
network.5  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we review the relevant 
literature; then in section 3 we describe the data used in this research. Section 4 discusses the 
model specification. The estimation results are presented in section 5. In section 6 we run the 
robustness tests, cross-validations, causality inference, and policy simulations. In section 7 we 
conclude this paper with a discussion of the contributions and limitations of our research, and 
future research opportunities.  
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 This literature review focuses on three streams of literature around which we build our 
comprehensive framework: social interaction, social influence, and tie strength. 
Research on social interactions has a long history in marketing, sociology, and computer 
science. Most of this literature concentrates on the identification of social connections. For 
example, Iacobucci (1990) discusses various methods to identify social subgroups from 
sociometric data. Hoff, Raftery, and Handcock (2002) use a latent variable model to predict the 
                                                 
5 Barnes & Noble’s Nook and Amazon’s Kindle now allow their customers to share books with friends (but Apple 
still forbids the sharing of eBooks from the Apple Store). 
 7 
 
existence of relational ties. Ansari, Koenigsberg, and Stahl (2011) develop a framework to 
simultaneously model multiple relationships. Shriver, Nair, and Hofstetter (2011) discuss the 
self-reinforcing effects between the formation of social ties and the posting of self-generated 
content. Hartmann et al. (2008) discuss the modeling of active and passive social interactions. 
Literature on social influence is also rich. For instance, Nair, Manchanda, and Bhatia 
(2010) use linear models to investigate the asymmetric social influence of opinion leaders on 
physicians’ prescription behaviors. The authors detail their methods of inferring causality (peer 
effects) from the correlation of these behaviors. Christakis and Fowler (2007) use longitudinal 
models to analyze the spread of obesity through a social network. Trusov, Bodapati, and Bucklin 
(2010) use a Poisson regression model and a Bayesian shrinkage algorithm to analyze customers’ 
influence on each other’s log-on behaviors and to identify influential customers. Ma, Krishnan, 
and Montgomery (2011) use a hierarchical Bayesian model to investigate the impact of 
homophily6 and social influence on customers’ purchasing timing and product choice decisions. 
Narayan, Rao, and Saunders (2011) use a two-stage conjoint-based approach to model peer 
effects on customers’ preferences for product attributes in a social network. Leenders (2002) 
models social influence through network autocorrelation. Hartmann et al. (2008) discuss 
spillover and multiplier effects in social influence.   
A large portion of the tie strength literature focuses on the structural role of strong ties 
and weak ties in a social network. In his seminal paper, Granovetter (1973) elaborates the 
importance of weak ties. He finds that weak ties can serve as the “bridges” connecting isolated 
communities, which cluster together through strong ties. Recently, with increasingly available 
online social network data, researchers have found evidence to support Granovetter’s weak tie 
                                                 
6 In social science, homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001) usually refers to the fact that people with 
similar characteristics tend to form strong ties.    
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theory. For instance, Ferrar et al. (2012) use Facebook data to quantitatively assess the strength 
of weak ties. They find that weak ties provide better access to information and opportunities. 
Bakshy et al. (2012) run a large-scale field experiment on Facebook and find that weak ties are 
important for the spread of online information. Some researchers, on the other hand, have found 
that strong ties can be important under certain circumstances. For example, Farrow and Yuan 
(2011) find that tie strength has an influence on people’s attitudes and behaviors in the context of 
volunteerism and charity. 
   Most researchers identify strong and weak ties using simple metrics (Marsden and 
Campbell 1984). These metrics include time spent together (Granovetter 1973), communication 
frequency (Bakshy et al. 2012; Farrow and Yuan 2011), or “emotional closeness” determined 
through surveys (Farrow and Yuan 2011). Some researchers have adopted a modeling approach 
to measure tie strength as a function of parameters. For example, Iacobucci and Hopkins (1992) 
apply a log-linear model to a ܻ-array to estimate discrete level tie strength. With this technique, 
the authors predict the probability that actor ݅ is related to ݆ with strength ݇ and ݆ related to ݅ with 
strength ݈. Xiang, Neville, and Rogati (2010) propose a hierarchical model to obtain a latent, 
continuous tie strength measure. In their model, latent tie strength is constructed as a function of 
homophily parameters (e.g., living at the same location, going to the same school, the number of 
common friends) and is estimated from people’s interactions (e.g., communication, tagging).  
We found several relevant gaps in the literature. First, “group-to-one” social influence is 
an area that remains largely unexplored. Most of the social influence literature concentrates on 
“one-to-one” social influence (e.g., physician-physician, blogger-reader). However, such one-to-
one social influence might not be applicable in the context of virtual product purchasing, where 
an individual customer is usually immersed in the influence of a group of customers with whom 
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she interacts.  
Second, most of the literature does not incorporate the direction and strength of social 
relationships when measuring social influence. It remains unclear whether the social influence 
mechanism operates differently through strong ties and weak ties.  
Finally, the measurement of relationship strength has room for improvement. Using 
gaming data, we are able to develop a directional, continuous, and time-varying tie strength 
measure. In other words, this measure should contain as much information about the nature of 
the relationship as possible. It should also be the function of various relevant factors and should 
therefore enable us to understand the how these factors influence a customers’ relationships.    
To fill these gaps in the literature, we develop a comprehensive framework combining 
social interaction models, social influence models, and new measures of tie strength. We then 
use this framework to investigate group-to-one influence through strong ties and weak ties in the 
context of virtual product purchasing behavior.  
 
1.3 Data 
Data Source 
The data used in this research were provided by an online video game company in China. 
The company records every customer’s registration information and activity information. The 
registration information includes virtual demographic and social connection information. Two 
types of social connections exist in most online games: friendship and guild membership.7 
Customers become friends through an “invitation-confirmation” process (similar to Facebook). 
Any customer can form an online group called a “guild” and become its administrator.  
To advance in the game, customers must participate in a variety of activities to earn game 
                                                 
7 “Guild” is gaming jargon referring to online groups that customers form voluntarily. 
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money and obtain virtual goods. Most items can be purchased from virtual merchants or from 
other customers with game money.8 Special items (especially powerful items) can only be 
purchased with real cash.9 Customers have limited storage space in the game. If customers have 
more items than they can carry, they have three options to dispose of them: (1) sell the items to 
virtual merchants and get 25% of the items’ labeled value; (2) sell them to other customers; or (3) 
simply give away the items free of charge. Interestingly, according to the data, most of the 
exchanges (more than 95%) are free. Another interesting finding is that most customers naturally 
strike a balance between their giving and receiving activities. 
Observation Period 
Our data includes customer activities between February 22 and June 21, 2011 (exactly 
four months).10 The game, however, was launched at the end of December 2010. In other words, 
for customers who registered before February 22 and were still active during our observation 
period, we do not have a record of their activities prior to that day. This left truncation issue 
applies to about 39% of the customers and 22% of the dyads11 in our final sample.  The server 
was closed after June 21. Therefore, we are able to observe the true ending of all dyadic relations, 
and there is no right truncation issue.   
Multiple IDs 
No rule prevents the use of multiple IDs in a game. In fact this is a common practice 
among experienced game players. Customers use multiple IDs for three main reasons: (1) to gain 
more storage space, (2) to facilitate advancement in the game, and (3) to “gold dig.” In games 
                                                 
8 Game money circulates in the game and cannot be exchanged for real cash. 
9 Games are usually easy and absolutely free at the beginning. As the games progress, they become more and more 
challenging. After a certain stage, if players want to advance, they need particular powerful items that can only be 
purchased with cash. Without these items, customers can still advance, but it takes much more time and effort.  
10 Game data can be overwhelming because the system records all activities of all customers (accurate down to a 
second). The system of this game automatically backed up the data on a four-month rolling basis.  
11 In these dyads, both customers are truncated. 
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(especially the popular ones) groups of professional players (a.k.a. “gold diggers”) sometimes try 
to make real money from the game. They usually work in teams to obtain hard-to-get items and 
sell them to other players, under the table, for cash. These gold diggers tend to use multiple IDs 
to fetch valuable items and cover their traces. (Gold digging is forbidden in games.)  
Multiple IDs could contaminate the data and bias estimates. For instance, two customers 
who are identified as strongly tied might in fact be two IDs controlled by the same customer. To 
eliminate this problem, we detect multiple IDs by checking registration information and activity 
records.12 We then merge the multiple IDs held by the same customer and give this customer a 
new unique ID.  
Sampling the Social Network 
We construct our sample using two criteria. First, sampled customers must be regular 
customers (i.e., these customers must have log-in records documenting time spent in the game 
across a period of at least 30 days). Second, sampled customers must have interacted actively 
with others in the game (i.e., interacted with at least one other customer for at least four weeks). 
Our sample contains 181 customers, 2,524 directional sharing dyads, 1,315 non-directional pairs 
of friends, and 42 guilds. Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics of this social network. In Table 
1.2 we cross-tabulate membership in the friendship network against the sharing dyads network 
and find only a small overlap between these two networks. Thus, many players who registered as 
friends actually did not interact at all. Similarly, many customers who did interact were not 
friends. Thus, we include both friendship and interaction covariates in the model. 
  
                                                 
12 Most of the multiple ID holders are easy to pinpoint, because they either use the same user ID for multiple user 
names, or use IDs and names with similar combinations of letters and numbers. We also double-checked the activity 
records of some “suspects.” We doubt that professional gold diggers would target a small game like this one and 
then would use sophisticated approaches to cover their traces.  
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Table 1.1 
Descriptive Statistics of Sampled Customers 
Variable min max mean median std dev
Number of Friends 0.00 123.00 25.01  19.00 23.60 
Number Guilds Joined13  0.00 11.00 2.72  2.00 2.16 
Number of Sharing Dyads (In-Degree) 0.00 27.00 2.22  1.00 2.79 
Number of Sharing Dyads (Out-Degree) 0.00 21.00 2.22  1.00 2.67 
Online Time (Hours per Week) 0.00 167.55 31.89  13.09 41.71 
Number of Missions Accomplished per Week 0.00 533.00 19.17  1.00 47.35 
Tenure (Weeks in Game since Registration) 3.00 24.00 13.62  13.00 6.34 
Dyad Duration (Week) 1.00 18.00 3.24  1.00 3.51 
Weekly Sharing Frequency (of Sharing Customers) 1 472 4.64 2 11.70
Weekly Cash Payment (of Paying Customers, RMB) 14 2 13,064 745.50 294 1,567.33
 
 
Table 1.2 
Overlap between the Sharing Network and the Friendship Network 
Friendship  
Relationship 
Sharing Relationship 
No Yes Sub Total 
No 00.00%
669
33.72%
669 
33.72% 
Yes 72236.39%
593
29.89%
1,315 
66.28% 
Sub Total 72236.39%
1,262
63.61%
1,984 
100.00% 
 
 To ensure that the sampled customers are also valuable customers, we compare the 
payments made in real money by the customers in the sample and by those who played the game 
but were not included in our sample (hereafter, “out-of-sample”) (Figure 1.1).  
                                                 
13 We deleted all of the single-member guilds. 
14 1RMB ≈ 0.16USD 
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Figure 1.1 
Monetary Contribution by In-Sample Customers and Out-of-Sample Customers 
 
These box plots show that, on average, sampled customers made much higher contributions than 
the customers who were not sampled. The t-test shows that this difference is statistically 
significant: the mean payment of the sampled customers is $289.50 higher than that made by out-
of-sample customers (݌ ൏ 0.001ሻ. 
Zero-Inflated Data 
Sharing and payment observations are usually sparse in gaming data. In our sample, 
sharing did not happen in 48.01% of the dyad-week sharing observations. Payment observations 
are even less common: customers made no payments in 76.44% of the customer-week 
observations.  
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Note that our sample consists of active customers only (playing the game for at least 30 
days and interacting with at least one other customer for at least four weeks). If we were to look 
at the whole customer population, these two figures would be much lower (95-5 rule). Figure 1.2 
illustrates the sharing and payment pattern of a typical customer. 
Figure 1.2 
Sharing and Purchasing Behaviors of a Typical Customer 
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1.4 Models 
Framework 
Our framework has two interrelated components: a dyadic-level social interaction model 
and an individual-level revenue (social influence) model (Figure 1.3).   
Figure 1.3 
Research Framework 
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Customers’ cash payments are the most important revenue source for a gaming company. 
A company’s cash revenue from a game is the sum of all its customers’ cash payments across 
their tenures in the game: 
 Π ൌ ∑ ∑ ߨ௜௧೔்
ಷ
௧ୀ ೔்ೀ
ே௜ୀଵ . (1.1) 
Π is the company’s total cash revenue from the game, and ߨ௜௧ is the cash payment made by 
customer ݅ in week ݐ. ܰ is the total number of customers. ௜ܶை is the starting time of customer ݅’s 
tenure, and ௜ܶி is the ending time of customer ݅’s tenure.  
In our social influence model, customer ݅’s cash payment in week ݐ, ߨ௜௧ is described as 
the function of her individual characteristics, her social network characteristics, and her payment 
history. One novelty in this model is that we try to capture the group-to-one social influence of 
both strong ties and weak ties on her purchasing behaviors.  
In our social interaction model, we use customers’ sharing behaviors to gauge the 
strength of their relationships. We make this decision for three reasons: (1) Sharing is the true 
interaction between two customers and is well recorded; (2) sharing is directional, and the 
direction of sharing contains information about the relationship, such as favor and prestige 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994); and (3) sharing imposes opportunity costs on the givers. Giving an 
item to another customer for free means giving up 25% of the label price, which could be easily 
earned by selling this item to a virtual merchant. Thus, frequent sharing is an indicator of a close 
and friendly relationship.  
We use tie strength measures as a link between our social interaction and social influence 
models. With estimated coefficients of the social interaction model, we can calculate the tie 
strength within each dyad in each week. Using these measures, we are able to identify all strong 
ties and weak ties. Therefore, for each focal customer ݅, we cluster her active social ties into four 
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cohesion subgroups based on the direction and strength of the ties (Figure 1.4).  
Figure 1.4 
Cohesion Subgroups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We then generate various aggregate covariates of 
these four subgroups, which we then use in the social influence model to capture the group-to-
one influence. 
Modeling Issues 
Three modeling issues must be addressed in our research: zero-inflated data, dyadic 
interdependence, and temporal correlation. 
(1) Modeling zero-inflated data 
In our sample 48.01% of dyad-week sharing observations are 0, and 76.44% of customer-
week payment observations are 0. In such a case, even models with zero-inflated distributions 
(e.g., zero-inflated Poisson / negative binomial models) might not be sufficient. Therefore, we 
Strength 
Direction Strong Weak 
From ݅ ௌ்ܰሺ݅ ⋅, ݐሻ ܰௐ்ሺ݅ ⋅, ݐሻ
To ݅ ௌ்ܰሺ⋅ ݅, ݐሻ ܰௐ்ሺ⋅ ݅, ݐሻ
Customer i 
ܰௐ்ሺ݅ ⋅, ݐሻ ܰௐ்ሺ⋅ ݅, ݐሻ
ௌ்ܰሺ݅ ⋅, ݐሻ ௌ்ܰሺ⋅ ݅, ݐሻ
Strong Tie        Weak Tie    
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adopt a two-stage modeling approach (Ansari, Koenigsberg, and Stahl 2011; Gelman and Hill 
2007).15 First, we model the dyads’ sharing decisions (binary) with a logit model; then, for those 
dyads that do share items, we analyze their weekly sharing frequency using a Poisson regression 
model.16 Similarly, we analyze customers’ payment decisions with a logit model; then, for 
customers who do make payments, we analyze their payment amounts with a lognormal 
regression model. In addition to its convenience in modeling zero-inflated data, this approach 
also gives us more flexibility. We can use different sets of covariates to separately model the 
decisions and the counts (amounts).    
(2) Modeling dyadic interdependence 
Dyadic interdependence is a critical issue in social network modeling. Obviously, the 
interactions in dyad 〈݅, ݆〉 and 〈݆, ݇〉 are not independent, because these two dyads share the same 
customer ݆. Therefore their error terms in the models are correlated. To address this issue, we use 
a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) with “sender” and “receiver” random effects 
(intercepts). Conditional on these random effects, the likelihood of dyads can be considered 
independent (Hoff 2003; McCulloch and Searle 2001).  
Formally, in the dyadic interaction case, if we define 〈ܻ௜,௝〉 as the random variable of 
interaction from customer ݅ to customer ݆ ( 〈ܻ௜,௝〉 could be a binary or a count variable), ߛ〈௜,௝〉 ൌ
ܽ௜ ൅ ௝ܾ ൅ ߳௜௝, ߳௜௝~ܰሺ0, ߪఊଵଶ ሻ as the random effect with ݅ as “sender” and ݆ as “receiver”, and ௒݂ 
as the density of 〈ܻ௜,௝〉, then—conditional on random effect ߛ〈௜,௝〉—the distribution of 〈ܻ௜,௝〉 could 
be considered independent (i.e., conditional independence):    
 ݕ〈௜,௝〉|ߛ〈௜,௝〉~indep. ௒݂〈೔,ೕ〉|ఊ〈೔,ೕ〉൫ݕ〈௜,௝〉|ߛ〈௜,௝〉൯.  (1.2) 
                                                 
15 Statisticians also call it “two-part” model (Duan et al. 1983). 
16 We also tried using a negative binomial distribution (NBD) model; we found that it returns very similar results, 
but the algorithm takes a much longer time to converge. Trusov, Bodapati, and Bucklin (2010) have a similar 
finding. 
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When modeling individual customer’s payments, we still face the interdependence issue. 
The error terms of customers who are involved in dyadic relations might be correlated as well. In 
a similar vein, we use GLMM with individual random effects (intercepts) to control for such 
dependence. Hence, we model individual customer’s payments as 
 ݕ௜|ߛ௜~indep. ௒݂೔|ఊ೔ሺݕ௜|ߛ௜ሻ, (1.3) 
where ௜ܻ is the payment variable of customer ݅ (payment decision or payment amount), and  
ߛ௜ ൌ ܽ௜ ൅ ߳௜, ߳௜~ܰሺ0, ߪఊଶଶ ሻ is the random effect term of customer ݅. 
(3) Modeling temporal correlation 
Individuals and dyads in our data are measured repeatedly during their stay in the game. 
Therefore, the observations could be correlated across time. To address this issue, we introduce 
cumulative terms with time-diminishing effects into all four models, following Guadagni and 
Little (1983) and Trusov, Bodapati, and Bucklin (2010). For dyadic interactions, we define the 
cumulative interaction term at time ݐ as 
 〈ܺ௜,௝〉௧௉ ൌ ∑ 〈ܺ௜,௝〉௧ିௗ ⋅ ߠሺ݀, ߩሻ஽ௗୀଵ , (1.4) 
where 	ߠሺ݀, ߩሻ is the weight; ݀ is the time lag; and ߩ is the time-diminishing effect parameter. 
〈ܺ௜,௝〉௧ is dyad 〈݅, ݆〉’s interaction (decision/count) at time ݐ, and ܦ is the width of the time window. 
Similarly, the cumulative term for the individual customer’s payment decision and payment 
amount are calculated by  
 ௜ܺ௧௉ ൌ ∑ ௜ܺ,௧ିௗ ⋅ ߠሺ݀, ߩሻ஽ௗୀଵ , (1.5) 
where ௜ܺ௧ is customer ݅’s payment decision/amount at time ݐ.  
We define the time window as ܦ ൌ 5, because most of the dyadic relations lasted five 
weeks or shorter. The weight ߠሺ݀, ߩሻ is calculated by 
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 ߠሺ݀, ߩሻ ൌ expሺെ݀ ⋅ ߩሻ∑ exp ሺെ݈ ⋅ ߩሻ஽௟ୀଵ . (1.6) 
Note that ∑ ߠሺ݀, ߩሻ ൌ 1஽ௗୀଵ . ߩ is a model parameter to be estimated. Different ߩ values yield 
different schemes to weigh the past interactions or payments. From Figure 1.5 we see that when 
ߩ ൌ 0, we get ߠሺ1, ߩሻ ൌ ⋯ ൌ ߠሺܦ, ߩሻ ൌ 1/ܦ. In this case, customers have a “long memory” 
about their past activities, and past activities have equal impact on their current activities. When 
ߩ ൒ 5.0, we have ߠሺ1, ߩሻ ൎ 1, ߠሺ2, ߩሻ ൎ 0,⋯ , ߠሺܦ, 5ሻ ൎ 0, which means that customers have a 
“short memory”: only the most recent activities affect their current activities.  
Figure 1.5 
Time-Diminishing Effects 
 
To simplify the estimation, instead of estimating ߩ jointly with other parameters, we estimate the 
model over a grid of ߩ from 0 to 5.  This is possible because if the ߩ value changes, it only 
affects the value of this cumulative term, not other covariates. We draw the grid with ߩ from 0 to 
5 and calculate the value of that cumulative term at each point of the grid. We choose the optimal 
ߩ value that yields the best model fit according to log likelihood, Akaike information criterion 
(AIC), and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) measures.  
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Model Specification 
We develop four models ሺ݉ ൌ 1,⋯ ,4ሻ in our framework. All four models are 
generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) with different types of distributions and random 
effects terms (Table 1.3).  
Table 1.3 
Models 
Model Domain Outcome Scale Distribution 
1 Sharing Sharing decision 
ݕ〈௜,௝〉௧ௌ ൌ ൜1, ݏ݄ܽݎ݁0, ݋. ݓ.  
Binary Logistic 
2 Sharing Weekly sharing frequency 
ݕ〈௜,௝〉௧ௌி  
Count Poisson 
3 Payment Payment decision 
ݕ௜௧௉ ൌ ൜1, ݌ܽݕ0, ݋. ݓ. 
Binary Logistic 
4 Payment Payment amount 
ݕ௜௧௉஺ 
Continuous 
(൒ 0) 
Lognormal 
 
Model 1 - Sharing Decision Model 
We model dyad 〈݅, ݆〉’s sharing decision (݅’s decision to give items to ݆) with a logit 
model. We define customer ݅’s utility gained from her giving items to customer ݆ as 
 ݑ〈௜,௝〉௧ௌ ൌ ࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧஺ሾଵሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼ஺ሾଵሿ ൅ ࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧ுሾଵሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼுሾଵሿ ൅ ࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧௉ሾଵሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼ௉ሾଵሿᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௙௜௫௘ௗ	௘௙௙௘௖௧௦
൅ ܽ௜ሾଵሿ ൅ ௝ܾሾଵሿᇣᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇥ
௥௔௡ௗ௢௠ ௘௙௙௘௖௧௦
൅ ߳௜௝௧ሾଵሿต
௘௥௥௢௥
. (1.7) 
The sharing decision is 
ݕ〈௜,௝〉௧ௌ ൌ ቊ1, ݑ〈௜,௝〉௧
ௌ ൐ 0
0, ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁	. 
 The covariates used in this model are listed in Table 1.4. 
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Table 1.4 
Covariates Used in Models 1 and 2 
Covariates Type 
Model 
Description 
1 2 
ࢄ஺ 
ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜⋅,௧ Generosity x  The number of customers excluding ݆ who receive items from ݅ in week ݐ 
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜⋅,௧ Generosity  x The number of times ݅ gives items to customers excluding ݆ in week ݐ 
ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝⋅,௧ Generosity x  The number of customers excluding ݅ to whom ݆ gives items in week ݐ 
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝⋅,௧ Generosity  x The number of times ݆ gives items to customers excluding ݅ in week ݐ 
ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௜,௧ Popularity x  The number of customers excluding ݆ from whom ݅ gets items in week ݐ 
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௜,௧ Popularity  x The number of times ݅ receives items from customers excluding ݆ in week ݐ 
ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௝,௧ Popularity x  The number of customers excluding ݅ from whom ݆ gets items in week ݐ 
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௝,௧ Popularity  x The number of times ݆ receives items from customers excluding ݅ in week ݐ 
log	ሺܨ݄݅݃ݐ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௧ሻ Devotion x x The log count of customer ݅’s “monster fights” in week ݐ 
log	ሺܨ݄݅݃ݐ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝௧ሻ Devotion x x The log count of customer ݆’s “monster fights” in week ݐ 
ܮܽݏݐ_2ܹ Event x x The indicator of week 24 and week 25 of 2011 
ࢄு 
ܨݎ݅݁݊݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௧ Nominal network x x The number of friends ݅ has in week ݐ 
ܨݎ݅݁݊݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝௧ Nominal network x x The number of friends ݆ has in week ݐ 
ܥ݋݉݉݋݊_ܨݎ݅݁݊݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝௧ Nominal network x x The number of ݅ and ݆’s common friends in week ݐ 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௧ Nominal network x x The number of guilds that ݅ has joined in week ݐ 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝௧ Nominal network x x The number of guilds that ݆ has joined in week ݐ 
ܥ݋݉݉݋݊_ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝௧ Nominal network x x The number of guilds that ݅ and ݆ have joined together in week ݐ 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܮ݁ܽ݀݁ݎ௜௧ Nominal network x x The indicator of whether ݅ is the leader of any guilds in week ݐ 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܮ݁ܽ݀݁ݎ௝௧ Nominal network x x The indicator of whether ݆ is the leader of any guilds in week ݐ 
ܦݕܽ݀_ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧ Behavioral network  x x The number of weeks since ݅ and ݆’s first interaction 
ܦݕܽ݀_ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௧ଶ  Behavioral network  x x The squared term of dyad duration 
ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜௧ Behavioral network   x Customer ݅’s tenure in week ݐ 
ܶ݁݊ݑݎ ௝݁௧ Behavioral network   x Customer ݆’s tenure in week ݐ 
ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁_ܦ݂݅ ௜݂௝ Behavioral network  x  The gap between ݅ and ݆’s tenures (ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜௧ െ ܶ݁݊ݑݎ ௝݁௧) 
ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁_ܣݒ ௜݃௝௧ Behavioral network  x  The average of ݅ and ݆’s tenures in week ݐ	ሺሺܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜௧ ൅ ܶ݁݊ݑݎ ௝݁௧ሻ/2ሻ 
ܮ݁ݒ݈݁௜௧ Behavioral network   x Customer ݅’s level in week ݐ 
ܮ݁ݒ݁ ௝݈௧ Behavioral network   x Customer ݆’s level in week ݐ 
ܱ݈݊݅݊݁_ܶ݅݉݁_ܱݒ݁ݎ݈ܽ݌_ܲܿ݊ݐ௜௝௧ Behavioral network  x x The % of time when ݅ and ݆ stay in the game simultaneously in week ݐ 
ܲܭ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝௧ Behavioral network  x x The number of “personal killings” that ݅ and ݆ finished in week ݐ 
ܯ݅ݏݏ݅݋݊_݈ܵ݅݉݅ܽݎ݅ݐݕ௜௝௧ Behavioral network   x The % of unique missions customer ݅ and ݆ participate together in week ݐ 
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Table 1.4 (Continued) 
Covariates Type 
Model 
Description 
1 2 
ࢄ௉  
ܥݑ݉_݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܹܭ௜௝௧ሺߩௌ ሻ Interaction history x  The cumulative number of weeks in which ݅ gives items to ݆ during the past five weeks, calculated with time-diminishing parameter ߩௌ  
ܥݑ݉_݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܹܭ௝௜௧ሺߩோௌሻ Interaction history x  The cumulative number of weeks in which ݆ gives items to ݅ during the past five weeks, calculated with time-diminishing parameter ߩோௌ 
ܥݑ݉_݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝௧ሺߩௌிሻ Interaction history  x The cumulative number of times ݅ gives items to ݆ during the past five weeks, calculated with time-diminishing parameter ߩௌி 
ܥݑ݉_݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝௜௧ሺߩோௌிሻ Interaction history  x The cumulative number of times ݅ receives items from ݆ during the past five weeks, calculated with time-diminishing parameter ߩோௌி 
 
 ࢄ௜௝௧஺ሾଵሿ is the vector of auxiliary covariates, which includes two generosity covariates, two 
popularity covariates, two devotion covariates, and one event covariate. We use these auxiliary 
covariates to control for the factors that have an impact on customers’ interactions but have 
nothing to do with their relationship strength. For instance, if we observe that customer ݅ gives 
items to customer ݆, it does not necessarily mean that ݅ has a strong relationship with ݆. ݅ could be 
generous (i.e., ݅ gives items to many people at the same time, not just ݆), and/or ݆ could be 
popular (i.e.,  ݆ receives items from many people other than ݅ at the same time). We use 
generosity and popularity covariates to control for such effects. Also, if customers were active 
and diligent in the game, they would have more chances to interact and share items with other 
players. We use the log count of “monster fights”17 to capture such a devotion effect. The event 
covariate ܮܽݏݐ_2ܹ is used to capture the change in customer interaction behaviors in weeks 24 
and 25, the final two weeks before the server was shut down.  
 ࢄ௜௝௧ுሾଵሿ is the vector of homophily covariates, which captures the effect of demographic 
and behavioral similarity between the two customers in the dyad. The nominal network 
covariates are calculated from customers’ registration information (friendship and guild 
membership). The behavioral network covariates are calculated from customers’ interaction 
                                                 
17 “Monster fight” is gaming jargon that refers to the fight between players and virtual figures in the game. 
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records.     
 ࢄ௜௝௧௉ሾଵሿ is the vector of cumulative past interactions. ܥݑ݉_ܶݎܽ݀݁_ܹܭ௜௝௧ሺߩௌ ሻ captures 
customer ݅’s “inertia” of interaction with customer ݆. ܥݑ݉_ܶݎܽ݀݁_ܹܭ௝௜௧ሺߩோௌሻ measures the 
impact of ݆’s “reciprocity” on ݅’s interaction decisions. Both covariates are calculated using 
equations (4) and (5). We estimate the model over a grid of ߩௌ  and ߩோௌ and choose the 
combination of ߩௌ  and ߩோௌ that yields the best model fit. 
Model 2 - Sharing Frequency Model 
We model dyad 〈݅, ݆〉’s sharing frequency in week ݐ using a Poisson distribution with a 
log link function. In our specification, conditioning on the random effects ߛ〈௜,௝〉 ൌ ܽ௜ ൅ ௝ܾ, the 
weekly count of sharing in dyad 〈݅, ݆〉 follows independent Poisson distribution: 
 
௒݂〈೔,ೕ〉೟|ఊ〈೔,ೕ〉ሺݕ〈௜,௝〉௧ௌி |܆〈௜,௝〉௧ሾଶሿ , ࢼሾଶሿ, ࢽ௜௝ሾଶሿሻ ൌ
௘షഋ〈೔,ೕ〉೟ൈ൫ఓ〈೔,ೕ〉೟൯೤〈೔,ೕ〉೟
ೄಷ
௬〈೔,ೕ〉೟ೄಷ !
, (1.8) 
and the mean of the Poisson distribution is parameterized as 
												ߤ〈௜,௝〉௧ ൌ expቌࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧஺ሾଶሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼ஺ሾଶሿ ൅ ࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧ுሾଶሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼுሾଶሿ ൅ ࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧௉ሾଶሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼ௉ሾଶሿᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௙௜௫௘ௗ	௘௙௙௘௖௧௦
൅ ܽ௜ሾଶሿ ൅ ௝ܾሾଶሿᇣᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇥ
௥௔௡ௗ௢௠	௘௙௙௘௖௧௦
൅
߳௜௝௧ሾଶሿต
௘௥௥௢௥
ቇ. 
(1.9) 
   
Table 1.4 displays all the covariates used in this model. ࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧஺ሾଶሿ  is almost the same as 
ࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧஺ሾଵሿ . The only difference is that we replace dyad count covariates ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜⋅,௧,⋯, 
ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௝,௧ with sharing count covariates ݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜⋅,௧,⋯, ݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௝,௧. The 
purpose remains the same: to capture the impact of “generosity” and “popularity” factors on 
customers’ sharing frequency. 
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Compared with ࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧ுሾଵሿ , in ࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧ுሾଶሿ  we replace ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁_ܦ݂݅ ௜݂௝ and ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁_ܣݒ ௜݃௝௧ with 
ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜௧ and ܶ݁݊ݑݎ ௝݁௧. We also add two new covariates: ܮ݁ݒ݈݁௜௧ and ܮ݁ݒ݁ ௝݈௧, which are 
customer ݅ and ݆’s experience levels in week ݐ. Moreover, we replace ܲܭ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝௧ with a 
behavioral similarity covariate ܯ݅ݏݏ݅݋݊_ܵ݅݉௜௝௧. It is defined as ெ௜௦௦௜௢௡_஼௢௨௡௧೔ೕ೟ெ௜௦௦௜௢௡_஼௢௨௡௧೔೟ାெ௜௦௦௜௢௡_஼௢௨௡௧ೕ೟, 
where ܯ݅ݏݏ݅݋݊_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௧ and ܯ݅ݏݏ݅݋݊_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝௧ are the numbers of unique missions customer ݅ 
and ݆ joined in week ݐ; ܯ݅ݏݏ݅݋݊_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝௧ is the number of unique missions ݅ and ݆ joined in 
together at the same time within week ݐ. We use this covariate as a proxy of customers’ 
interactions in the missions.18      
Different from ࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧௉ሾଵሿ , in ࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧௉ሾଶሿ  we use cumulative sharing count covariates 
ܥݑ݉_݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝௧ሺߩௌிሻ and ܥݑ݉_݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝௜௧ሺߩோௌிሻ, because they work well to predict 
weekly sharing frequency. They are calculated using equations (4) and (5). We determine the 
values of ߩௌி and ߩோௌி following our methods for determining the values of  ߩௌ  and ߩோௌ (i.e., grid 
search). 
Identification of Strong / Weak Ties 
After estimating Models 1 and 2, we then use the estimated coefficients of homophily 
and interaction history parameters to calculate two tie strength measures: 
 ܴ 〈ܵ௜,௝〉௧ଵ ൌ exp ቀࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧ுሾଵሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼ෡ுሾଵሿ ൅ ࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧௉ሾଵሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼ෡௉ሾଵሿቁ
ܴ 〈ܵ௜,௝〉௧ଶ ൌ exp ቀࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧ுሾଶሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼ෡ுሾଶሿ ൅ ࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧௉ሾଶሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼ෡௉ሾଶሿቁ, 
(1.10) 
   
where ࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧ுሾ௠ሿ and ࢄ〈௜,௝〉௧௉ሾ௠ሿ are the data vectors of Model ݉; ࢼ෡ுሾ௠ሿ and  ࢼ෡௉ሾ௠ሿ are the vectors of the 
                                                 
18 In our data we can track whether two customers participated in the same mission at the same time and location. 
However, we still lack the direct evidence that these two customers were indeed interacting in the game.  
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estimated coefficients of Model ݉, ݉ ൌ 1, 2.19 ܴ 〈ܵ௜,௝〉௧ଵ  measures dyad 〈݅, ݆〉’s tie strength in 
terms of the customers’ propensity to interact; and ܴ 〈ܵ௜,௝〉௧ଶ  measures tie strength in terms of the 
customers’ interaction frequency when they decide to interact. 
After calculating tie strength measures, we use the following rule to identify the strong 
and weak ties (Figure 1.6): in each week we use the ܴܵଵ and ܴܵଶ measures to pick out the two 
sets of top 25 percentile20 dyads. The dyads at the intersection of these two sets are marked as 
strong ties in that week.  
Figure 1.6 
The Identification of Strong/Weak Ties 
 
The rationale for this approach is that a dyad with a strong relationship is more likely to 
interact and at a higher frequency than a dyad with a weak relationship. If Models 1 and 2 are 
well specified and estimated,21 the dyads labeled as strong ties should have a significantly higher 
likelihood of social interactions and higher interaction frequency than other dyads.    
                                                 
19 We only include the significant coefficients in our calculation. 
20 We experimented with various cutoff values: top 10, 25, and 50 percentile. We found that the top 25 percentile 
value had the best distinguishing power.  
21 By “well specified and estimated” we mean the model should yield good goodness-of-it according to criteria such 
as likelihood, AIC, and BIC. 
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 After strong ties and weak ties are identified in each week and for each individual 
customer, we cluster each customer’s active social ties into four cohesion subgroups (Figure 1.4). 
Here we only count the active ties. In other words, sharing behaviors must be observed in these 
ties. We then move on to generate various aggregate-level sharing and payment covariates of 
these four subgroups, which we then use in Model 3 and Model 4.  
Model 3 – Purchase Decision Model 
We model customer ݅’s cash purchase decision with a logit model. We define customer 
݅’s utility gained from her cash payment decision as  
 ݑ௜௧௉ ൌ ࢄ௜௧ூሾଷሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼூሾଷሿ ൅ ࢄ௜௧ேሾଷሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼேሾଷሿ ൅ ࢄ௜௧஻ሾଷሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼ஻ሾଷሿ ൅ ࢄ௜௧௉ሾଷሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼ௉ሾଷሿᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௙௜௫௘ௗ	௘௙௙௘௖௧௦
൅
ܽ௜ሾଷሿต
௥௔௡ௗ௢௠ ௘௙௙௘௖௧௦
൅ ߳௜௧ሾଷሿต
௘௥௥௢௥
. 
(1.11) 
   
The purchase decision is 
ݕ௜௧௉ ൌ ൜1, ݑ௜௧
௉ ൐ 0
0, ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁	. 
Table 1.5 shows the covariates used in Model 3. 
ࢄ௜௧ூሾଷሿ is the vector of individual characteristics. These covariates capture the impact of a 
customer’s experience (duration of game play and level within the game) on her purchase 
decisions. ࢄ௜௧ேሾଷሿ is the vector of nominal network characteristics. We use these covariates to 
analyze the impact of friends and guilds. ࢄ௜௧஻ሾଷሿ is the vector of behavioral network characteristics. 
These covariates will help us understand the influence of actively interacting customers. The 
vector of past payment decisions ࢄ௜௧௉ሾଷሿ has one covariate: ܥݑ݉_ܲܽ݅݀_ܹܭ௜௧ሺߩ௉ ሻ. It is calculated 
with equation (1.4) and (1.5), using the time-diminishing coefficient ߩ௉ . We estimate Model 3 
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on a grid of ߩ௉  and choose the ߩ௉ 	 value that leads to the best model fit. 
 
Table 1.5 
Covariates Used in Models 3 and 4 
Covariates Type 
Model 
Description 
3 4 
ࢄூ 
ܮ݁ݒ݈݁௜௧ Individual characteristics x x Customer ݅’s average level in week ݐ 
ܯ݅ݏݏ݅݋݊_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௧ Individual characteristics x x The number of missions customer ݅ finishes in week ݐ 
ܱ݈݊݅݊݁_ܶ݅݉݁௜௧ሺ݄ݎሻ Individual characteristics x x The total time (hours) customer ݅ spends in the game in week ݐ 
ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜௧ Individual characteristics x x Customer ݅’s tenure up until week ݐ 
ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜௧ଶ Individual characteristics x x The squared term of customer ݅’s tenure 
ܮܽݏݐ_2ܹ Event x x The indicator of week 24 and week 25 
ࢄே 
ܨݎ݅݁݊݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௧ Nominal network  x x The number of friends customer ݅ has made up until week ݐ 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ_ܮ௜௧ Nominal network x x The number of guilds that customer ݅ leads in week ݐ 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܯܾ݁݉݁ݎ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ_ܮ௜௧ Nominal network x x The total size of the guilds that customer ݅ leads in week ݐ 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ_ܯ௜௧ Nominal network x x The number of guilds that ݅ has joined as a member up until week ݐ 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܯܾ݁݉݁ݎ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ_ܯ௜௧ Nominal network x x The total size of the guilds that ݅ has joined as a member up until week ݐ 
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜⋅,௧ሺܵܶሻ Behavioral network x  The number of strong ties from customer ݅ to other customers 
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜⋅,௧ሺܹܶሻ Behavioral network x  The number of actively-sharing weak ties from customer ݅ to other customers in week ݐ 
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௜,௧ሺܵܶሻ Behavioral network x  The number of active strong ties from other customers to customer ݅ in week ݐ 
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௜,௧ሺܹܶሻ Behavioral network x  The number of active weak ties from other customers to ݅ in week ݐ 
ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜⋅,௧ሺܵܶሻ Behavioral network  x The total amount of cash payments in week ݐ made by customers who have active strong ties from customer ݅ in week ݐ 
ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜⋅,௧ሺܹܶሻ Behavioral network  x The total amount of cash payments in week ݐ made by customers who have active weak ties from customer ݅ in week ݐ 
ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ⋅௜,௧ሺܵܶሻ Behavioral network  x The total amount of cash payments in week ݐ made by customers who have active strong ties toward customer ݅ in week ݐ 
ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ⋅௜,௧ሺܹܶሻ Behavioral network  x The total amount of cash payments in week ݐ made by customers who have active weak ties toward customer ݅ in week ݐ 
ࢄ௉ 
ܥݑ݉_ܲܽ݅݀௜௧ሺߩ௉ ሻ Payment history x  The cumulative number of weeks in which customer ݅ make cash payments during the past five weeks, calculated with time-diminishing parameter ߩ௉
ܥݑ݉_ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜௧ሺߩ௉஺ሻ Payment history  x The cumulative payments made by customer ݅ during the past five weeks, calculated with time-diminishing parameter ߩ௉஺ 
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Model 4 – Payment Amount Model 
We model customer ݅’s weekly cash payment amount (if she pays) with a lognormal 
model. Conditioning on the random effect ܽ௜,  
 y୧୲୔୅|X୧୲ሾସሿ, βሾସሿ, γ୧ሾସሿ~i. i. d. lognormalሺμ୧୲୔୅, σ୔୅ଶ ሻ,     (1.12) 
and  
 ߤ௜௧௉஺ ൌ ࢄ௜௧ூሾସሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼூሾସሿ ൅ ࢄ௜௧ேሾସሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼேሾସሿ ൅ ࢄ௜௧஻ሾସሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼ஻ሾସሿ ൅ ࢄ௜௧௉ሾସሿ
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼ௉ሾସሿᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௙௜௫௘ௗ	௘௙௙௘௖௧௦
൅
ܽ௜ሾସሿต
௥௔௡ௗ௢௠௘ ௘௙௙௘௖௧௦
൅ ߳௜௧ሾସሿต
௘௥௥௢௥
. 
(1.13) 
Table 1.5 describes the covariates used in Model 4. The vector of individual 
characteristics, ࢄ௜௧ூሾସሿ, is the same as ࢄ௜௧ூሾଷሿ; and the vector of nominal network characteristics, 
ࢄ௜௧ேሾସሿ, is the same as ࢄ௜௧ேሾଷሿ. In ࢄ௜௧஻ሾସሿ, the vector of behavioral network characteristics, we use the 
aggregate weekly payment made by the four cohesion subgroups to capture the group-to-one 
influence on customers’ payment amounts. The cumulative past payment vector ࢄ௜௧௉ሾସሿ has one 
covariate: ܥݑ݉_ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜௧ሺߩ௉஺ሻ. It is calculated with the time-diminishing coefficient ߩ௉஺. 
Similarly, we estimate Model 4 on a grid of ߩ௉஺, then choose the ߩ௉஺ value that yields the best 
model fit. 
 
1.5 Estimation 
 The three most commonly used methods to estimate generalized linear mixed models 
(GLMMs) are maximized likelihood (ML), penalized quasi-likelihood (PQL-1), and Markov 
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2010). We use SAS’s GLIMMIX 
procedure with Laplace approximation (SAS 2011) to estimate all four models for three reasons. 
First, compared to other estimation methods (ML and MCMC), the approximation method used 
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in GLIMMIX is much faster. This is particularly important for us when we cross-validate our 
models, because we use a time-intensive algorithm. Second, compared to other approximation 
algorithms (e.g., pseudo-likelihood method or maximum likelihood with adaptive quadrature), 
although Laplace algorithm is slower to converge, it is more accurate and robust (Rabe-Hesketh 
and Skrondal 2010). Third, unlike pseudo-likelihood algorithms, the Laplace algorithm reports 
log likelihood and various goodness-of-fit measures such as AIC and BIC, which enable us to 
compare the models easily.  
We estimate each of the four models (Models 1–4) in four steps (A–D). At each step we 
add in one type of parameter and compare the results (see Table 1.6).  
Table 1.6 
Model Estimation Results 
(1) Dyadic Level Models 
 
Model 
Covariates Goodness-of-Fit 
 Auxiliary Nominal Network 
Behavioral 
Network 
Interaction 
History 
-2Log 
Likelihood AIC BIC
Sharing 
Decision 
1A x    10720.54 10740.54 10720.54
1B x x   10565.51 10609.51 10565.51
1C x x x  10381.91 10429.91 10381.91
1D x x x x 10042.60 10094.60 10042.60
Sharing 
Frequency 
2A x    31523.03 31543.03 31523.03
2B x x   30126.13 30174.13 30126.13
2C x x x  28826.97 28878.97 28826.97
2D x x x x 28668.74 28724.74 28668.74
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Table 1.6 (Continued) 
(2) Individual Level Models 
 
Model 
Covariates Goodness-of-Fit 
 Individual 
Characteristics 
Nominal 
Network 
Behavioral 
Network 
Payment 
History 
-2Log 
Likelihood AIC BIC
Payment 
Decision 
3A x    1699.84 1715.84 1741.43
3B x x   1683.88 1709.88 1751.46
3C x x x  1657.80 1691.80 1746.17
3D x x x x 1636.22 1672.22 1729.79
Payment 
Amount 
4A x    1624.90 1642.90 1669.18
4B x x   1625.17 1653.17 1694.05
4C x x x  1576.02 1612.02 1664.58
4D x x x x 1560.13 1598.13 1653.61
 
At Step A we only consider the individual characteristics. At Step B we add the social 
network information obtained from customer registration data. At Step C we include the social 
network information calculated from customer social interaction data. Finally, at Step D we 
consider customer interaction and payment history. This stepwise approach enables us to check 
the power of different types of covariates to explain the variation in customer social interaction 
and purchasing behavior. Table 1.6 shows that the full models (Models 1D, 2D, 3D, 4D) yield 
the best fit according to log likelihood, AIC, and BIC measures. Therefore in subsequent 
subsections we only report the estimation results of full models. The full results of this section 
are available from the authors upon request.  
Model 1. Sharing Decisions 
Table 1.7 displays the results from Model 1. Generosity, popularity, and reciprocity have 
a significant impact on customers’ sharing decisions. ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜⋅ and ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௝  are 
significant and positive. This tells us that if customer ݅ were generous and/or customer ݆ were 
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popular, then it is more likely that ݅ would give items to ݆. ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௜ (customer ݅’s 
popularity) is slightly significant and negative. This can be explained by reciprocity: if ݅ received 
items from many other customers, she would have reciprocated the favor and given other items 
to those customers. Therefore she would be less likely to give items to ݆. ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝⋅	 (݆’s 
generosity) is not significant in all four models. This is because usually ݅ could not observe ݆ 
giving items to others; therefore it had no impact on ݅’s sharing decisions.  
Table 1.7 
Sharing Decision Model (Model 1D) Estimation Results 
݄ܵܽݎ݅݊݃	ܦ݁ܿݏ݅݋݊	݋݂	〈݅, ݆〉  Variable Type Mean	 STD 
ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜⋅ Generosity 0.04857 .015 ***
ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝⋅ Generosity -0.01376 .015 
ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௜ Popularity -0.03126 .013 **
ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௝ Popularity 0.03878 .013 ***
log	ሺܨ݄݅݃ݐ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜ሻ Devotion -0.00352 .011 
log	ሺܨ݄݅݃ݐ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝ሻ Devotion 0.06707 .011 ***
ܮܽݏݐ_2ܹ Event 0.886 .177 ***
ܨݎ݅݁݊݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜ Nominal Network -0.00913 .003 ***
ܨݎ݅݁݊݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝ Nominal Network -0.01028 .003 ***
ܥ݋݉݉݋݊_ܨݎ݅݁݊݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝ Nominal Network 0.00093 .007 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜ Nominal Network -0.03411 .022 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝ Nominal Network -0.01222 .023 
ܥ݋݉݉݋݊_ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝ Nominal Network 0.05099 .030 * 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܮ݁ܽ݀݁ݎ௜ Nominal Network -0.01658 .115 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܮ݁ܽ݀݁ݎ௝ Nominal Network -0.226 .122 * 
ܦݕܽ݀_ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝ Behavioral Network -0.5582 .033 ***
ܦݕܽ݀_ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝ଶ 				   Behavioral Network 0.03381 .002 ***
ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁_ܦ݂݅ ௜݂௝ Behavioral Network -0.01635 .008 **
ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁_ܣݒ݃௜௝ Behavioral Network 0.03317 .011 ***
ܱ݈݊݅݊݁_ܶ݅݉݁_ܱݒ݁ݎ݈ܽ݌_ܲܿ݊ݐ௜௝ Behavioral Network 2.7665 .285 ***
ܲܭ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝ Behavioral Network 0.03003 .006 ***
ܥݑ݉_ܶݎܽ݀݁_ܹܭ௜௝ (Best model fit at ߩௌ ൌ 0) Interaction History 1.4495 .191 ***
ܥݑ݉_ܶݎܽ݀݁_ܹܭ௝௜ (Best model fit at ߩோௌ ൌ 0) Interaction History 1.1404 .184 ***
***݌ ൏ 0.01; **݌ ൏ 0.05; *݌ ൏ 0.10 
  
Second, devoted, actively interacting customers were more likely to share items with 
each other. We can tell this by the positive signs on the devotion covariate ln	ሺܨ݄݅݃ݐ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝ሻ 
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and on the behavioral similarity covariates ܱ݈݊݅݊݁_ܶ݅݉݁_ܱݒ݁ݎ݈ܽ݌_ܲܿ݊ݐ௜௝ and ܲܭ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝. 
This result is not surprising because actively interacting customers tended to spend more time 
together. They had more opportunities to see each other’s belongings and exchange information 
and were thus more likely to share items. 
 Third, customers’ propensity to share items decreased with the duration of the 
relationship and their tenures in the game. The signs and scales of ܦݕܽ݀_ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊ and 
ܦݕܽ݀_ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊ଶ tell us that dyad duration has a negative impact on the probability of sharing, 
unless the relationship lasted a long time (longer than eight weeks). However, because the 
average dyad duration in the game was merely 3.24 weeks, most customers were less and less 
likely to share with the passage of time. We also find that an experience gap reduced customers’ 
willingness to share (ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁_ܦ݂݂݅ has a negative sign). This result is not surprising because 
newcomers likely had few chances to interact with veterans. However, if both customers were 
experienced, they were more likely to share items (ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁_ܣݒ݃ has a positive sign). 
Interestingly, ܮܽݏݐ_2ܹ is significantly positive, which tells us that in the final two weeks of 
game play, customers were much more willing to share items. Customers knew that after the 
server shut down, all accounts would be closed and all items would be lost.   
 Finally, customers had a “long” memory about their past sharing decisions. Covariates 
ܥݑ݉_݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܹܭ௜௝ሺߩௌ ሻ and ܥݑ݉_݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܹܭ௝௜ሺߩோௌሻ are both significantly positive. This means 
that if ݅ and ݆ shared items in the preceding five weeks, they were more likely to share again. We 
find that ߩௌ ൌ ߩோௌ ൌ 0 yields the best model fit. This means that to make her sharing decision, ݅ 
would equally weigh her sharing interactions with ݆ within each of the past five weeks. In other 
words, she had a “long” memory of past sharing decisions.  
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Model 2. Weekly Sharing Frequency  
Table 1.8 
Sharing Frequency Model (Model 2D) Estimation Results 
݄ܵܽݎ݅݊݃	ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ	݋݂	〈݅, ݆〉 Variable Type Mean STD 
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜⋅ Generosity -0.00417 .0004 ***
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝⋅ Generosity -0.00165 .0004 ***
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௜ Popularity 0.001821 .0003 ***
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௝ Popularity 0.00051 .0003 * 
log	ሺܨ݄݅݃ݐ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜ሻ Devotion 0.03386 .0046 ***
log	ሺܨ݄݅݃ݐ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝ሻ Devotion 0.00454 .0045 
ܮܽݏݐ_2ܹ Event 0.1422 .0564 **
ܨݎ݅݁݊݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜ Nominal Network -0.00044 .0017 
ܨݎ݅݁݊݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝ Nominal Network 0.004921 .0016 ***
ܥ݋݉݉݋݊_ܨݎ݅݁݊݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝ Nominal Network 0.009633 .0029 ***
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜ Nominal Network -0.03502 .0147 **
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝ Nominal Network -0.08926 .0144 ***
ܥ݋݉݉݋݊_ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝ Nominal Network 0.08261 .0128 ***
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܮ݁ܽ݀݁ݎ௜ Nominal Network 0.02262 .0538 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܮ݁ܽ݀݁ݎ௝ Nominal Network 0.007043 .0586 
ܦݕܽ݀_ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝ Behavioral Network 0.203 .0093 ***
ܦݕܽ݀_ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝ଶ 					  Behavioral Network -0.00989 .0007 ***
ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜ Behavioral Network -0.05563 .0086 ***
ܶ݁݊ݑݎ ௝݁ Behavioral Network -0.02595 .0086 ***
ܮ݁ݒ݈݁௜ Behavioral Network -0.00271 .0009 ***
ܮ݁ݒ݁ ௝݈ Behavioral Network 0.001316 .0008 
ܱ݈݊݅݊݁_ܶ݅݉݁_ܱݒ݁ݎ݈ܽ݌_ܲܿ݊ݐ௜௝ Behavioral Network 3.1088 .0879 ***
ܯ݅ݏݏ݅݋݊_݈ܵ݅݉݅ܽݎ݅ݐݕ௜௝ Behavioral Network 0.5907 .0799 ***
ܥݑ݉_݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝ (Best model fit at ߩௌி ൌ 0) Interaction History 0.006194 .0008 ***
ܥݑ݉_݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝௜ (Best model fit at ߩோௌி ൌ 0) Interaction History 0.008347 .0010 ***
***݌ ൏ 0.01; **݌ ൏ 0.05; *݌ ൏ 0.10 
  
Most Model 2 results mirror those of Model 1. The two popularity covariates 
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௝ and ݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௜ are significant and positive, which means the more 
frequently customer ݅ and customer ݆ received items from other customers, the more frequently 
they would share. The two generosity covariates, ݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜⋅ and ݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝⋅, are 
significant and negative, which again reveals a “diluting” effect: if customer ݅ and ݆ shared with 
other customers very often, it would reduce the sharing frequency between them. Customer ݅’s 
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“devotion” covariate ln	ሺܨ݄݅݃ݐ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜ሻ and behavioral similarity covariates 
ܱ݈݊݅݊݁_ܶ݅݉݁_ܱݒ݁ݎ݈ܽ݌_ܲܿ݊ݐ௜௝ and ܯ݅ݏݏ݅݋݊_݈ܵ݅݉݅ܽݎ݅ݐݕ௜௝ are all significantly positive. This 
means that if customers were active and spent a lot of time together, they would share items 
more often. We also find that over time customers shared less and less often (negative signs for 
ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜, ܶ݁݊ݑݎ ௝݁, and ܮ݁ݒ݈݁௜) . One possible explanation is that when customers advanced in 
the game, their belongings became more and more valuable; therefore they would not share as 
often as they did in the early stages.22 ܮܽݏݐ_2ܹ is significantly positive. This means that people 
were sharing items more often during the final two weeks, because they knew that they would 
lose their items when the server shut down. ܥݑ݉_݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝ and ܥݑ݉_݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝௜ are 
both significantly positive, and we get the best model fit at ߩௌி ൌ ߩோௌி ൌ 0. Therefore, in terms 
of sharing frequency, customers had a “long” memory about past sharing experiences. 
However, two things catch our attention in Model 2. First, the friendship and guild 
membership covariates in the sharing frequency model become more significant than their 
counterparts in Model 1.  ܥ݋݉݉݋݊_ܨݎ݅݁݊݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝ and ܥ݋݉݉݋݊_ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝ are positive 
and significant, which means that if two customers shared many of the same friends and joined 
many guilds together, they would share items more frequently. ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜ and ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝ 
have negative signs, which reveals the “diluting” effect again. The positive sign of 
ܨݎ݅݁݊݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝ tells us that if a customer was popular and had many friends, other customers 
shared with her more frequently.  
One explanation for this discrepancy is the existence of two different types of sharing 
behaviors: “casual” sharing and “serious” sharing. When customers met in the game, they might 
share (probably low-value) items casually, as a means of socializing. Therefore, friendship and 
                                                 
22 Unfortunately we do not have complete records about the value of items shared each time. This is one limitation 
of our research. 
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guild membership might have had no significant impact on their decision to share. However, 
among customers who did share, high weekly sharing frequency could indicate a serious 
relationship. In such a case, social connections become important. Therefore, social connection 
covariates become more significant in the sharing frequency model.  
Second, the signs of ܦݕܽ݀_ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊ and ܦݕܽ݀_ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊ଶ	in the sharing frequency 
model (Model 2) are different from those in the sharing decision model (Model 1). Model 1 tells 
us that over time, customers were less and less likely to share items with each other. Model 2, 
however, tells us that customers with enduring relationships shared more often in each week if 
they decided to share, with sharing activities increasing each week until week 10 (Figure 1.7).  
Figure 1.7 
The Impact of Dyad Duration on Customers’ Sharing Decision and Frequency 
 
This result, again, can be explained by “casual” versus “serious” sharing behaviors. With the 
passage of time, more and more customers left the game. Thus, the proportion of casual sharing 
likely decreased among the remaining customers. Those who remained in the game tended to 
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cultivate strong relationships and were more likely to share frequently within each week.  
Strong Tie and Weak Tie Identification 
 After estimating Models 1 and 2, we use equation (1.10) to calculate ܴ 〈ܵ௜,௝〉,௧ଵ  and ܴ 〈ܵ௜,௝〉,௧ଶ , 
the two tie strength measures of dyad 〈݅, ݆〉 in week ݐ. We can then identify all the strong and 
weak ties with these two measures. Note that these measures are both directional. Therefore dyad 
〈݅, ݆〉 and 〈݆, ݅〉 might have different tie strength at the same time. This leads to an interesting 
question: is relationship strength, in general, symmetric? We find that most dyads have 
symmetric tie strength. Among all dyad-week observations, approximately 26% of cases feature 
mutually strong relationships; about 63% feature mutually weak relationships. In only 11% cases, 
dyads have asymmetric relationship strength. This demonstrates that reciprocity is an important 
feature in online relationships.     
In Figure 1.8 we compare the percentage of sharing dyads and the average weekly 
sharing frequency among customers with strong ties and weak ties. We also run a t-test to 
compare the means of these two groups. From the graphs and the t-test results, we see that the 
customers with strong ties were more likely to share and tended to share more often. These 
results demonstrate the effectiveness of using the two tie strength measures developed in our 
research. 
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Figure 1.8 
Comparison of Strong and Weak Ties in Sharing Behaviors 
 
 
T-test shows that strong ties have significantly higher percentage of sharing dyads and higher sharing frequency than 
weak ties (p<0.0001).  
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Model 3. Cash Payment Decisions 
Table 1.9 
Cash Payment Decision Model (Model 3D) Estimation Results 
ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ		ܦ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊	 Variable Type Mean	 STD 
ܮ݁ݒ݈݁ Experience 0.006 .005 
ܯ݅ݏݏ݅݋݊_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ Devotion 0.003595 .001 ** 
ܱ݈݊݅݊݁_ܶ݅݉݁ሺ݄ݎሻ Devotion 0.01198 .002 ***
ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁ Experience -0.1399 .048 ***
ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁ଶ Experience 0.002297 .002 
ܮܽݏݐ_2ܹ Event -0.9443 .543 * 
ܨݎ݅݁݊݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ Nominal Network 0.001815 .007 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ_ܮ Nominal Network 0.2508 .498 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܯܾ݁݉݁ݎ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ_ܮ Nominal Network -0.00785 .010 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ_ܯ Nominal Network 0.06774 .100 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܯܾ݁݉݁ݎ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ_ܯ Nominal Network 0.001088 .002 
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜⋅ሺܵܶሻ Behavioral Network 0.3061 .133 ** 
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜⋅ሺܹܶሻ Behavioral Network 0.09156 .047 * 
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௜ሺܵܶሻ Behavioral Network -0.1723 .122 
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௜ሺܹܶሻ Behavioral Network 0.08004 .047 * 
ܥݑ݉_ܲܽ݅݀_ܹܭ (Best model fit at ߩ௉ ൌ 5) Payment History 0.8109 .164 ***
***݌ ൏ 0.01; **݌ ൏ 0.05; *݌ ൏ 0.10 
 
Model 3 produces three major findings. First, devoted customers were more likely to pay 
cash. ܯ݅ݏݏ݅݋݊_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ and ܱ݈݊݅݊݁_ܶ݅݉݁ሺ݄ݎሻ are both significantly positive. This tells us that if 
customers spent more time in the game and participated in more missions, they were more 
willing to purchase items with cash. 
Second, an individual’s social ties might be exerting some group-to-one influence on that 
customer. Recall that ݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜⋅ሺܵܶሻ, ݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ௜⋅ሺܹܶሻ, and 
݄ܵܽݎ݁_ܦݕܽ݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ⋅௜ሺܹܶሻ are the numbers of customers who had active connections with 
customer ݅ (with various direction and tie strength). These three covariates are all positive. This 
tells us that a customer was more likely to purchase with cash if she was actively sharing with 
others.  
Third, no friendship and guild membership covariates (i.e., nominal network 
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characteristics) are significant. This reminds us that when modeling customer behaviors in a 
social network, we cannot simply use the covariates generated from registration information. 
Activity-based covariates must also be included in the model.  
Fourth, we find that customers became less willing to make cash payments over time in 
the game. ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁ is significant and negative. This makes sense because with time, the game 
became harder and items became more costly. Some customers might have quit and left the game. 
Those who chose to stay might have become less ambitious to get to higher levels, which 
required larger cash investment in items. They might have continued to play simply to have fun 
with their friends. As a result, customer willingness to purchase decreased over time. ܮܽݏݐ_2ܹ 
is slightly significant and negative. Apparently when customers knew that the server would soon 
shut down, they were unwilling to invest in items using real cash.   
Finally, the cumulative payment decision covariate ܥݑ݉_ܲܽ݅݀_ܹܭ calculated with 
ߩ௉ ൌ 5.0 is significantly positive and yields the best model fit. This tells us two things: (1) a 
customer’s past purchase decisions had significant impact on her later purchasing decisions, and 
(2) customers tended to have a “short” memory regarding their past payment decisions (ߩ௉ ൌ
5.0 means that almost all weight is put on the most recent purchasing decision). 
Model 4. Cash Payment Amount 
 Table 1.10 shows that ܮ݁ݒ݈݁ is significant and negative. Again this indicates that 
customers became less willing to pay cash for items when the game got harder and items got 
more expensive. ܱ݈݊݅݊݁_ܶ݅݉݁ሺ݄ݎሻ is significant and positive; therefore “devotees” tended to 
pay more cash to purchase items. Interestingly, we find that ܮܽݏݐ_2ܹ is significantly positive. It 
seems that although in the final two weeks customers, on average, became less willing to pay 
cash, those who did pay real money paid more. Possibly some customers wanted to advance 
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faster and get to the end of the game before the server shut down; hence, they were willing to pay 
more. The cumulative past cash payment, ܥݑ݉_ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ calculated with ߩ௉஺ ൌ 5.0, is 
significantly positive and yields the best model fit. This tells us that customers had “short” 
memory when they decided how much real money to spend on virtual items. 
Table 1.10 
Cash Payment Amount Model (Model 4D) Estimation Results 
ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ	 Variable Type Mean	 STD 
ܮ݁ݒ݈݁ Experience -0.01683 .004 ***
ܯ݅ݏݏ݅݋݊_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ Devotion 0.001411 .001 
ܱ݈݊݅݊݁_ܶ݅݉݁ሺ݄ݎሻ Devotion 0.003478 .002 ** 
ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁ Experience 0.017 .042 
ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁ଶ Experience -0.00231 .002 
ܮܽݏݐ_2ܹ Event 1.2748 .596 ** 
ܨݎ݅݁݊݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ Nominal Network -0.00311 .004 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ_ܮ Nominal Network 0.1007 .323 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܯܾ݁݉݁ݎ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ_ܮ Nominal Network -0.0005 .006 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ_ܯ Nominal Network 0.03287 .082 
ܩݑ݈݅݀_ܯܾ݁݉݁ݎ_ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐ_ܯ Nominal Network -0.00048 .002 
ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜⋅ሺܵܶሻ, 000 Behavioral Network -0.236 .104 ** 
ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜⋅ሺܹܶሻ, 000 Behavioral Network -0.3706 .066 ***
ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ⋅௜ሺܵܶሻ, 000 Behavioral Network 0.2929 .097 ***
ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ⋅௜ሺܹܶሻ, 000 Behavioral Network 0.4473 .063 ***
ܥݑ݉_ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ (Best model fit at ߩ௉஺ ൌ 5) Payment History 0.000214 .00003 ***
***݌ ൏ 0.01; **݌ ൏ 0.05; *݌ ൏ 0.10 
 
The key components of Model 4 are the four behavioral network covariates: 
ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜⋅ሺܵܶሻ, ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜⋅ሺܹܶሻ, ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ⋅௜ሺܵܶሻ, and ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ⋅௜ሺܹܶሻ. We use them to 
capture the group-to-one social influence on a customer’s purchasing behaviors. Model 4 
produces several interesting results. 
 First, the group-to-one social influence pattern is complex in the context of virtual 
product purchasing, especially when sharing is allowed. The covariates ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜⋅ሺܵܶሻ and 
ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜⋅ሺܹܶሻ are both negative. This result indicates that if customer ݅ saw other players to 
whom she gave items spending real cash to purchase items, she would spend less cash. This 
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seems counterintuitive at first glance, because past research (e.g., Nair, Manchanda, and Bhati, 
2010; Trusov, Bodapati, and Bucklin, 2010) tells us that customers who have influence on each 
other should have similar purchasing behaviors (i.e., the coefficients should be positive).  
However, if we take into account the reciprocity factor in social relationships, this 
phenomenon makes sense. When a customer gives items to others, she expects them to 
reciprocate the favor and give her items that she needs in return. With such an expectation, she 
might reduce her cash expenditures if she sees that the customers who receive items from her are 
purchasing items with cash. ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ⋅௜ሺܵܶሻ and ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ⋅௜ሺܹܶሻ are both positive, which 
means that if customer ݅ received items from customers who made cash purchases, she would 
pay more cash to purchase items as well. Again, reciprocity seems to be at play. If other 
customers are buying and giving items to customer ݅, she would be motivated to spend more on 
items so she can return the favor. 
 Interestingly, ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ⋅௜ሺܵܶሻ ሺ൅ሻ and ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ⋅௜ሺܹܶሻ ሺ൅ሻ have higher absolute values 
than ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜⋅ሺܵܶሻ	ሺെሻ and ݐ௜⋅ሺܹܶሻ ሺെሻ, respectively. Hence, if customers gave and received 
items in the same week, the net impact on their payment amount could be positive. 
 Second, weak ties, as a whole, are more influential than strong ties. From the scales of the 
four covariates, we see that the weak tie subgroups have stronger influence than the strong tie 
subgroups. This, again, looks counterintuitive at first glance, because strong ties are supposed to 
carry greater influence than weak ties. This could be explained by the difference in the size and 
the cohesiveness of the strong and weak tie subgroups. Figure 1.9 plots the size and the average 
degree (as a measure of group cohesiveness) of the entire strong tie network and weak tie 
network in each week. It is quite obvious that the weak tie network is more widespread and more 
cohesive than the strong tie network.  
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Figure 1.9 
Comparison of the Sizes of Strong Tie Network and Weak Tie Network 
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In the strong tie–weak tie literature (e.g., Granovetter 1973; Bakshy et al. 2012), 
researchers have shown that weak ties play an important role in the dissemination of information. 
This is particularly true in our case: customers had more opportunities to see various items and 
exchange information through their weak ties than through their strong ties. As a result, weak 
ties, as a whole, had a stronger impact on customers’ purchase behaviors than strong ties. 
 Finally, we find that only actively interacting customers (customers who share items in 
that week) had a significant influence on each other’s purchasing behaviors. As a test, we include 
both active and inactive ties into the calculation of the four subgroup payment covariates. None 
of the four revised covariates is significant.     
Managerial Implications for Gaming Companies 
 Based on our findings, we recommend five actions that gaming companies can take to 
increase their revenues. First, companies should encourage their customers to stay longer and be 
more active in the games, because this will directly increase customer propensity to pay and the 
amount they pay. Second, companies should encourage their customers to interact with as many 
other customers as possible, including casual interactions. Interactions enable customers to see 
new products and exchange information, which stimulates purchases. Third, they should 
encourage customers to share items with each other, because the net impact of sharing activities 
on revenues is positive. Fourth, gaming companies should foster customers’ initial interactions. 
After establishing relationships, customers will continue on their own, because they have a long 
memory of past interactions. Finally, following a customer cash purchase, companies should 
provide monetary incentives (e.g., coupon with a short expiration period) to the customer to spur 
additional purchases. Our research shows that customers have a short memory of past purchases, 
meaning that only the most recent purchase has an impact on their next purchase. Thus, 
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companies should offer incentives to encourage continuous spending. 
 
1.6 Robustness Tests, Cross-Validation, Causality Inference, and Policy Simulations23 
Robustness Tests  
(1) Tests on the left truncation  
We run a series of robustness tests to assess the impact of left truncation on our 
estimation results. In these tests we estimate Models 1D–4D (all full models) on three datasets: 
data of truncated customers/dyads, data of non-truncated customers/dyads, and data of all 
customers/dyads.  
We find that some of the coefficients (mainly friend and dyad counts) estimated on 
truncated customer data become insignificant (with p-values above 0.10). This might be due to 
the small number of observations of truncated customers. However, we do not observe any sign 
changes (significant but with different signs). Therefore it seems that left truncation has only a 
small impact on our estimation results.   
 (2) Tests on lagged payments  
 We test a different specification of Model 3D and Model 4D by including the lagged 
subgroup payment covariates in the models.  The coefficients of lagged covariates are all 
insignificant. Hence, a customer’s current purchasing behaviors are not significantly influenced 
by other customers’ previous purchasing behaviors.     
Cross-Validation  
 It is difficult to employ a usual holdout set approach to validate our models because we 
have a small sample across a short observation period. If we randomly assigned customers to an 
estimation set and a holdout set, the sample size of each group would be very small, not to 
                                                 
23 Detailed results of this section are available from the authors upon request. 
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mention the difficulties of drawing representative random samples from an interconnected 
network. Using the observations in the final ܶ weeks as our holdout set also creates difficulties. 
The server was shut down at the end of our observation period, and customers knew about it. 
This awareness that their accounts would be closed within a few weeks might have caused 
customers to behave differently.  
Taking these issues into account, we use a “leave-one-out” (LOO) approach to cross-
validate our models. First, we loop over all the dyads in our dataset to validate our sharing 
decision and frequency models (Models 1D and 2D). Each loop consists of  three steps: (1) take 
out one dyad and estimate the models with the data of all the remaining dyads; (2) use estimated 
coefficients to predict the left-out dyad’s probability to share and the sharing frequency if they 
decided to share; and (3) compare the predicted values with the observed values. The loop 
continues until we finish all the dyads in our sample. Second, we use the same LOO approach to 
validate the payment decision and amount models (Models 3D and 4D). Similarly, at each loop 
we leave out one individual customer, then do the estimation and prediction, and compare the 
predicted values and the observed values for the deleted customer (See Table 1.11).24  
The validation results show that with our models a company can identify interacting 
dyads and paying customer with much higher accuracy than a “model-free” approach in which 
the company randomly chooses a number of customers. For instance, Model 1D correctly 
identifies 72.61% of the interacting dyads. Using Model 2D, a company can detect 37.56% of the 
most actively interacting dyads (top 25 percentile). In terms of payment prediction, our models 
perform even more impressively. With Model 3D, a company can successfully pinpoint 53.22% 
of the payers in each week. Model 4D can help capture 51.35% of the most valuable customers 
                                                 
24 Note that LOO cross-validation can be time-consuming. We ran our program on a Linux server, and it took 
approximately 5.5 days of CPU time to validate all four models. 
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(top 25 percentile in cash payments). 
Table 1.11 
Results of Cross-Validation 
(1) Sharing Decision Model 
Model % of Correct Identification of Interacting Dyads 
Model-Free 51.99 
Model 1A  62.96 
Model 1B 65.18 
Model 1C 65.39 
Model 1D 72.61 
 
(2) Sharing Frequency Model 
Model MSE 
% of Successful Identification of  
Actively-Sharing Dyads 
Top 50 Percentile Top 25 Percentile 
Model-Free 143.92 50.00 25.00 
Model 2A  151.80 58.11 35.14 
Model 2B 142.68 58.11 22.09 
Model 2C 130.05 58.56 45.95 
Model 2D 128.55 57.66 51.35 
 
(3) Payment Decision Model 
Model % of Correct Identification of Payers 
Model-Free 23.56 
Model 3A  40.80 
Model 3B 46.78 
Model 3C 47.32 
Model 3D 53.22 
 
 (4) Payment Amount Model 
Model MSE 
% of Successful Identification of  
High-Value Customers 
Top 50 Percentile Top 25 Percentile 
Model-Free 1,361,452 50.00 25.00 
Model 4A  1,319,648 58.11 35.14 
Model 4B 1,326,134 58.11 22.09 
Model 4C 906,845 58.56 45.95 
Model 4D 883,128 57.66 51.35 
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Causality Inference 
Model 4D shows a strong correlation between an individual customer’s payments and the 
payments made by the customers actively interacting with her. However, further investigation is 
needed to ensure that such a correlation is caused only by the social influence (peer effects) and 
not by other possible sources of correlation, such as endogenous group formation, correlated 
unobservables, or simultaneity (Moffitt 2001).  
(1) Endogenous group formation  
Customers with similar characteristics might behave in a similar manner. Therefore, the 
correlation between payments might actually reflect customers’ similarity (homophily) instead of 
social influence. This, however, is unlikely in our case. First, we note that the coefficients of 
ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜⋅ሺܵܶሻ and ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜⋅ሺܹܶሻ are negative, and the coefficients of ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ⋅௜ሺܵܶሻ and 
ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ⋅௜ሺܹܶሻ are positive, which cannot be explained by homophily effects. Moreover, in 
Model 4D we have already included the customer random effect ܽ௜, which could help explain 
away the possible correlation due to unobserved homophily factors. Therefore, endogenous 
group formation seems unlikely to be the cause of the correlation in customers’ payments.  
(2) Correlated unobservables  
If customers’ payments are driven by some unobservable factors (e.g., promotion or 
seasonality), their payments could be correlated. We rule out this possibility for the following 
four reasons: First, the game analyzed in our research is small and promotion-free. Only a small 
gift card of game money was provided to all newcomers when they started. Second, we are 
analyzing the peer effects from four different cohesion subgroups on one individual customer. It 
is unlikely that all the customers in these four subgroups are correlated with the same 
unobservables at the same time—not to mention that the members of these groups vary with time. 
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Third, two subgroup payment coefficients are positive and two are negative. Evidently, 
correlated unobservables are not the cause of correlated payments. Finally, we re-estimate Model 
4D with weekly fixed effects, but none of the fixed effects are significant (p൑0.10). This means 
that temporal factors such as promotions or seasonality do not have an impact on customers’ 
payments. Thus, we rule out correlated unobservables as a possible source of the correlation in 
customer payment amounts.    
 (3) Simultaneity 
If an individual customer’s payments and the payments made by her four cohesion 
subgroups are contemporaneously interdependent, the subgroup payment coefficients could be 
biased upwards (Nair, Manchanda, and Bhatia 2010). To investigate whether contemporaneous 
interdependence exists in our data, we adopt a system-of-equations approach. For example, if we 
want to check whether covariate ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜⋅,௧ሺܵܶሻ is endogenous, we estimate the following two 
equations together:   
 
൝	ln	ሺܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜௧ ሻ ൌ ࢄ௜௧
ᇱ ⋅ ࢼଵ ൅ ߛଵ ⋅ ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜⋅,௧ሺܵܶሻ ൅ ܽ௜ ൅ ߳௜௧,ଵ
ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜⋅,௧ሺܵܶሻ ൌ ࢄ௜௧ ᇱ ⋅ ࢼଶ ൅ ܽ௜ ൅ ߳௜௧,ଶ 											
, 
(1.14) 
where ࢄ௜௧  is the data vector of customer ݅ in week ݐ, excluding the four cohesion subgroup 
payment covariates; ࢼଵ  and ࢼଶ  are the coefficient vectors; ܽ௜ is customer ݅’s random effect; and 
߳௜௧,ଵ and ߳௜௧,ଶ are the error terms. If ߳௜ଵ,௧ and ߳௜ଶ,௧ are not significantly correlated, we will have 
evidence that 	ln	ሺܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜௧ ሻ and ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜⋅,௧ሺܵܶሻ are not contemporaneously interdependent. 
We run this test on all four subgroup payment covariates. (See Table 1.12.)25  
  
                                                 
25 We do not use five equations to test all four subgroup payment covariates altogether because we do not have 
enough observations to do so. 
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Table 1.12 
Endogeneity Tests on Subgroup Payment Covariates 
Test Endogenous Relationship Tested
Correlation between ߳௜ଵ,௧ and 
߳௜ଶ,௧ 
Coefficient ܲݎ݋ܾ ൐ |ݎ| 
1 ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜ and ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜⋅ሺܵܶሻ -0.00055 0.9906 
2 ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜ and ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜⋅ሺܹܶሻ 0.00018 0.9970 
3 ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜ and ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ⋅௜ሺܵܶሻ -0.00690 0.8838 
4 ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜ and ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ⋅௜ሺܹܶሻ 0.06365 0.1772 
 
We find that in all four tests ߳௜ଵ,௧	and ߳௜ଶ,௧ are not significantly correlated, which means that 
simultaneity is not a serious issue in this research. This finding coincides with our life experience: 
group-to-one influence is typically much stronger than one-to-group influence.   
Policy Simulation 
 We design two policy simulations to demonstrate our framework’s usefulness for 
increasing gaming company revenues. We suppose that a company is considering two separate 
strategies: (1) making customers more actively interact with each other (e.g., making it easier for 
customers to share their items) or (2) making customers spend more time in the game (e.g., using 
a customer loyalty program or increasing the chance to get windfall prizes in the game). 
Accordingly, in the first simulation we assume that the company increases the number of 
actively interacting dyads by 10%. In the second simulation, we assume that the company 
induces its customers to spend 10% more time in the game. To simplify the operation, we make 
two assumptions. First, the newly added payment cases all occur at the end of each week; 
therefore they have no impact on previous purchases. Second, the distributions of newly-added 
payment amounts have the same variance. This variance is calculated from the data. 
The simulation results show that increasing actively interacting dyads by 10% could lift 
revenue by 42.25%, and increasing customers’ online time by 10% could lead to a 44.56% 
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revenue increase (Figure 1.10). Thus, increasing customers’ online time is slightly more effective. 
The covariate ܱ݈݊݅݊݁_ܶ݅݉݁ሺ݄ݎሻ is significant in both Model 3D and Model 4D, indicating that 
customers’ online time not only boosts customers’ propensity to pay, but also raises their 
payment amounts if they do pay. Such a difference is quite obvious when we compare the total 
revenues from these two strategies.  
Figure 1.10 
Policy Simulation Results 
 
 
1.7 Discussion  
 This study makes three primary contributions to the current social network literature. 
First, to the best of our knowledge, our research is the first to reveal the group-to-one social 
influence of strong and weak ties in the context of virtual product purchasing. We demonstrate 
the complexity of social influence patterns in such a setting, especially when sharing is allowed. 
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These findings could also shed light on customer purchasing behaviors of tangible products in 
the physical world in a social network context.  
Second, we develop a comprehensive framework to combine social interaction models, 
social influence models, and tie strength measures. This framework enables us to see a more 
complete picture of customer connections, interactions, and influence within a social network. 
This framework de-composes the revenue generation process, thus enabling a company to 
leverage the power of social networks to increase revenues, as illustrated in our simulations.   
Finally, we propose a tie strength measure based on social connection and interaction 
information and show that it performs well in distinguishing strong ties from weak ties. Our tie 
strength measure, which is directional, continuous, and time-varying, contains rich information 
about the characteristics of customer relationships. This measure is also modeled as the function 
of various factors. These findings can help companies cultivate enduring and profitable 
relationships among their customers.    
 Our research, however, is not without limitations. First, even though we have shown that 
the influence of left truncation is small, our estimation results might still be biased. Second, we 
only use the counts of social interactions (sharing of items) to measure customer tie strength, 
which might only provide a partial picture. Because of a lack of data on item value, we are 
unable to consider the values of items exchanged through those interactions. Finally, we could 
not directly observe customers’ interactions in their game missions. We also do not have 
information about their communications inside and outside the game.26  
Our framework could be extended in the following three directions. First, we could 
incorporate a latent state model, such as a hidden Markov model (HMM), into our framework. 
                                                 
26 Modern game players use free online audio/video communication services (such as MSN or Skype) to coordinate 
their actions in the games. Only a few players still use texting within the game. Even so, most video game 
companies choose not to record such text communications due to privacy protection concerns. 
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With such a modification, our approach would enable a better understanding of the dynamic 
nature of customer interactions and influences in a social network. Second, our research could be 
extended to investigate how customers influence each other within a triadic structure. This 
extension, however, might prove to be highly challenging. Finally, we could estimate all four 
models jointly, which would enable us to directly model the relationship between customers’ 
social interactions and purchases.         
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CHAPTER 2  
MODELING CUSTOMERS’ DEFECTION IN A SOCIAL NETWORK 
 
Abstract 
In this research we attempt to model customers’ defection decisions within a social 
network. We propose a framework to jointly estimate a dyadic level tie strength model and an 
individual level defection decision model. We use tie strength model to reveal the latent, time-
varying tie strength within each customer dyad. We then use the revealed tie strength states and 
customers’ defection history to generate a set of social contagion covariates. Using these 
covariates we are able to capture the impact of strong ties and weak ties on customers’ defection 
decisions. We test our framework with the data collected from an online game. We find that 
customers who actively interact with others tend to have strong ties with them. Also, customers 
with strong ties tend to have stronger influence on other customers’ defections than customers 
with weak ties. Based on our model we propose an incremental impact measure that can be used 
to identify influential customers. We also propose a new approach to measure customers’ social 
network value. To conclude this paper, we demonstrate the importance of correctly identifying 
and retaining influential customers with two policy simulations. 
Key Words: customer relationship management, defection, social network 
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2.1 Introduction 
It was in the early 1990s when companies started accepting that customers are their most 
valuable assets. As a result customer retention became a hot topic (Billington 1996). Researchers 
and practitioners painstakingly investigated the root causes of customer defection (Reichheld 
1996). Interestingly, it was soon discovered that customers still defect even when they are 
satisfied, unless they are “completely satisfied” (Jones and Sasser 1995). Therefore researchers 
pay a lot of attention to the accurate measurement of customer satisfaction and model the 
relationship between satisfaction and defection (e.g., Bolton 1998, Chandrashekaran et al. 2007). 
However, analyzing customers’ defection behaviors is not an easy task. First, it is 
difficult to detect customers’ defections, especially in a non-contractual situation. Various 
methods have been developed to predict customers’ status (Fader and Hardie 2009). Most of 
these methods provide the probability distribution of whether customers are still “alive” or 
already “dead”. Yet with these outcomes it is still difficult to investigate how customers make 
their decisions to churn. 
Second, social influence might play a role in customers’ defection, which is hard for 
researchers to capture.  Researchers have found that satisfied and unsatisfied customers are likely 
to engage in word of mouth (Anderson 1998), and customers’ satisfaction levels are substantially 
related with the duration of customer-company relationships (Bolton 1998). But so far no one 
has put these two pieces together to show the impact of social influence on customer’s 
satisfaction and retention. An attempt has been made by Nitzan and Libai (2011). The authors 
use hazard model to analyze the impact of social network on customers churn from a 
telecommunication service provider. One important reason for this sparsity in literature lies in 
the lack of social connection and interaction data. Also, economists have already pointed that, 
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unless with detailed information of customers and observe customers’ behaviors in a strictly 
controlled environment, it is difficult to capture the true social influence (Manski 1993).   
Fortunately, data collected from online gaming offer researchers a unique opportunity to 
analyze customers’ defection decisions within a social network. In online gaming data, 
researchers can observe how customers connect and interact with each other. Thus researchers 
can infer how customers influence each other through their social ties. More importantly, some 
games are running on a number of servers, each for only a limited period of time. Therefore, in 
these games a customer’s whole life cycle is observable and her defection behaviors are also 
visible. Inspired by such a unique feature, in this research we model customers’ defection 
decisions, using data collected from a game server.    
The ability to model customer defection behaviors within a social network is of critical 
importance to companies. Knowing how customers influence each other’s defection decisions, 
companies can identify influential customers and make more efforts to retain them. Further more, 
companies can leverage the social influence from these influential customers to retain more other 
customers. With models, companies are able to quantitatively measure the impact of one 
customer’s defection decision on other customers’ defection decisions. This incremental impact 
can be directly used to identify influential customer. This incremental impact, together with the 
purchasing records of those customers who are under influence, can be used to gauge each 
customer’s “social influence value”. A customer’s social influence value, plus her intrinsic value 
(her own purchasing) can then be used to optimize a company’s resource allocation for customer 
retention. 
To model customers’ defection behaviors within a social network, we propose a 
framework with a tie strength model and a defection decision model. The tie strength model uses 
 60 
 
customers’ interaction history to model each customer dyad’s tie strength as a time-varying, 
binary, and latent state (strong vs. weak). With revealed tie strength states and customers’ 
defection records, we generate four social contagion covariates. These covariates are used in the 
defection decision model to capture the “group-to-one” social influence on each individual 
customer’s defection decision.  
We jointly estimate the tie strength model and defection decision model using a MCMC 
algorithm. The results show that the more time two customers spend together, the more likely 
they have a strong relationship. The more recent their interactions are, the more likely they are 
strongly related. The results also show that customers with stronger ties tend to have stronger 
influence on each other’s defection decision than those with weak ties. 
With estimated parameters we measure the incremental impact of each customer’s 
defection decision on other customers’ decision to stay or leave. This measure of the incremental 
impact can be used to identify influential customers. The social network value, calculated with 
this incremental impact and customers’ monetary contribution records can help a company to 
decide how to allocate their rendition efforts to customers. As a demonstration of the 
effectiveness of our framework, we use two policy simulations to show how a company can 
greatly increase its revenues by correctly identifying and retaining its influential customers. 
To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first attempt to jointly model customers’ 
tie strength and their defection decision within a social network. Different from the hazard model 
approach (e.g., Nitzan and Libai 2011), our defection decision model can help predict each 
individual customer’s defection at each point of time. Our tie strength model can help identify 
influential customers from their interaction records. Our method can help companies improve 
their resource allocation to retain customers. Our findings from online gaming can be applied to 
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other settings as well, including physical social networks. This is because recent investigations 
show that customers have similar motivations and behaviors in the virtual world and the physical 
world (Bartle 2003; Malone 1981; Williams, Yee, and Caplan 2008).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature 
relevant to this research; section 3 describes the data used in this research. In section 4 we 
specify the models for tie strength and defection decision. In section 5 we present the estimation 
results from our models. In section 6 we discuss robustness tests, cross-validation, and policy 
simulation.  We then conclude this paper with a discussion of the contributions and limitations of 
this research, and future research directions. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 Our research is relevant to three streams of literature: customer defection/retention, social 
influence, and social network value. 
Customer Defection/Retention 
The topic of customer retention gained popularity in the early 90s, when companies 
became more customer-oriented (Billington 1996). The discussions focused on: (1) how to 
identify high value customers; and (2) how to allocate resources to retain valuable customers 
(Reinartz and Venkatesan 2008). Some researchers work on the relationship between customers’ 
satisfaction and their loyalty to the firms (e.g., Bolton 1998, Shankar et al. 2003, 
Chandrashekaran et al. 2007). Others directly investigate customers’ defection or the duration of 
their relationship with firms. 
 Modeling customers’ defection is relatively easier in the contractual setting, in which 
customers’ defection can be detected by their termination of contracts or subscription. Neslin et 
al. (2006) run an interesting meta-analysis of the models used to predict customer churn. The 
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authors find that logit and probit model outperform other models.  
 Things get much more difficult in the non-contractual setting, when customers’ defection 
cannot be directly observed. Hazard models are used to analyze the duration of customer-
company relationship or customers’ inter-purchase timing (Allenby et al. 1999, Seetharaman and 
Chintagunta 2003).  
A variety of probability models have been developed to predict the probability of a 
customer’s staying “alive” at a certain point of time. The two most widely used models are 
Pareto/NBD model (Schmittlein et al. 1987, Schmittlein and Peterson 1994) and Beta 
geometric/NBD model (Fader et al. 2005). Probability model are employed to predict customers’ 
inter-purchase timing (e.g., Gupta 1991). Based on the output of these models, customer’s life 
time value (CLV) can be estimated and companies’ CRM decisions can be optimized (e.g., 
Reinartz and Kumar 2000, 2003).  
 Most literature in this stream treats each individual customer independently, ignoring the 
possible influence among customers. Recently, social network effects have already caught some 
CRM researchers’ attention. For instance, Villanueva et al. (2008) find that customers acquired 
via word-of-mouth have much higher long-term value to the firm than the customers acquired 
through marketing activities. So far, literature is still sparse in the area of modeling customers’ 
defection/retention with explicit consideration of social ties and social influence. The most recent 
attempt is carried out by Nitzan and Libai (2011).  In this paper the authors use hazard model to 
investigate the impact of social network characteristics, tie strength, satisfaction, and economic 
incentives on customers’ hazard to churn from a telecommunication service provider. 
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Social Influence 
 In this research we try to model how customers influence each other’s defection decisions 
through their social ties in an online social network. In particular, we want to investigate whether 
the impact on defection due to strong ties and weak ties is significantly different. In an online 
social network, customers form social connections by registration (e.g., becoming friends on the 
Facebook) or through interaction (e.g., sharing information, participating in activities, or sharing 
digital products). Interactions vary in scale and frequency. Some interactions are casual, which 
result in weak ties; while others are intense, which leads to strong ties. Accordingly, strong 
influence might be conveyed via strong ties. To establish this, we analyze a complete chain of 
“social interaction → tie strength → social influence” in our research. 
 So far most of the social influence literature has concentrated on the link of “social 
connection (interaction) → social influence”, particularly: (1) the spread of certain phenomena or 
behaviors within a social network (social contagion); (2) the influence from influential customers 
and opinion leaders. Examples of the former topic include the spread of obesity (Christakis and 
Fowler 2007) and happiness (Fowler and Christakis 2008); the diffusion of new products (Bhatt 
et al. 2010, Iyengar et al. 2011, Katona et al. 2011, Banerjee et al. 2012); the structure effect on 
the spread of behaviors (Centola 2010). The examples of the latter topic include: the asymmetric 
influence between opinion leaders and followers (Nair et al. 2010) and the identification of 
influential customers from their social behaviors (Trusov et al. 2010, Aral and Walker 2012).    
 There are a few papers discussing the link of “social interaction → tie strength”. 
Iacobucci and Hopkins (1992) model tie strength at discrete levels. Xiang et al. (2101) model tie 
strength as a continuous, latent covariate. We believe that tie strength, as a function of customers’ 
social connections and interactions (usually observable), can help us identify influential 
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customers (usually unobservable). In Chapter 1, we “assign” tie strength levels (weak/strong) to 
each customer dyad at each time point, based on their social connections and interaction. We 
then generate social effect covariates using tie strength information and analyze strong ties and 
weak ties’ social influence on customers’ purchasing behaviors.  
In this paper we adopt a similar approach. We first treat customers’ tie strength as latent 
and model it as a function of their interaction history, then use tie strength information to 
generate a set of social contagion covariates. Using these social contagion covariates we can 
investigate strong ties and weak ties’ social influence on customers’ defection decision. In other 
words, we utilize the complete chain of “social connection/interaction → tie strength → social 
influence” in this research.     
Social Network Value 
 The social network value of a customer can be defined as “the expected profit from sales 
to other customers she may influence to buy, the other customers those may influence, and so on 
recursively” (Domingos and Richardson 2001, page 1). The literature in this stream is 
surprisingly sparse. One possible reason for this scarcity is the lack of data: it is difficult to piece 
together all the information needed to calculate the social network value (e.g., social connection, 
social interaction, purchasing… etc.)  Another (and maybe a more important) reason is that the 
contexts of research varies dramatically from one social network to another (Facebook, Twitter, 
e-commerce, online gaming … etc.). Apparently it is difficult to build a uniform framework to 
analyze customers’ social network value across so diversified contexts. 
 One attempt is made by Gupta et al. (2009). In their paper the authors use a structural 
model to estimate the value of direct network effects (“buyer-buyer”) and indirect network 
effects (“buyer-seller”). However, the value of networked effects estimated in this paper is still 
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not the value of social influence among customers.  
Data mining researchers also make some progress in this area. Modeling customer social 
network as a Markov random field, Domingos and Richardson (2001) first assume that all 
customers are in isolation and estimate the value contribution of each customer (“intrinsic 
value”). They then assume that there exists social influence among customers and estimate the 
value contribution (“total value”). They define the difference between a customer’s total value 
and intrinsic value as her “social network value”. This approach is suitable for the scenarios of 
new customer acquisition or the adoption of new product. It is still difficult to capture customers’ 
social network value in a repeated purchasing context. 
 In this research we propose a different approach to measure customers’ social network 
values. We first model customers’ defection decisions. Then we estimate the incremental impact 
of each customer’s defection decision on other customers’ decision to stay. Combining this 
incremental impact and the purchasing records of those influenced customers, we estimate the 
expected incremental value contribution of those customers. This approach can be used as a 
measure of the value of a customer’s social influence on other customers.    
 
2.3 Data 
 The data used in this research were collected from an online video game server in 
Shanghai, China. Online games, especially massively multiplayer online role-playing games 
(MMORPGs), are often run on different servers. On each server the game runs for several 
months (six months in our case). After that the game will start all over again. By doing so, 
company can attract a continuous inflow of new customers; because when those newcomers join 
the new round of the game they won’t be lagged too far behind.  
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Such a way of game operation affords us a unique opportunity to observe customers’ 
defection behaviors within a social network. Even though customers haven’t signed contracts or 
subscribed to the game, we can still observe their exit from the game. When customers register 
into a game, they can choose to join different servers (at different stages of the game). They will 
be informed about the closing date of the server. And as the closing date approaches, they will 
see the message every time they log on the game to remind them to make plans for the ending of 
the game. In this situation, if we observe that a customer never came back till the end of the 
game, we can safely claim that this customer left for good after her final logon. Therefore, 
simple but well-performed logit and probit models can be employed to analyze customers’ 
defection decisions (Neslin et al. 2006). 
Comparing with other social network data, online gaming data have several additional 
attractive features. For instance, in online gaming data customers’ social ties can be observed. 
Their social interactions are painstakingly recorded. Their purchasing behaviors are also well 
logged. All these advantages make it possible for researchers to infer the social influence among 
customers. Also, recently large surveys on game players show that customers have very similar 
motives and behaviors in the virtual world and the physical world (Williams et al. 2008, 
Lehonvirta 2009). This means what we find in an online social network can be applied to an 
offline social network as well. 
The game recorded in our data ran for a period of six months. Unfortunately, the database 
only recorded the most recent four month worth of behavioral data on a rolling basis.27 Therefore 
we can only observe customers’ interactions and purchases during the final four months. The 
first two months’ data are missing. In other words, we have a left truncation issue. All customers’ 
                                                 
27 The system records all gamers’ activities (accurate down to a second), therefore the data recorded everyday could 
be overwhelming. To save storage space, the system only records the most recent four months’ data. 
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registration information, such as virtual demographic and friendship information, is kept in a 
separate database. Customers’ logon information is also complete, therefore we can observe each 
customer’s complete life cycle, including when they left the game for good. 
Most customers (more than 75%) in the game only showed up once or twice, and then 
disappeared. Therefore, we resample the data and keep the records of regular customer only. 
Based on our discussions with company managers, a “regular” customer is defined as the 
customer who: (1) stayed in the game for at least one month; (2) interacted with at least one other 
customer for at least one month in the game. We have 181 customers in our final sample. These 
customers form 1,315 friendship dyads (dyads that registered as friends) and 1,262 interacting 
dyads (dyads that interacted at least once). 
In game customers can take a variety of actions. First, customers can become friends with 
each other, in a Facebook manner. Second, customers can participate in various missions, 
independently, or jointly with other customers. Third, customers can buy (sell) virtual products 
from (to) virtual merchants or other customers in the game. Some virtual products are priced 
with virtual currency, while others are priced with real money. Forth, customers can share virtual 
products with each other, free of charge. Fifth, customers can build or join different online 
groups (in gaming jargon, these groups are called “guilds”). Table 2.1 presents some descriptive 
statistics of the customers: 
In this research, we can identify two types of social connections: friendship and 
partnership. If two customers register as friends, they have friendship connection between them. 
If two customers interact with each other (e.g., participating missions together, trading or sharing 
virtual products with each other … etc.), they are involved in a partnership and they become 
partners. Friendship starts with registration and ends with one friend’s leaving. Partnership starts 
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with first interaction and ends with one partner’s defection. These two social relationships 
usually do not coexist in the same dyads. As a matter of fact, in our data they only have a small 
overlap (Table 2.2). 
Table 2.1 
Descriptive Statistics of Sampled Regular Customers 
Variable min max mean median std dev
Number of Friends 0.00 123.00 25.01  19.00 23.60 
Number Guilds Joined28  0.00 11.00 2.72  2.00 2.16 
Number of Interacting Dyads (In-Degree) 0.00 27.00 2.22  1.00 2.79 
Number of Interacting Dyads (Out-Degree) 0.00 21.00 2.22  1.00 2.67 
Online Time (Hours per Week) 0.00 167.55 31.89  13.09 41.71 
Number of Missions Accomplished per Week 0.00 533.00 19.17  1.00 47.35 
Tenure (Weeks in Game Since Registration) 3.00 24.00 13.62  13.00 6.34 
Dyad Duration (Week) 1.00 18.00 3.24  1.00 3.51 
Weekly Interacting Frequency (Interacting Customers)  1 472 4.64 2 11.70
Weekly Cash Payment (Paying Customers, RMB) 29 2 13,064 745.50 294 1,567.33
 
Table 2.2 
Overlap between the Interacting Network and the Friendship Network 
Friendship  
Partnership (Interacting Relationship) 
No Yes Sub Total 
No 00.00%
669
33.72%
669 
33.72% 
Yes 72236.39%
593
29.89%
1,315 
66.28% 
Sub Total 72236.39%
1,262
63.61%
1,984 
100.00% 
 
                                                 
28 We deleted all of the guilds with less than five members. 
29 1RMB ≈ 0.16USD 
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2.4 Models 
 In this research we build a framework with two models: a tie strength model, and a 
defection decision model (Figure 2.1).  
Figure 2.1 
The Research Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In tie strength model we use each customer dyad’s interaction history to reveal their tie 
strength (time-varying and latent). Combining tie strength information and customers’ defection 
history we are able to generate a set of social contagion covariates. Then in defection decision 
model we use these social contagion covariates to capture strong ties and weak ties’ social 
influence on a customer’s defection decision. A Markov Monte Carlo Chain (MCMC) algorithm 
is used to iterate between these two models until the chain converges. See Figure 2.2. 
  
Social Contagion Covariates 
(e.g., # of defected strong/weak ties) 
Interaction History  
(e.g. recency, frequency)  
Relationship Strength States 
 (dyadic, binary, latent, time-varying) 
Relationship Strength Model 
Defection Decision Model 
 Jointly estimated 
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Figure 2.2 
The MCMC Algorithm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After these two models are estimated we then use the parameters to measure each 
customer’s incremental impact on other customers’ defection decisions. This imcremental impact 
measure can be directly used to identify influential customers. Combining this incremental 
impact measure with customers’ purchasing record we are able to gauge each customer’s social 
network value.   
Tie Strength Model 
 We use each customer dyad’s interaction history to model their tie strength as a two-state 
(strong/weak), time-varying latent state. We decide to use a specific type of interactions in this 
dyadic level model: customers’ sharing behaviors, because it is a good indicator of the nature of 
the relationship between two customers.  
As mentioned in the Data section, virtual products can be bought, sold and shared among 
Draw new value of ሼࢻ, ࢼ, ࢽሽ
Draw latent states ܴܵሺ௜,௝ሻ,௧
Using MH to decide whether to accept the new value of ࢻ 
Generate social contagion covariates based on tie strength states ࡾࡿ
Using MH to decide whether to accept the new value of ࢼ and ࢽ 
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customers. We find that most (more than 90%) of such transactions among customers are free of 
charge. Unlike other interactions such as mission participation, sharing behavior is the direct 
interaction between the giver and receiver.30 It is also well recorded. More importantly, the items 
shared among customers have values (bought with game currency or real money). Therefore, 
sharing among two customers can be a good sign of an affectionate relationship. 
 In this model we treat customers’ relationship as nondirectional, because in our prior 
project we find that in 89% cases customer dyads have a symmetric relationship (see Chapter 1). 
Therefore, the interaction between customer ݅ and ݆ in week ݐ is calculated as: ௡೔→ೕ,೟ା௡ೕ→೔,೟ଶ , where 
݊௜→௝,௧ is the frequency customer ݅ giving to customer ݆ in week ݐ. 
 We use a probit model to describe each customer dyad’s tie strength as a binary, time-
varying latent state: 
 ܲ൫ݏሺ௜,௝ሻ,௧ ൌ 1 หࢄሺ௜,௝ሻ,௧ு௜௦௧ ሻ ൌ ܩሺࢄሺ௜,௝ሻ,௧ு௜௦௧ ′ ⋅ ࢻሻ, (2.1) 
where ݏሺ௜,௝ሻ,௧ is customer ݅ and ݆’s tie strength in week ݐ (1: strong tie; 0: weak tie); ܩሺ⋅ሻ is the 
CDF of a normal distribution with its mean at ࢄሺ௜,௝ሻ,௧ு௜௦௧ ′ ⋅ ࢻ.  To make the model estimable, we fix 
the variance of this normal distribution to 1; ࢄሺ௜,௝ሻ,௧ு௜௦௧  is the vector of customer ݅ and ݆’s interaction 
history up till week ݐ; ࢻ is the vector of the corresponding parameters. We use following 
parameters in this model: 
1) Partner Similarity. This is the measure of the overlap between customer ݅ and ݆’s partners 
(customers with interacting relationship). It is calculated as 
ே௉ሺ೔,ೕሻ,೟
ே௉೔೟ାே௉ೕ೟, where ܰܲሺ௜,௝ሻ,௧ is the 
number of the “mutual partners” between customer ݅ and ݆ in week ݐ; ܰ ௜ܲ௧ and ܰ ௝ܲ௧ are the 
                                                 
30 In our data we can observe that the two customers show up in the same mission at the same time, but we do not 
have direct evidence that these two customers are interacting with each other. As matter of fact, they might not see 
each other in the game at all. 
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number partners of customer ݅ and ݆ have in week ݐ. This measure varies from 0 (no overlap) 
to 0.5 (full overlap); 
2) Online Time Overlap. This is the measure how often customer ݅ and ݆ log in the game 
simultaneously. It is defined as 
ை்ሺ೔,ೕሻ,೟
ை்೔೟ାை்ೕ೟, where ܱ ሺܶ௜,௝ሻ,௧ is the length of time when customer 
݅ and ݆ are both in the game in week ݐ; ܱ ௜ܶ௧ and ܱ ௝ܶ௧ are the time customers ݅ and ݆ spend in 
week ݐ. Because in the data we cannot observe customers direct interactions in the missions, 
we use this measure as proxy of the interaction intensity between customer ݅ and ݆. This 
measure varies from 0 (no overlap) to 0.5 (full overlap); 
3) Cumulative Count of Interactions. This covariate counts the total number of interactions 
since the beginning of customer ݅ and ݆’s partnership. It is used to track customer ݅ and ݆’s 
interaction history; 
4) Recency of Interaction. This covariate records the time lapse since customer ݅ and ݆’s last 
interaction. It is used to capture the time diminishing impact on customers’ tie strength.    
Social Contagion Covariates 
 Basically, customers’ defection process can be treated as the “spread of defecting 
behaviors” on a social network. This spreading process is similar to the adoption process of a 
new product (in a sense, defection can be considered as a “reverse-adoption”). So far, a large 
number of social influence papers have demonstrated social contagion in new product diffusion 
over a social network (e.g., Nair et al. 2010, Iyengar et al. 1011). In this research we use a similar 
approach to capture the social contagion effect in customers’ defection behaviors.  
However, the mechanism of social contagion is more complicated in a defection scenario 
than it is in a new product adoption scenario. This is because when a customer considers her 
defection decision, she is under influence from two groups: (1) her partners who have already 
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left; (2) her partners who have chosen to stay. The former will increase her probability to leave, 
while the latter will reduce that probability. To capture social contagion in this more complex 
setting, we need to employ a set of social contagion covariates. 
One simple approach is to count the number of left partners and staying partners, using 
them as the social contagion covariates in the defection decision model. With this approach we 
can capture social contagion using a single model. The model can be estimated with MLE. In 
fact, we use this specification as one of our benchmark models. This approach, however, cannot 
help us differentiate customers by their influence, not to mention identify influential customers.  
To be able to identify influential customers with their observable interaction behaviors, in 
our framework we investigate the complete link of “social interaction → tie strength → social 
influence”. In order to do so, we use the latent tie strength information and customers’ defection 
records to construct a set of four social contagion covariates: 
1) ܵ ௜ܵ௧: the number of customer ݅’s staying partners in week ݐ, with strong ties; 
2) ܵ ௜ܹ௧: the number of customer ݅’s staying partners in week ݐ, with weak ties; 
3) ܥܦ ௜ܵ௧: the cumulative number of customer ݅’s defected partners, with strong ties (in the week 
when they left);  
4) ܥܦ ௜ܹ௧: the cumulative number of customer ݅’s defected partners, with weak ties (in the week 
when they left).  
These covariates are used in the defection decision model. To construct these four covariates, in 
each week we actually categorize each individual customer’ partners (current and left) into 
2ൈ2ൌ4 groups (“strong tie” vs. “weak tie”, and “staying” vs. “left”). By definition, unless these 
covariates have very small variation (which is not the case in this research) multicollinearity will 
not be an issue in our estimation. As a test, we calculate the correlation among these four 
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covariates at a number of iterations. We do not observe significant correlations among the 
covariates.    
Table 2.3 
Scenarios of Incremental Effects 
Scenario Customer ݅’s Decision 
Customer ݅’s 
Tie Strength 
with ݆ 
Social Contagion Incremental Effect on 
Customer ݆’s Probability to 
Stay  Sign Scale
1 Stay Strong Negative Large Large and positive effect 
2 Stay Weak Negative Small Small and positive effect 
3 Leave Strong Positive Large Large and negative effect 
4 Leave Weak Positive Small Small and negative effect 
 
Defection Decision Model 
 We analyze each individual customer’s defection decision in each week with an 
individual level, logit model:  
 ܲሺ݀௜௧ ൌ 1ห࢙௜௧, ࢄ௜௧ௌா, ࢄ௜௧ௌ஼൯ ൌ ܨሺ ࢄ௜௧ௌா ′ ⋅ ࢼᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
௦௘௟௙ ௘௙௙௘௖௧௦
൅ ࢄ௜௧ௌ஼ ′ ⋅ ࢽᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ  
௦௢௖௜௔௟ ௖௢௡௧௔௚௜௢௡ 
ሻ,	 (2.2) 
   
where ݀௜௧ is customer ݅’s defection decision in week ݐ (1: leave; 0: stay); ࢄ௜௧ௌா is the vector of self 
effects covariates; ࢄ௜௧ௌ஼ ൌ ሾܵ ௜ܵ௧, ܵ ௜ܹ௧, ܥܦ ௜ܵ௧, ܥܦ ௜ܹ௧ሿ  is the vector of four aforementioned social 
contagion covariates; ࢼ and ࢽ are the vectors of coefficients. ࢄ௜௧ௌா  includes following covariates: 
1) Count of Guilds Attended. This covariate is the number of online groups customer ݅ has 
joined up till week ݐ. It is used to measure a customer’s willingness to participate in group 
activities;  
2) Tenure in the Game. This covariate is the number of weeks customer ݅ has already stayed in 
the game since registration. It is used to track the trend of defection with time; 
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3) ln(Online Time). This is the logarithm of customer’s online time (in hours) in week ݐ. It is a 
measure of customer ݅’s activeness; 
4) ln(Cumulative Online Time). This is the logarithm of customer’s cumulative online time (in 
hours) up till week ݐ. It is used to track the trend of customer defection with time; 
5) Count of Missions: This the number of missions customer ݅ joined in week ݐ. It is also a 
measure of customer ݅’s activeness; 
6) Change in Level: This is customer ݅’s change in performance level in week ݐ (ܮ݁ݒ݈݁௧ –
ܮ݁ݒ݈݁௧ିଵ). It is used to measure customer ݅’s achievement in week ݐ; 
7) Cumulative Payments: This is the (real) money customer ݅ has paid up till week ݐ. We want 
to use this covariate to check whether customers experience “escalated commitments” (the 
more they have spent, the less willing they are to give up the game). Note that in this 
particular game, when a customer exists, she cannot get any refund. What she has spent will 
stay in the game. Therefore, we are expecting to observe some escalated commitment effect.   
 In our data, the time series of a customer’s defection decision ሼ݀௜௧ሽ is: ሼ0,⋯ ,1ሽ (customer 
defected) or ሼ0,⋯ ,0ሽ (customer never defected). Therefore the likelihood function is: 
 ܮ ൌ Π௜ୀଵே Π௧ୀ ೔்బ
೔்భ ሼܲሺ݀௜௧ ൌ 1ሻௗ೔೟ ⋅ ܲሺ݀௜௧ ൌ 0ሻଵିௗ೔೟ሽ, (2.3) 
where ܰ is the total number of customers; ሾ ௜ܶ଴, ௜ܶଵሿ is the observation period of customer ݅. 
Incremental Impact and Social Network Value 
   After we estimate the defection decision model, we are able to estimate the incremental 
impact of customer ݅’s defection decision (stay, leave) on her partner ݆’s decision to stay. There 
are four scenarios. Note that we are estimating the impact on customer ݆’s probability to stay (i.e., 
ܲሺ ௝݀௧ ൌ 0ሻ).  
 Scenario 1. Customer ݅ decides to stay in week ݐ, the incremental impact of her stay on 
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her strongly-tied partner ݆ is: 
 Δۦ௜,௝ۧ,௧ ൌ
߲ܲ൫ ௝݀௧ ൌ 0หࢄ௝௧ௌ஼൯
߲ܵ ௝ܵ௧ ൌ െ݂൫ࢄ௝௧
ௌா ⋅ ࢼ ൅ ࢄ௝௧ௌ஼ ⋅ ࢽ൯ ൈ ߛଵ, (2.4) 
where ࢄ௜௧ௌ஼ ൌ ሾܵ ௜ܵ௧, ܵ ௜ܹ௧, ܥܦ ௜ܵ௧, ܥܦ ௜ܹ௧ሿ  is the vector of social contagion covariates. 
Scenario 2. Customer ݅ decides to stay in week ݐ, the incremental impact of her stay on 
her weakly-tied partner ݆ is: 
 Δۦ௜,௝ۧ,௧ ൌ
߲ܲ൫ ௝݀௧ ൌ 0หࢄ௝௧ௌ஼൯
߲ܵ ௝ܹ௧ ൌ െ݂൫ࢄ௝௧
ௌா ⋅ ࢼ ൅ ࢄ௝௧ௌ஼ ⋅ ࢽ൯ ൈ ߛଶ. (2.5) 
Scenario 3. Customer ݅ decides to leave in week ݐ, the incremental impact of her 
defection on her strongly-tied partner ݆ is: 
 Δۦ௜,௝ۧ,௧ ൌ
߲ܲ൫ ௝݀௧ ൌ 0หࢄ௝௧ௌ஼൯
߲ܥܦ ௝ܵ௧ ൌ െ݂൫ࢄ௝௧
ௌா ⋅ ࢼ ൅ ࢄ௝௧ௌ஼ ⋅ ࢽ൯ ൈ ߛଷ. (2.6) 
Scenario 4. Customer ݅ decides to leave in week ݐ, the incremental impact of her 
defection on her weakly-tied partner ݆ is: 
 Δۦ௜,௝ۧ,௧ ൌ
߲ܲ൫ ௝݀௧ ൌ 0หࢄ௝௧ௌ஼൯
߲ܥܦ ௝ܹ௧ ൌ െ݂൫ࢄ௝௧
ௌா ⋅ ࢼ ൅ ࢄ௝௧ௌ஼ ⋅ ࢽ൯ ൈ ߛସ. (2.7) 
Note that subscript 〈݅, ݆〉 indicates that the incremental impact is directional (from ݅ to ݆). Recall 
that ܵ ௝ܵ௧, ܵ ௝ܹ௧, ܥܦ ௝ܵ௧ and ܥܦ ௝ܹ௧ are the social contagion covariates of customer ݆ in week ݐ, 
ߛଵ,⋯ߛସ are the coefficients of these four social contagion covariates. 
 Apparently, Δۦ௜,௝ۧ,௧ can be used to locate influential customers. If we find a customer has a 
large number of social ties, most of them carry high incremental impacts, she can be labeled as 
an influential customer. 
 In data, we can also observe customer ݆’s monetary contribution in week ݐ: ߨ௝௧. Thus the 
expected incremental lift on customer ݆’s monetary contribution, due to customer ݅’s defection 
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decision in week ݐ, is: 
 ܵ 〈ܸ௜,௝〉,௧ ൌ Δ〈௜,௝〉,௧ ൈ ߨ௝௧. (2.8) 
ܵ 〈ܸ௜,௝〉,௧ can therefore be used as the measure of the value of customer ݅’s incremental social 
influence on customer ݆ in week ݐ. The total value of customer ݅’s incremental social influence is: 
 
ܵ ௜ܸ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ෍ ෍ ܵ 〈ܸ௜,௝〉,௧
ሺ்೔,ೕሻమ
௧ୀ ሺ்೔,ೕሻభ 						௝∈ௌ௉ሺ௜ሻ
෍ ෍ ܵ 〈ܸ௜,௝〉,௧
ሺ்೔,ೕሻయ
௧ୀ ሺ்೔,ೕሻమ ାଵ௝∈ௌ௉ሺ௜ሻ
 
, before ݅’s defection 
, after ݅’s defection 
(2.9) 
where ܵܲሺ݅ሻ is the set of customer ݅’s partners; ሺܶ௜,௝ሻଵ  is the time when customer ݅ and ݆ start 
interaction; ሺܶ௜,௝ሻଶ  is the time when customer ݅ defects; ሺܶ௜,௝ሻଷ  is the time when customer ݆ defects 
(both customers leave the game). 
 ܵ ௜ܸ can be defined as a measure customer ݅’s social network value. Note that here we 
only measure the value of direct (first order) influence between two customers. In other words, 
we do not evaluate the influence on partners’ partner. For example, if we observe a partnership 
of “݅ → ݆ → ݇” (there is no interaction between ݅ and ݇), we only measure the value of influence 
from ݅ to ݆. We do not measure the value of influence from ݅ to ݇ through ݆. Therefore, ܵ ௜ܸ is a 
conservative measure of customer ݅’s social network value.    
 
2.5 Estimation and Results 
Estimation Algorithm 
To jointly estimate the tie strength model and the defection decision model, we use an 
MCMC algorithm. Because the posterior distribution does not have a closed form, we employ 
the random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to update the parameter estimates in iterations 
 78 
 
(see Appendix). 
 For each parameter, we use a diffuse normal prior ܰሺ0,100ሻ. To generate the initial value 
for parameters, we take the following steps: 
1) Tie Strength States. Because tie strength states are latent, we use the level of each customer 
dyad’s interaction frequency as a proxy. In each week, if a dyad’s interaction frequency is 
higher (lower) than a cutoff value, we label this dyad’s tie strength as “strong” (“weak”). We 
use three sets of cutoff values: 50 percentile, 70 percentile, and 80 percentile of weekly 
interactions. Thus we get three sets of tie strength states; 
2) Tie Strength Model Parameters. After we get the initial values of tie strength states, we then 
estimate three probit models using these three sets of tie strength initial values. We use the 
three sets of MLE estimates from these models as the initial values of tie strength model 
parameters; 
3) Defection Decision Model Parameters. We use assigned tie strength states and customers’ 
defection records to generate the four social contagion covariates: ܵ ௜ܵ௧, ܵ ௜ܹ௧, ܥܦ ௜ܵ௧, and 
ܥܦ ௜ܹ௧. We then estimate the three individual level, logit models of customers’ defection 
decisions. We use these three sets of MLE of parameters as the initial values for the defection 
decision model.  
With these three different sets of initial values, we are able to run three Markov chains 
simultaneously. Because latent states are involved in the model, the chains converge slowly. We 
run the chains for 206,000 iterations and record every tenth draw. We tune the random-walk 
steps several times during iterations to control the acceptance rate to a level between 25% and 50% 
(Gelman et al. 2004). The average acceptance rate of these three chains is approximately 30%. 
We then use the final 60,000 draws to calculate the posterior statistics. We use the posterior 
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distribution of these three chains to check whether they converge to the same position. We 
follow Gelman et al. (2004)’s approach to calculate the “potential scale reduction” ෠ܴ.  All 17 
parameters’ ෠ܴs range from 1.00 to 1.03, which is all very close to 1 (below the 1.1 criterion 
suggested by Gelman et al. 2004). This provides us strong evidence that the chains do converge. 
Estimation Results 
The estimation results are given in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4 
Estimation Results of Tie Strength Model and Defection Decision Model 
Model Parameter Expected Sign Covariate 2.5% 50.0% 97.5%
Tie 
strength 
ߙ଴ +/−  Intercept  -25.45 -9.36 -3.25 * 
ߙଵ + Partner Similarity  -17.11 -1.85 15.24  
ߙଶ + Online Time Overlap  5.49 12.46 24.29 * 
ߙଷ +/− Cumulative Count of Interactions -11.99 -5.14 2.14  
ߙସ − Recency of Interaction  -15.61 -6.16 -1.25 * 
Defection 
Decision 
ߚ଴ +/− Intercept  -6.20 -4.51 -2.84 * 
ߚଵ − Count of Guilds Attended  -0.35 -0.21 -0.07 * 
ߚଶ +/− Tenure in the Game 0.05 0.09 0.13 * 
ߚଷ − ln(Online Time) -0.30 -0.01 0.26  
ߚସ +/− ln(Cumulative Online Time) 0.03 0.18 0.34 * 
ߚହ − Count of Missions  -0.17 -0.07 -0.02 * 
ߚ଺ − Change in Level -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 * 
ߚ଻ +/− Cumulative Payments 0.00 0.05 0.10 * 
ߛଵ − Count of Stayed Strong Ties (ܵܵ) -2.52 -1.31 -0.65 * 
ߛଶ − Count of Stayed Weak Ties (ܹܵ) -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 * 
ߛଷ + Cum. Count of Defected Strong Ties (ܥܦܵ) 0.43 1.62 3.59 * 
ߛସ + Cum. Count of Defected Weak Ties (ܥܦܹ) 0.01 0.06 0.11 * 
ܮܮ Log likelihood -363.74 -356.43 -351.45  
  
As we can see, two parameters are significant in the tie strength model: Online Time 
Overlap and Recency of Interaction. Online time overlap has a positive sign, which means the 
more time two customers spend together, the more likely they have strong relationship. Recency 
of interaction (weeks since last interaction) has a negative sign, which means the more recent 
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two customers’ last interaction is, the more likely they maintain a strong relationship. 
 Most of the parameters in the defection decision model are significant. Among self-effect 
parameters (ߚ’s), we find that (note that this model predicts a customer’s probability to leave): 
1) Count of Guilds Attended is significantly positive. This tells us that if a customer is actively 
involved in various online groups, she is less likely to leave; 
2) Tenure in the Game is positive. This means when a customer stays for a long time in the 
game, she has a high probability to defect; 
3) ln(Cumulative Online Time) is positive. It means that we do not discover “escalated 
commitment” phenomenon is this case. The more time a customer spends on the game, the 
more likely she will leave; 
4) Count of Missions is negative. This parameter is a measure of a customer’s activity in the 
game. The more active a customer is, the less likely she will defect; 
5) Change in Level is negative. This means if a customer is advancing in her performance level 
she is less likely to quit; 
6) Cumulative Payment is positive. Again, we do not find “escalated commitment” phenomenon 
is this case. The more money a customer has spent on the game, the more likely she is 
leaving. 
We get three interesting findings in four social contagion parameters (ߛ’s). 
First, we find that Count of Stayed Strong Ties (ܵ ௜ܵ௧) and Count of Stayed Weak Ties 
(ܵ ௜ܹ௧) both have negative signs. This tells us that if a customer decides to stay, the customers 
who are interacting with her will become less likely to leave; 
Second, we find that Cumulative Count of Defected Strong Ties (ܥܦ ௜ܵ௧) and Cumulative 
Count of Defected Weak Ties (ܥܦ ௜ܹ௧) both have positive signs. Apparently, one customer’s 
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leave will have impact on other customers who are interacting with her, making them more likely 
to leave as well. This reveals the social contagion factor in customers’ defection behaviors; 
Third, we also find that strong tie covariates have larger scale than weak tie covariates 
(|ܵ ௜ܵ௧| ൐ |ܵ ௜ܹ௧|, |ܥܦ ௜ܵ௧| ൐ |ܥܦ ௜ܹ௧|). This means customers with strong ties have stronger 
influence than customers with weak ties. 
 Incremental Impact on Defection Decision 
 The incremental impact of one customer’s defection decision (stay or leave) on other 
customers’ probability to stay can be calculated with equation (2.4) - (2.7). Our defection 
decision model is a logit model, therefore the first component of the incremental effect equation 
is the density of logistic distribution: 
 ݂൫ࢄ௝௧ௌா ⋅ ࢼ ൅ ࢄ௝௧ௌ஼ ⋅ ࢽ൯ ൌ
݁ݔ݌൫ࢄ௝௧ௌா ⋅ ࢼ ൅ ࢄ௝௧ௌ஼ ⋅ ࢽ൯
൛1 ൅ ݁ݔ݌ൣ൫ࢄ௝௧ௌா ⋅ ࢼ ൅ ࢄ௝௧ௌ஼ ⋅ ࢽ൯൧ൟଶ
. (2.10) 
 Density is always positive, therefore the sign and scale of incremental impact Δ〈௜,௝〉,௧ 
depends on the sign and scale of social contagion covariates. Note that in the four scenarios 
listed in Table 2.3, customer ݅’s incremental impact on customer ݆ depends on not only her own 
scenario (ߛ), but also other customers’ scenarios (embedded in ݁ݔ݌൫ࢄ௝௧ௌா ⋅ ࢼ ൅ ࢄ௝௧ௌ஼ ⋅ ࢽ൯ ).  
 
2.6 Tests, Cross-Validation, and Policy Simulation 
In this section we first test our models’ goodness-of-fit against four benchmark models. 
Then we test our models’ robustness to left truncation. We also cross-validate our models using a 
“Leave-One-Out” (LOO) approach. We finally run two policy simulations to demonstrate the 
importance of correctly identifying and effectively retaining influential customers. 
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Benchmark Models 
In our investigation of customers’ defection decisions, if we do not want to explicitly 
model customers’ tie strength, we have two options: (1) completely ignore the tie strength. We 
can simply count the number of partners staying or leaving in each week. We then use these 
counts as social contagion covariates; (2) use some rule of thumb to assign each customer dyad a 
tie strength level.  
In each week we can assign each customer dyad into strong tie group or weak tie group, 
based on its weekly interaction frequency. We can choose some cutoff value, such as 50 
percentile, 70 percentile, or 80 percentile. This is exactly our approach to generate initial value 
for MCMC algorithm. From option 1 and 2 we specify four benchmark models. The estimation 
results of these four models and our full model are given in Table 2.5.  
In Table 2.5 Model P00 is the one without considering tie strength; Model P50, P70 and 
P80 are the models using 50, 70 and 80 percentile as cutoff values to assign tie strength states. 
“Joint” model is our full model jointly estimated with the tie strength model. As we can see in 
this table, all five models have similar coefficient estimates, but Joint Model outperforms all four 
benchmark models in terms of log likelihood and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
Robustness Test 
Our data is left truncated; therefore we need to test our models’ robustness to this issue. 
In addition to our original data set (including both truncated and non-truncated customers), we 
prepare three more datasets: (1)ܶ0: all the dyads in this data set do not suffer from truncation 
issue; (2) ܶ1: the dyads in this data set contain only one truncated customer; (3) ܶ2: all dyads in 
this data set contain two truncated customers. Accordingly, we call our original, full data set ܶܣ. 
We then estimate our model on ܶ0 െ ܶ2 and compare the results with the ones from ܶܣ. 
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Table 2.5 
Estimate Results of Benchmark Models 
 
Model 
P00 P50 P70 P80 Joint 
Intercept -4.17 (0.76)* -4.16 (0.77) -4.16 (0.76) -4.16 (0.75) -4.51 (-6.20,-2.84)** 
Count of Guilds Attended -0.16 (0.07) -0.15 (0.07) -0.14 (0.07) -0.22 (0.06) -0.21 (-0.35, 0.07) 
Tenure in the Game 0.09 (0.02) 0.09 (0.02) 0.09 (0.02) 0.09 (0.02) 0.09 ( 0.05, 0.13) 
ln(Online Time) -0.44 (0.10) -0.40 (0.13) -0.47 (0.12) -0.46 (0.12) -0.01 (-0.30, 0.26) 
ln(Cumulative Online Time) 0.15 (0.07) 0.15 (0.07) 0.15 (0.07) 0.14 (0.07) 0.18 ( 0.03, 0.34) 
Count of Missions -0.07 (0.04) -0.07 (0.04) -0.07 (0.04) -0.07 (0.04) -0.07 (-0.17,-0.02) 
Change in Level -0.05 (0.01) -0.05 (0.01) -0.05 (0.01) -0.05 (0.01) -0.05 (-0.08,-0.02) 
Cumulative Payment 0.05 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.05 ( 0.00, 0.10) 
Count of Stayed Ties -0.06 (0.02)      
Cumulative Count of Defected Ties 0.08 (0.02)      
Count of Stayed Strong Ties  -0.13 (0.10) -0.13 (0.10) -0.10 (0.10) -1.31 (-2.52,-0.65) 
Count of Stayed Weak Ties  -0.06 (0.02) -0.07 (0.02) - - -0.04 (-0.09,-0.01) 
Cum. Count of Defected Strong Ties  0.18 (0.18) 0.16 (0.19) 0.25 (0.19) 1.62 ( 0.43, 3.59) 
Cum. Count of Defected Weak Ties  0.06 (0.03) 0.07 (0.27) 0.02 (0.25) 0.05 ( 0.01, 0.11) 
Log likelihood -371.30 -369.33 -369.51 -374.92 -351.45 
AIC 762.60 762.66 763.03 771.84 724.90 
* Standard deviation; ** 95% confidence intervals  
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In Table 2.6 we see no flip sign. Most of the estimates are consistently significant. But 
we do observe some variation in the scale of estimates. This is inevitable due to the small sample 
size of this research. The robustness test indicates that the impact of truncation, though 
unavoidable, is marginal on the estimation of our models.  
Table 2.6 
Estimation Results of Robustness Test 
Data Set Used T0 T1 T2 TA  
Intercept  -8.50  -11.01 * -15.11 * -9.36 * 
Partner Similarity  4.06  -0.59  1.68  -1.85  
Online Time Overlap  7.84 * 6.14 * 9.53 * 12.46 * 
Cumulative Count of Interactions -0.45  -3.05  -2.39  -5.14  
Recency of Interaction  -4.65 * -6.80 * -4.79 * -6.16 * 
Intercept  -6.87 * -4.32 * -5.44 * -4.51 * 
Parameter Count of Guilds Attended  -0.42 * -0.21 * -0.12  -0.21 * 
Estimates Tenure in the Game 0.12 * 0.10 * 0.19 * 0.09 * 
ln(Online Time) -0.21  -0.40  -0.23  -0.01  
ln(Cumulative Online Time) 0.43 * 0.14 * 0.06 * 0.18 * 
Count of Missions  -0.04  -0.15 * -0.75 * -0.07 * 
Change in Level -0.05 * -0.06 * -0.07 * -0.05 * 
Cumulative Payments 0.06  0.03 * 0.06 * 0.05 * 
Count of Stayed Strong Ties (SS) -3.85 * -2.10 * -3.56 * -1.31 * 
Count of Stayed Weak Ties (SW) -0.05 * -0.02 * -0.06 * -0.04 * 
 
Cum. Count of Defected Strong Ties 
(CDS) 3.07
* 2.40 * 4.44 * 1.62 * 
 
Cum. Count of Defected Weak Ties 
(CDW) 0.26
* 0.09 * 0.05 * 0.06 * 
Number of Customers in the Data Set 70 147 103 181
Number of Dyads in the Data Set 141 415 701 1257
* significant at 0.05 level. 
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Influential Customer Identification and Social Network Value 
With all the estimated parameters, we can then calculate each customer’s incremental 
impact on other customers’ defection decisions (equation (2.4) - (2.7)). This incremental impact 
can be used to identify influential customers. We illustrate each customer’s total incremental 
impact in Figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3 
Incremental Impacts of Customers’ Defection Decisions 
 
We can use equation (2.9) and customers’ purchasing records to calculate each 
customer’s social network value in each week. We can also calculate customers’ total social 
network value during their tenures.  
Note that there are two types of social network value measures here: (1) if a customer 
chooses to stay, she will have a positive network value (a potential lift on the expected value 
Highly influential customers ⇒ 
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contribution made by customers under her influence); (2) if a customer decides to leave, she will 
have a negative network value (a potential loss in the expected value contribution). We plot 
customers’ total social network values in Figure 2.4. 
Figure 2.4 
Measuring Customers’ Social Network Values 
 
 It is evident in Figure 2.3 and 2.4 that there exists a small group of influential customers. 
If they choose to stay, the customers under their influence are more likely to stay. When they 
decide to leave, they will impact other customers to leave too.  
Our tie strength model tells us that we can identify these influential customers using their 
interaction history: the more frequently a customer interacting with others, the more time she 
spends with others, the more likely she has strong influence on others.  
Also note that if a customer is actively interacting with large, closely-connected groups, 
Retain these customers ⇒
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she is likely to be influential. This is because groups with high centrality (Wasserman and Faust 
1994) have large ݁ݔ݌ሺࢄ௝௧ௌா ⋅ ࢼ ൅ ࢄ௝௧ௌ஼ ⋅ ࢽሻ,  which enhances the individual incremental impact 
(see equation (2.4) – (2.7)). 
LOO Cross-Validation 
“Leave-One-Out” (LOO) is one type of the bootstrap algorithm used to cross-validate the 
predictive power of models. This approach is particularly suitable for social network models. 
Customers in a social network usually have complex connections with others, which makes it 
difficult to divide the data into an estimation set and a validation set. Using LOO algorithm, 
however, we can loop across all the customers, at each step removing one customer and her 
social ties. We estimate the models with the data of all the remaining customers; then use the 
estimated models to predict the defection behaviors of this “left-out” customer. Using this 
approach we can test the predictive power of our models without interfering too much with the 
whole network. One big disadvantage of this approach is that LOO is very time-consuming. If 
we have ܰ customers we need to estimate the model ܰ times. Particularly, when we use MCMC 
algorithm, time becomes a serious issue.31  
 The results of LOO validation are given in Table 2.7 and Figure 2.5. 
Table 2.7 
Results of LOO Validation 
(1) Prediction with Model 
   Predicted Defections  
  No Yes Total 
Actual 
Defections 
No  28 (46.67%) 32 (53.32%) 60 (100.00%) 
Yes 49 (40.50%) 72 (59.50%) 121 (100.00%) 
 
                                                 
31 In our case, estimating one model on a Linux server takes about a week. 
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Table 2.7 (Continued) 
(2) Prediction without Model 
   Predicted Defections  
  No Yes Total 
Actual 
Defections 
No  0 (0.00%) 60 (100.00%) 60 (100.00%) 
Yes 0 (0.00%) 121 (100.00%) 121 (100.00%) 
 
We validate our models at two levels. First, we test our models’ capability of identifying 
churned customers. Second, for those churned customers who are correctly identified, we check 
how accurately our models can predict their defection time. As a benchmark, we use following 
“model-free” approach to predict customers’ defection:  
We assume that managers know the average defection rate in each week, which is 6% in 
our case. We assume that without a model, in each week managers simply randomly choose 6% 
customers and predict that they will defect within that week. 
From Table 2.7 we can see that with our models we can correctly identify nearly 60% of 
the churned customers and 56.67% of the customers who decided to stay. “Model-free” approach 
captures all the defected customers by predicting that all customers have churned, thus resulting 
in a 100% misclassification of un-churned customers.  
More importantly, if we take a closer look at these two approaches’ predictions on 
defection time, we find that the modeling approach yields much higher accuracy than model-free 
approach. Modeling approach correctly predicts the defection time in15 cases, and most of its 
predicting errors fall within five weeks. As a contrast, model-free approach makes no correct 
prediction on defection time. Most of its prediction errors are larger than five weeks (Figure 2.5). 
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Figure 2.5 
Model Can Predict Defection Time with Higher Accuracy 
 
Accurately predicting defection time is critical for managers. Managers want to identify 
potential churned customers before hand, and persuade them to stay. Premature identifications of 
churned customers could lead to suboptimal allocation of resources: time and money are spent on 
customers with little intention to defect. Figure 2.5 illustrates that using our models can help 
managers improve their allocation of resources to retain customers.     
Policy Simulation 
To demonstrate the importance of identifying and retaining influential customers, we set 
up two policy simulations. In the first simulation we assume that company manages to persuade 
the top 25% of their most influential customers to stay until the end of the game. In second 
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simulation company retains bottom 25% of their least influential customers until the end. The 
simulation results are listed in Figure 2.6. 
Figure 2.6 
Retention of Influential Customers Can Largely Increase Revenues 
 
 
Figure 2.6 shows that both approaches increase revenues. And apparently retaining 
influential customers lead to much bigger increase in revenues. With this information, a 
company can decide how much it should spend to retain those influential customers. On average, 
retaining the top 25% most influential customers will generate 110,000 RMB (approx. 18,000 
USD) more revenues than retaining the bottom 25% of the least influential customers. 
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2.7 Discussion 
 To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first attempt to model customers’ 
defection behaviors within a social network. We jointly estimate a tie strength model and a 
defection decision model. Using defection decision model we capture the social influence on 
customers’ defection through strong ties and weak ties. Using tie strength model we can identify 
influential customers with the records of their social interactions.  
We find that if a customer is frequently interacting with other customers she tends to 
have strong tie with those customers. We also find that social contagion influence through strong 
ties is significantly stronger than the one through weak ties. With defection decision model we 
can also estimate the incremental impact of a customer’s defection decision on the customers 
under her influence. With this measure we are able to identify influential customers in the 
network.  
In this research we also propose a new measure of social network value, which is based 
on a customer’s incremental impact on other customers’ propensity to stay. Combining 
incremental impact measure with customers’ purchasing records we calculate each customer’s 
social network value, which is the lift on expected monetary contribution by other customers 
under influence. This social network value, together with customers own purchase (intrinsic 
value), can help a company more effectively allocate its CRM resources. We demonstrate the 
importance of correctly identifying and retaining influential customers with two policy 
simulations. 
Our research is not without limitations. First, due to the small dataset we have (181 
customers, 16 weeks) we cannot afford a more sophisticated model structure. Therefore, in this 
research we ignore customer heterogeneity and panel data characteristics. We use pooled 
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estimation. We also ignore the time-diminishing effects in customer’s interactions and 
influence.32  
Second, our data set suffers from left truncation issue. Even though in our robustness test 
section we have demonstrated that left truncation has only a marginal impact, it still biases our 
estimation results. 
Third, in this research we only capture the direct (first order) social influence. We ignore 
the influence on “friend’s friends”. Therefore this conservative measure indicates the lower 
boundary of a customer’s true social influence. We might underestimate the true value of a 
customer’s social influence. 
Forth, we directly use customers’ purchasing records to calculate the social network 
value. We do not analyze what factors influence a customer’s purchases. It could be very 
interesting to analyze customers’ purchasing behaviors in the same framework as well. 
Based on aforementioned limitations, our framework can be extended in the following 
four directions: 
First, with richer dataset, we can introduce more complex structure to the tie strength 
model and the defection decision model, to addresses the specific requirements from panel data. 
Second, it can be interesting to analyze the influence on friend’s friend and see how the 
social influence gets diminished or enhanced. This will require more sophisticated network 
analysis techniques. 
Third, we can integrate a purchasing model into our framework. Therefore we can have 
better understanding of not only the impact of social influence on customers’ defection decisions, 
but also the impact on their purchasing decisions. With this knowledge we will be able to get a 
                                                 
32 One finding from our prior research shows that customers have short memory about their past purchases, but long 
memory about their past interactions (for details, see Chapter 1). Hence in this research we do not consider the time-
diminishing effect.  
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more comprehensive and accurate measure of customer’s social network values. 
Fourth, to make a full use of the information we can model tie strength with a continuous 
distribution (instead of a binary state). Accordingly, we can generate a series of expected values 
from this distribution and use them as social contagion covariates in the defection model. 
Therefore we will be able to have better understanding of the impact of social influence on 
customers’ defection decisions. 
 
Appendix 
The MCMC algorithm to jointly estimate tie strength model and defection decision model 
Generate ࢻ 
At each iteration,  
1) Draw a new vector of ࢻ: ࢻሺ௞ାଵሻ ൌ ࢻሺ௞ሻ ൅ ઢఈ, where ઢఈ is drawn from a normal distribution: 
ઢఈ~ܰሺ૙, ߜఈࡵሻ; ߜఈ is the size of random-walk step;  
2) Draw latent tie strength states: For customer dyad ሺ݅, ݆ሻ in week ݐ we draw a random number 
from a normal distribution ݎሺ௜,௝ሻ,௧~ܰሺࢄሺ௜,௝ሻ,௧ு௜௦௧ ᇱ ⋅ ࢻ, 1ሻ. If ݎሺ௜,௝ሻ,௧ ൐ 0 then customer ݅ and ݆ have 
a strong tie in week ݐ:  ܴܵሺ௜,௝ሻ,௧ ൌ 1; otherwise their tie strength is weak: ܴܵሺ௜,௝ሻ,௧ ൌ 0; 
3) Update the four social contagion covariates for each customer ݅ in each week ݐ: ܵ ௜ܵ௧, ܵ ௜ܹ௧, 
ܥܦ ௜ܵ௧, and ܥܦ ௜ܹ௧; 
4) Calculate the likelihood ܮ൫ࡾࡿ|ࢻሺ௞ାଵሻ൯ using equation (2.3); 
5) Accept ࢻሺ௞ାଵሻ with probability  
 Prሺܣܿܿ݁݌ݐሻ
ൌ ݉݅݊ ቐቂexp	 ቀ൫ࢻ
ሺ௞ାଵሻ െ ࢻ଴൯′઱ఈ଴൫ࢻሺ௞ାଵሻ െ ࢻ଴൯ቁቃ ൈ ܮ൫ࡾࡿ|ࢻሺ௞ାଵሻ൯
ൣexp ൫ሺࢻሺ௞ሻ െ ࢻ଴ሻ′઱ఈ଴ሺࢻሺ௞ሻ െ ࢻ଴ሻ൯൧ ൈ ܮሺࡾࡿ|ࢻሺ௞ሻሻ , 1ቑ. 
(2.11) 
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where ࢻ଴ and  ઱ఈ଴ are the hyperparameters of a normal prior. We use a diffuse prior: ࢻ଴ is a 
݊ఈ ൈ 1 vector of zeros, ઱ఈ଴ ൌ 100 ൈ ࡵ௡ഀ, where ݊ఈ ൌ dim	ሺࢻሻ. 
Generate ࢼ 
1) Draw a new vector of ࢼ: ࢼሺ௞ାଵሻ ൌ ࢼሺ௞ሻ ൅ ઢఉ, where ઢఉ is drawn from a normal distribution: 
ઢఉ~ܰሺ૙, ߜఉࡵሻ; ߜఉ is the length of step;  
2) Calculate the likelihood using equation (2.3); 
3) Accept ࢼሺ୩ାଵሻ with probability  
 Prሺܣܿܿ݁݌ݐሻ
ൌ ݉݅݊ ቐቂexp	 ቀ൫ࢼ
ሺ௞ାଵሻ െ ࢼ଴൯′઱ఉ଴൫ࢼሺ௞ାଵሻ െ ࢼ଴൯ቁቃ ൈ ܮ൫ࡰ|ࢼሺ௞ାଵሻ൯
ቂexp	 ቀሺࢼሺ௞ሻ െ ࢼ଴ሻ′઱ఉ଴ሺࢼሺ௞ሻ െ ࢼ଴ሻቁቃ ൈ ܮሺࡰ|ࢼሺ௞ሻሻ
, 1ቑ. 
(2.12) 
where ࡰ is the vector of customers’ defection decisions;  ࢼ଴ and  ઱ఉ଴ are the hyperparameters of 
a normal prior. We use a diffuse prior: ࢼ଴ is a ݊ఉ ൈ 1 vector of zeros, ઱ఉ଴ ൌ 100 ൈ ࡵ௡ഁ, where 
݊ఉ ൌ dim	ሺࢼሻ. 
Generate ࢽ 
1) Draw a new vector of ࢽ: ࢽሺ௞ାଵሻ ൌ ࢽሺ௞ሻ ൅ ઢࢽ, where ઢࢽ is drawn from a normal distribution: 
ઢࢽ~ܰሺ૙, ߜࢽࡵሻ; ߜఉ is the length of step;  
2) Calculate the likelihood using equation (2.3); 
3) Accept ࢽሺ୩ାଵሻ with probability  
 Prሺܣܿܿ݁݌ݐሻ
ൌ ݉݅݊ ቐቂexp	 ቀ൫ࢽ
ሺ௞ାଵሻ െ ࢽ଴൯′઱ࢽ଴൫ࢽሺ௞ାଵሻ െ ࢽ଴൯ቁቃ ൈ ܮ൫ࡰ|ࢽሺ௞ାଵሻ൯
ቂexp	 ቀሺࢽሺ௞ሻ െ ࢽ଴ሻ′઱ࢽ଴ሺࢽሺ௞ሻ െ ࢽ଴ሻቁቃ ൈ ܮሺࡰ|ࢽሺ௞ሻሻ
, 1ቑ. 
(2.13) 
where ࡰ is the vector of customers’ defection decisions;  ࢽ଴ and  ઱ࢽ଴ are the hyperparameters of 
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a normal prior. We use a diffuse prior: ࢽ଴ is a ݊ࢽ ൈ 1 vector of zeros, ઱ࢽ଴ ൌ 100 ൈ ࡵ௡ࢽ, where 
݊ࢽ ൌ dim	ሺࢽሻ. 
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CHAPTER 3  
CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: 
POSSIBLE SYNERGY OPPORTUNITIES 
 
Abstract 
This paper discusses the promising research opportunities in integrating social network 
analysis (SNA) components into customer relationship management (CRM). The aim is to 
enable firms to manage their customers as a network and leverage the power of social influence 
among customers to enhance customer-firm relationships. This paper briefly reviews the four 
critical aspects of CRM: acquisition, retention, growth, and firm-customer relationship dynamics. 
Within each aspect the discussion focuses on the possible impact of social network components 
on CRM models, and how to combine CRM and SNA in modeling efforts. It can be foreseen that, 
with the increasing availability of CRM+SNA data, more research will be carried out in these 
interesting areas.    
Key Words: customer relationship management, social network analysis 
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3.1  Introduction 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to explore a way to leverage the power of social 
influence among customers within a social network, and enhance their relationships with the 
company. In Chapter 1 the discussion concentrates on customers’ influence on each other’s 
purchasing behaviors through strong ties and weak ties in a social network. In Chapter 2 the 
investigation focuses on modeling the impact of social influence on customers’ defection 
decisions. 
These two projects have revealed enormous research potential in the intersection of 
customer relationship management (CRM) and social network analysis (SNA). In classical 
customer relationship management research customers are treated independently. This practice 
might no longer be appropriate for customers connected within a social network. More 
sophisticated methodology is needed to model the impact of social influence on customers’ 
behaviors and their relationships with companies. On the other hand, social network analysis 
research, even though undergoing fast growth in marketing area, rarely crosses path with CRM 
research. Therefore, as Rust and Chung (2006) point out, investigating how to manage customers 
as a network is a promising direction for future CRM research. And that is the topic of the first 
two chapters of this dissertation.  
As a natural extension of Chapters One and Two, this chapter searches for and identifies 
possible synergy opportunities between customer relationship management and social network 
analysis. Beginning with a brief review of the recent developments in both CRM and SNA, this 
chapter discusses the possibilities to integrate social network components into the four key 
components of CRM: customer acquisition, customer retention, customer growth, and firm-
customer relationship dynamics.  
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In “acquisition” section, the discussion focuses on the use of social referral and social 
media to acquire customers. In “retention” section, the discussion concentrates on the impact of 
social influence on customers’ satisfaction, churn, and reaction to service failure/recovery. In 
“growth” section, the discussion covers the possibility to promote new products, or cross-sell 
sequentially-purchased products to the incumbent customers in a social network. In “relationship 
dynamics” section, the use of hidden Markov model (HMM) is reviewed, in its role to capture 
the latent, dynamic relationship between a firm and its customers. Then the discussion moves on 
to the hope and difficulty to consider social effects in modeling firm-customer relationship 
dynamics. 
 
3.2 CRM and SNA – A Brief Review 
Customer Relationship Management 
The idea of CRM can be traced back to the 1980’s and the term of “CRM” appeared in 
the 1990’s (Payne and Frow 2005).  Since then, despite some implementation difficulties, 
CRM’s popularity has been growing fast among top executives. For instance, a 2008 survey by 
Gartner Inc. showed that 75% of senior managers planned to invest on CRM in the coming year 
(Mertz 2009). 
At the same time, research on CRM also gained tremendous momentum. An important 
mission of CRM research is to find a way to allocate resources, in a differentiated and systematic 
way, to customers with different economic values (Reinartz and Venkatesan 2008). Accordingly, 
researchers need an accurate measurement of customer life time value (CLV), which is “the 
present value of future profit generated from a customer over his/her life of business with the 
firm” (Gupta and Lehmann 2008, page 256).  
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Furthermore, the sum of individual customers’ CLV is defined as a firm’s current 
customer equity (or assets) (Reinartz and Venkatesan 2008). Some researchers propose to use a 
firm’s customer equity as a link between its marketing activities and its shareholder value (e.g., 
Hogan et al. 2002, Gupta and Zeithaml 2006). 
In order to accurately measure CLV, researchers need to have a thorough understanding 
of various relationship phases between a company and its customers. According to Reinartz and 
Venkatesan (2008), there are five key components in CRM: acquisition, retention, growth, 
winning back lost customers, and firm actions. Researchers have developed various models to 
address the issues in these five key components of CRM. In order to facilitate the following 
discussion on CRM+SNA, “winning back lost customers” is considered as a specific type of 
retention effort. As for firm actions component, the discussion focuses on the relationship 
dynamics between a firm and its customers, due to its CRM activities. Some representative CRM 
papers are categorized in Table 3.1.    
Social Network Analysis in Marketing 
 Compared with CRM, social network analysis has a much longer history. The first social 
network research was published in the 1930’s (Moreno 1934, in which the concept of 
“sociometry” and “sociogram” were introduced).  After 40 years, contemporary social network 
analysis took shape between 1960’s and 1970’s (Scott and Carrington 2011).  After that this 
research area underwent slow growth from 1970’s to 1990’s (Carrington, Scott and Wasserman 
2005). Since then social network research has been expanding rapidly, due to the development of 
mathematical tools to model networks (Alba 1982). These days social network analysis has been 
applied to areas such as sociology, psychology, physics, education, communication, politics, 
technologies, economics, and management (Scott and Carrington 2011).
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Table 3.1 
Research on CRM 
  
(a) Acquisition 
Topic Paper Model/Method Findings Extension Opportunities 
     
Direct marketing / Using profit 
maximization to decide the 
cutoff value for target 
customers  
Bult andWansbeek (1995) RFM model Profit maximization can help 
researchers understand customer 
response curves better 
Purchase amount, frequency, and 
features of direct marketing can be 
considered 
     
Direct marketing / Investigating 
the performance of model 
directly predicting customer’s 
discrete response 
Bodapati and Gupta 
(2004) 
Discretized response 
scoring model 
When sample size is large and model is 
mis-specified, modeling discretized 
responses outperforms modeling 
continuous responses 
Model can be extended to predict 
customers’ purchasing intention of new 
product concept 
     
Customer profiling / Discussing 
the use of massively categorical 
variable (e.g. zip code) as 
explanatory covariate 
Steenburgh et al. (2003) Hierarchical Bayes variance 
component model 
The model performs well to estimate 
parameters. Massively categorical 
variables can be used to replicate 
customer information 
Semiparametric and nonparametric 
techniques can be used 
     
Acquisition channel / 
Comparing customer 
acquisition through various 
channels, in terms of loyalty 
and cross-selling opportunities 
Verhoef et al. (2005) Probit model Customers acquired through website 
channels are more loyal than the ones 
acquired through direct mail, radio, and 
TV 
Message contents can be considered. 
Analysis over long term is needed 
     
Acquisition channel / 
Comparing the short-term and 
long-term value of customers 
acquired through WOM channel 
and marketing  channels 
Villanueva et al. (2008) VAR model Customers acquired through marketing-
induced channels have higher short-
term value, while customers acquired 
through WOM channel have higher 
long-term value 
Dynamic interactions among 
acquisition channels can be analyzed. 
WOM creation can be modeled 
     
Customer referral / Modeling 
customer referral value (CRV) 
Kumar et al. (2010) Bayesian Tobit model Managers should measure CLV and 
CRV separately. Understanding the 
drivers for CRV and targeting referral 
campaign at customers in low-CRV 
segment can financially benefit 
companies 
This research concentrates on the 
extrinsic motivation (incentive), 
customers’ intrinsic motivation to make 
referrals can be analyzed  
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Topic Paper Model/Method Findings Extension Opportunities 
     
Customer referral / 
Investigating to what extent 
customers acquired through 
referral programs are more 
valuable than others 
Schmitt et al. (2011) Linear regression and 
proportional hazard model 
In financial service sector, compared 
with non-referral customers, referred 
customers have higher retention rate 
and contribute higher margin (but 
eroding with time) 
Actual social mechanism (such as 
dyadic connections) can be considered 
in the model 
     
 (b) Retention 
Topic Paper Model/Method Findings Extension Opportunities 
     
Customer status / Using 
customer purchase history to 
predict customer activeness 
status 
Schmittlein et al. (1987) NBD/Pareto model Developed first mathematically 
tractable and realistic model to predict a 
customer’s probability to be alive 
Time-varying covariates can be 
integrated into the model. Customer 
heterogeneity can be modeled with 
hierarchical structure 
     
Interpurchase timing / 
Predicting the change in 
customer purchase behaviors 
Allenby et al. (1999) Hierarchical Bayesian 
model 
Model can be used to identify 
customers in different active states. 
Companies can allocate resources 
accordingly 
More covariates can be included in the 
random-effect model 
     
Satisfaction and retention / 
Capturing the relationship 
between customer satisfaction 
and retention 
Bolton (1998) Proportional hazard model Customers’ satisfaction is positively 
related with the duration of their 
relationship with service providers. The 
strength of “satisfaction-duration” 
relationship depends on the length of 
prior experience with service providers 
Time-varying marketing covariates can 
be considered. Impact of customer 
satisfaction on their behaviors can be 
analyzed 
     
Satisfaction and retention / 
Analyzing the relationship 
between customer retention and 
satisfaction and other drivers 
Gustafsson et al. (2005) Linear regression model 
(aggregate level) 
Customer satisfaction has negative 
impact on customer churn, while 
affective commitment has no significant 
effect 
Better measures of satisfaction and 
affective commitment can be explored. 
Limitation on data collection  (through 
survey) needs to be addressed 
     
Acquisition and retention / 
Investigating the way to balance 
resource allocation on customer 
acquisition and retention 
Reinartz et al. (2005) Acquisition/retention two 
stage modeling 
Suboptimal resource allocation for 
retention has greater impact on long-
term profitability than suboptimal 
allocation for acquisition. Highly 
interpersonal and interactive 
communication benefits a company if 
it’s initiated by the company 
Competition factor can be considered. 
Marketing expenditure in B2C setting 
needs more attention. 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Topic Paper Model/Method Findings Extension Opportunities 
Defection prediction / 
Analyzing the performance of 
various models predicting 
customer defection 
Neslin et al. (2006) Meta-analysis  In contractual situation probit / logit 
models perform better than other 
models 
Attention can be paid to missing-value 
techniques, machine learning, and 
nonparametric methods. Dynamic 
procedure can be used  
     
Win back lost customers / 
Determining the optimal pricing 
strategy to re-capture lost 
customers 
Thomas et al. (2004) Probit model / regression 
model 
Offering both low re-acquisition price 
and retention price is an optimal 
strategy. If  price offered in re-
established relationship is lower than 
the first relationship, customers tend to 
have longer tenure 
Impact of pricing on demand and 
pricing elasticity can be considered 
     
Service recovery / Analyzing 
customer satisfaction with 
service failure / recovery 
encounters 
Smith et al. (1999) Linear regression model Customers want to receive recovery 
resources that match the type and 
magnitude of the service failures they 
experience 
Customer heterogeneity in their 
response to service failures can be 
considered. Conjoint approach can be 
used to design recovery strategies 
     
 
 (c) Growth 
Topic Paper Model/Method Findings Extension Opportunities 
     
Cross-selling / Predicting the 
next product an individual 
customer is most likely to 
purchase 
Knott et al. (2002) “Next product to buy” 
model 
Neural net models perform better than 
statistical models in terms of prediction 
accuracy 
The model can be combined with CLV 
models. The model can also be 
extended to be an optimal product 
targeting model 
     
Cross-selling / Using 
customers’ past purchase 
history across multiple 
categories to predict the 
purchase of a new product 
Kamakura et al. (2004) Multivariate split-hazard 
model 
The model performs well in predicting 
the adoption of existing and new 
products 
Marketing factors can be considered. 
The model can be extended to address 
repeat purchase. The model can be 
embedded in an optimal product 
framework 
     
Cross-selling in B2B / Jointly 
modeling product choice and 
purchase timing 
Kumar et al. (2008) Purchase timing: log-
logistic model 
Category choice: probit 
model 
Customer-focused campaign 
(promoting products only when 
customers are expected to purchase) 
can generate more profits than 
conventional sales campaigns 
The model might not apply to B2C 
setting. Purchase quantity can be 
modeled. Endogeneity issue might 
needs to be addressed 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Topic Paper Model/Method Findings Extension Opportunities 
     
CLV estimation / Estimating 
CLV in a non-contractual 
setting 
Reinartz and Kumar 
(2003) 
NBD/Pareto + proportional 
hazard model 
Proposed framework outperforms 
traditional RFM and other CLV 
frameworks. Customers with 
intermediate purchase frequency tend to 
have long relationship duration 
Two-step procedure can be integrated 
into one framework. Satisfaction and 
loyalty factors can be considered. 
Marketing mix can also be considered 
     
 
 (d) Relationship Dynamics 
Topic Paper Model/Method Findings Extension Opportunities 
     
Alumni relationship / Using 
transaction data to reveal the 
dynamic, latent firm-customer 
relationships 
Netzer et al. (2008) Hidden Markov Model 
(HMM) 
The model preforms probabilistically 
well to segment customers into various 
relationship states  
Multivariate outcome of relationships 
can be modeled. Nonstationary HMMs 
can be further analyzed. Surveyed 
attitudinal data can be integrated into 
the model 
     
Pharmaceutical detailing / 
Modeling dynamic allocation of 
marketing resources based on 
the short-term and long-term 
effectiveness of marketing 
activities 
Montoya et al. (2010) HMM + dynamic 
programming 
The framework provides important 
implications for dynamically managing 
customer relationship and maximizing 
long-term profitability 
Endogeneity issue, forward-looking 
behavior, and social interaction can be 
considered 
     
 
 
The application of social network analysis in marketing can be traced back to B2B research in the 1970’s (Spekman 1996). In B2C 
area, research topics vary from new product adoption to social media and viral marketing. Table 3.2 lists some representative 
application of social network analysis in the marketing area.   
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Table 3.2 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) Research in Marketing 
 
(a) Network Structure 
Topic Paper Model/Method Findings Extension Opportunities 
     
Interaction and relationship / 
Modeling the probability of 
each dyad connecting with 
certain relationship strength 
Iacobucci and Hopkins 
(1992) 
Hierarchical log-linear 
model 
One of the first attempts to model 
relationship strength in a sequential 
interaction setting 
The model involves large number of 
parameters, which might be difficult to 
estimate over a large network 
     
Interaction and relationship /  
Simultaneously modeling 
multiple relationship of 
different types 
Ansari et al. (2011) Hierarchical Bayesian 
model 
Heterogeneity, latent space, and 
relationship correlation are important 
components to recover the relationship 
structure. Researchers can use one type 
of relationship to predict the existence 
of another type of relationship 
Relationship dynamics can be 
incorporated into the model. Bayesian 
nonparametric methods can be 
considered 
     
Propagation on network / 
Investigating the impact of size 
and structure of local network 
around a node on the diffusion 
of products from this node 
Yoganarasimhan (2012) Descriptive dynamic model The size and structure of local network 
around a node have significant impact 
on the diffusion of product from this 
node. There is temporal variation in this 
impact 
The network can be extended to 
composite network, with data collected 
from multiple networks 
     
Adoption / Analyzing how 
diffusion curve is affected by 
network 
Dover et al. (2012) Network-based growth 
model 
Adopter network’s degree distribution 
significantly affects the contagion 
properties of dissemination process 
Research can be advanced to model 
aggregate patterns (adoption curve) on 
the heterogeneous individual behaviors 
     
Acquisition channel / 
Comparing customer 
acquisition through various 
channels, in terms of loyalty 
and cross-selling opportunities 
Verhoef et al. (2005) Probit model Customers acquired through website 
channels are more loyal than the ones 
acquired through direct mail, radio, and 
TV 
Message contents can be considered. 
Analysis over long term is needed 
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Table 3.2 (Continued) 
(b) Word-of-Mouth 
Topic Paper Model/Method Findings Extension Opportunities 
     
Customer satisfaction / 
Checking whether dissatisfied 
customers are more or less 
likely to engage in WOM 
Anderson (1998) Linear regression model An asymmetric U-shape relationship 
exists between customer satisfaction 
and WOM. Extremely satisfied 
customers are most likely engaged in 
WOM 
More flexible techniques can be used to 
estimate the relationship. Other 
attitudinal, behavioral and financial 
aspects related with customer 
satisfaction can be modeled 
     
Drivers of WOM / Analyzing 
the psychological drivers of 
immediate and ongoing WOM 
Berger and Schwartz 
(2011) 
Poisson log-normal mixed 
model 
More publicly visible products receive 
more immediate, ongoing and overall 
WOM. Promotional giveaways might 
promote WOM 
Other product features might be 
considered. The impact of WOM on 
product diffusion can be analyzed. The 
impact of online and offline WOM can 
be compared 
     
Online conversation / 
Investigating how to measure 
WOM from customer online 
conversation 
Godes and Mayzlin (2004) Linear regression model Online conversation provides less 
costly but efficient way to measure 
WOM. Dispersion of conversation is 
valuable information for measuring 
WOM. Measurement should be carried 
out early in product’s life cycle 
Further investigation is needed to 
analyze why dispersion is important for 
the measurement of WOM. Casualty 
between WOM and sales needs to be 
established 
     
Quality signal / Identifying and 
measuring contagious WOM 
Nam et al. (2010) Discrete time proportional 
hazard model 
The effect of contagious WOM is 
asymmetric. Effect of negative WOM is 
stronger than the one of positive WOM 
More service quality factors and 
customer heterogeneity can be 
considered in modeling 
     
(c) Opinion Leader 
Topic Paper Model/Method Findings Extension Opportunities 
     
New product adoption / 
Measuring the impact of social 
interaction and peer effect in a 
setting of physician prescription 
Nair et al. (2010) Linear model Asymmetric peer effects exist between 
opinion leaders and followers. Opinion 
leaders are more responsive to 
marketing activities 
Opinion leaders and followers’ 
heterogeneity, network characteristics, 
and marketing activities  can be 
considered 
     
New product adoption / 
Analyzing the impact of 
opinion leader and social 
contagion on new product 
adoption 
Iyengar et al. (2011) Linear model The correlation between sociometric 
and self-reported measure of opinion 
leadership is weak. Social contagion 
exists through network ties and its 
effect depends on recipients’ perception 
of opinion leadership 
The role of product usage in contagion 
processes can be investigated 
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Table 3.2 (Continued) 
(d) Social Contagion / Influence 
Topic Paper Model/Method Findings Extension Opportunities 
     
New product adoption / 
Identifying and measuring 
social contagion effect 
Manchanda et al. (2008) Hierarchical Bayesian 
model 
Marketing communication has more 
significant impact on early adoption, 
while social contagion plays more and 
more important role with time 
Time-varying marketing and contagion 
covariates can be considered. 
Asymmetric contagion effects can be 
investigated 
     
New product adoption / 
Investigating the impact of 
network structure, influencer 
characteristics, and adoption 
characteristics on adoption 
process within a social network 
Katona et al. (2011) Binary choice model Significant degree effect and clustering 
effect exist in adoption process. The 
characteristics of influencers and 
adopters also have significant impact on 
adoption 
Endogeneity issue can be addressed. 
The assumption of homogeneous 
network can be relaxed 
     
New product adoption / 
Measuring the degree of social 
contagion in product diffusion 
Du and Kamakura (2011) Discrete-time proportional 
hazard model 
Evidence of social contagion in the 
diffusion of new consumer packaged 
products is found, if spatial and 
temporal heterogeneity is allowed in 
modeling 
The mechanism of social contagion can 
be investigated 
     
New product adoption / Using 
social interaction data to 
improve the forecast of new 
product adoption 
Toubia et al. (2011) Diffusion model Using both social interaction data and 
penetration data can improve diffusion 
forecast 
The impacts of WOM, network 
structure, relationship types, and 
marketing mix can be considered in the 
model 
     
Formal and informal influence / 
Identifying formal and informal 
social influence in new 
technology adoption 
Tucker (2008) Binary discrete choice 
model 
Individual-level causal network 
externality is identified. The influential 
is not necessarily the one with formal 
authority. It is important to target the 
people at the center of communication 
network 
The effect of WOM needs to be 
investigated 
     
Influential customers / 
Identifying customers with 
strong influence in a social 
network 
Trusov et al. (2010) Poisson regression model Relatively fewer friends have 
significant influence on others’ 
behaviors. Customer profile cannot help 
identify influential customers 
Hidden Markov model can be 
employed to investigate the dynamic 
aspect. Multiple sites, offline social 
interactions can be analyzed. Influential 
customers’ response to marketing 
actions can be modeled 
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Table 3.2 (Continued) 
 (e) Social Contagion / Influence 
Topic Paper Model/Method Findings Extension Opportunities 
     
Product attribute preference / 
Investigating how peers 
influence each other’s 
preference for product attributes 
in a social network 
Narayan et al. (2012) Hierarchical Bayesian 
model 
Customers update their preference for 
product attributes in a Bayesian 
manner, under peer influence from 
other customers 
Peer effects on related purchase 
decisions can be analyzed. Both 
observational learning and information 
sharing can be investigated 
     
Experience attributes / 
Analyzing how customers 
resolve uncertainty about 
products through social learning 
Lee and Bell (2013) Bayesian learning model Local social learning can reduce 
uncertainty and lead to product trial. 
Local social capital lifts the efficiency 
of social learning 
Other temporal and spatial effects can 
be controlled to establish the causal 
relationship. Other social contagion 
mechanism can be investigated  
     
 
 
(f) User-generated Contents 
Topic Paper Model/Method Findings Extension Opportunities 
     
Social capital / Analyzing the 
impact of various factors on the 
release time of user-generated 
contents 
Mallapragada et al. (2012) Split hazard model Open source project founders’ social 
capital is a more important factor than 
product characteristics and the interplay 
between developers and end users. The 
existence of forums can accelerate 
product release  
Contexts other than user-generated 
contents can be analyzed. The impact of 
type and quality of communication can 
be investigated 
     
Collaborative contents / 
Investigating the impact of the 
number  and embeddedness of 
contributors on the user value of 
user-generated contents  
Ransbotham (2012) Social network analysis and 
hierarchical linear latent 
model 
A curvilinear relationship exists 
between the number of content 
contributors and the value of contents. 
Content contributors are not equal in 
value. The number and network of 
contributors have stronger impact at 
early stage 
The transfer of specific contents can be 
examined. Endogeneity issues require 
further investigation 
     
Social tie formation / 
Investigating the relationship 
between online users’ content 
generation and their social ties 
Shriver et al. (2013) Linear model Social ties can help  content generation 
on a social website 
Tie strength can be considered. The link 
between user-generated contents and 
advertising revenue can be analyzed. 
Social influence mechanism can be 
investigated 
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Table 3.2 (Continued) 
 (g) Social Media and Viral Marketing 
Topic Paper Model/Method Findings Extension Opportunities 
     
Viral product design / 
Examining the effectiveness of 
viral features on the generation 
of WOM peer influence 
Aral and Walker (2011) Hazard model Passive broadcast viral features are 
more effective than active-personalized 
viral features in generating peer 
influence and contagion. Active-
personalized viral features are more 
effective in encouraging adoption and 
sustainable product use 
Optimal viral marketing strategy design 
based on the effectiveness of viral 
features can be investigated 
     
WOM seeding / Analyzing how 
WOM seeding program can 
create value by expanding 
customer base and accelerating 
purchase by current customers 
Libai et al. (2013) Agent-based simulation 
model 
For similar brands most of the value 
from seeding program is created 
through market expansion. Seeding 
programs targeting most influential 
customers generate more social value 
through acceleration 
Social influence other than WOM, such 
as network externalities, can be 
investigated. The direction of 
communication can be considered. 
Customer life time value can be 
integrated 
     
Social media marketing strategy 
/ Proposing and measuring the 
metric of customer influence 
value. Measuring the ROI of 
social media marketing strategy 
Kumar et al. (2013) Field experiment The proposed method measures both 
tangible and intangible value of social 
media, which can help optimize social 
media campaigns  
The method can be tested indifferent 
industry settings. Customer 
heterogeneity can be considered. Game 
theory framework can be integrated 
     
 
(h) Social Network Value 
Topic Paper Model/Method Findings Extension Opportunities 
     
Value of buyers and sellers / 
Measuring customer value in a 
network setting 
Gupta et al. (2009) Structural model Strong direct (buyer-to-buyer) and 
indirect (buyer-to-seller) network effect 
exist in the network. Price and 
advertising elasticity becomes lower 
when network effects are considered 
Models can be built to predict future 
demand, expenses and customer value 
     
Value of networked sellers / 
Analyzing the value created 
through seller connections in an 
online commerce website 
Stephen and Toubia 
(2010) 
Hierarchical Bayesian 
model 
Connection among sellers can generate 
enormous economic value, due to 
customers’ accessibility to marketplace. 
Sellers with highest accessibility benefit 
the most 
Different types of online marketplaces 
need to be explored. Online stores’ 
influence on each other can be 
considered. Dynamics across time 
might be investigated 
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3.3 Acquire New Customers through Social Network and Social Media 
 The key to successful CRM is finding the “right” customers to serve. The right 
customers are the ones with high life time value. However, it is difficult for a firm to 
predict its prospect customers’ CLV before actually acquiring them, especially when 
information is limited.  
If prospect customers’ profiles are known, binary choice models such as logit 
or probit models can be used to analyze what type of customers are more likely to be 
acquired (e.g., Bodapati and Gupta 2004, Reinartz et al. 2005). If customer profiles are 
not available, diffusion models (Bass 1969) can be used (e.g., Bass et al. 1994, Kim et 
al. 1995, Gupta et al. 2004, Libai et al. 2009). 
Above approaches treat customers as they are independent from each other. If 
customers are connected in a social network, the information of social connections and 
interactions can be used in acquisition models. For instance, Toubia et al. (2009) use 
customers’ social interaction covariates in a diffusion model to predict the adoption of 
a new product.  
These days, omnipresent social networks and social media provide companies 
good opportunities to profile their incumbent and prospect customers in terms of their 
social behaviors. This enables companies to acquire new customers through social 
channels such as social referral and social media marketing.  
Referral system has caught researchers’ attention for a more than a decade. For 
example, Biyalogorsky et al. (2001) discuss the use of referral reward. Kumar et al. 
(2010) propose to use both CLV and CRV (customer referral value) to identify the 
most valuable customers in terms of their referral activities. The authors also point out 
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the importance of understanding the drivers behind customers’ referral value.  
Effectiveness of New Acquisition Channels 
 Before modeling the acquisition process through social referral (word-of-
mouth, WOM) and social media channels, it is necessary to compare the effectiveness 
of these two new acquisition channels and the traditional channels such as advertising. 
Villanueva et al. (2008) propose a method to do so. In their paper the authors use 
vector autoregression (VAR) model to compare the impact of WOM acquisition and 
marketing-induced acquisition, in terms of company’s financial performance. They 
find that customers acquired through word of mouth are comparatively more loyal and 
more valuable than the customers acquired by marketing campaigns. 
 Following this approach, the effectiveness of customer acquisition through 
social media marketing can also be compared: 
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൪, (3.1) 
where ܯܭ ௧ܶ is the number of customer acquired through marketing actions at time ݐ; 
ܹܱܯ௧ is the number of customers acquired through word of mouth (referral) at time ݐ; 
ܱܵܥܫܣܮ௧ is the number a customers acquired via social media advertising at time ݐ; 
and ܸܣܮܷܧ௧ is the firm’s financial performance at time ݐ. ܲ is model’s lag order.  
Using this approach the impact of various acquisition channels on company’s 
performance can be directly compared. If it can be established that customers acquired 
through WOM and social media have significantly stronger impact on a company’s 
financial performance than customers acquired by normal marketing activities, then 
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models can be built to investigate the acquisition process through social referral or 
social media.  
Acquisition through Social Referral 
 The key to a successful referral system is: (1) identify customers with strong 
WOM power, who can help acquire new customers with high CLV; (2) decide 
incentive (reward) level offered to these customers for their referrals. The former is a 
profiling issue (of current customers), while the latter is an evaluation issue. 
 If a company has its customers’ referral history, it can use a customers’ past 
referral records to calculate their customer referral value (CRV) and identify 
customers with strong WOM power. For instance, in Kumar et al. (2007) the authors 
compare customers with high CLV and CRV. They find that customers with high 
CRV are not necessarily the customers with high CLV.  
It would be interesting to further segment customers based on their social 
network characteristics and compare the referral results. It can be checked whether 
there is significant difference between more “sociable” customers and others.  
In Kumar et al. (2010), the authors move forward to investigate the drivers 
behind CRV, thus make it possible to dynamically target new customers. In modeling 
CRV, Kumar et al. (2010) discuss the effect of various drivers, such as firm-specific 
factors, exchange characteristics (e.g., monetary value, frequency, cross-buy, product 
return policy), and customer characteristics (age and income). It will be interesting to 
include some social network characteristics into a CRV model and measure their 
effects. Such social network covariates can be characteristics such as network 
structure, social interactions, relationship strength, etc. These covariates are well 
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investigated in social network literature (e.g., Katona et al. 2011, Ansari et al. 2011). 
They can be useful to improve the prediction of CRV. 
In Kumar et al. (2013), the authors use some interesting data collected from a 
social media campaign to measure customer influence effect (CIE) and customer 
influence value (CIV), both in monetary values. In particular, the authors estimate the 
drivers of CIE and CIV, including network and WOM characteristics (e.g., reciprocity, 
degree of transitive triangulation). The rationale for choosing these covariates and the 
method to estimate them can also be used to capture the drivers of customers’ social 
referral power.     
Acquisition through Social Media 
 More and more companies have added social media to their marketing mix 
(Armelini and Villanueva 2011, Weinberg and Pehlivan 2011).  Compared with 
traditional marketing activities, social media marketing enables companies to have 
more direct, targeted, and personalized interactions with incumbent and prospect 
customers. Social media carries more credibility. It also enables companies to build a 
feedback loop between companies and customers. As a result, more and more 
companies are using social media to acquire new customers. 
 To acquire new customers with high CLV, a company needs to profile its 
current high value customers to identify their demographic characteristics (e.g., age, 
location) and behavioral patterns on social media (e.g., topic interested in, groups 
attended, “likes”, etc.). Social media sites such as Facebook usually ask advertisers for 
this information to target specific customer segments and send messages to them 
(www.facebook.com/ads).  
 116 
 Due to privacy protection concerns, collecting social information can be 
difficult. One possible solution is: (1) text mining high value customers’ 
communications on company’s platform, such as forums, discussion groups, blogs, etc. 
(2) crawling external social media sites to collect the information of high value 
customers’ social behaviors. The former requires text mining capabilities and results 
can be quite accurate (e.g., Joachims 1999, Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010). The latter 
demands techniques to crawl on social website (Gjoka 2011). Only publicly available 
information can be collected.    
   After social behavior data is collected, researchers can use classification 
techniques to profile high value customers. On social media sites this profile 
information can be used to target the segment of promising potential customers. 
 
3.4 Leverage the Power of Social Influence to Retain Customers 
 Identifying and retaining high value customers is the key to a company’s long 
term profitability. Various CRM papers have devoted to the topics such as customer 
status (e.g., Schmittlein et al. 1994, Allenby et al. 1999), CLV calculation (e.g., Gupta 
et al. 2006), and resource allocation (e.g., Reinartz et al. 2005). This section focuses 
on the impact of social influence on customer retention/defection within a social 
network.  
Social Influence on Customer Defection 
 If the impact of one customer’s churn on other customers’ defection decisions 
can be directly modeled, influential customers in a social network can also be 
identified. If these influential customers choose to stay, customers connected with 
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them and under their influence are more likely to stay. If these influential customers 
choose to leave, then customers under their influence are more likely to leave as well. 
More resources should be allocated to retain these influential customers, so more 
customers can be retained through their social influence. 
 Research on this topic, however, is surprisingly sparse. One possible reason 
lies in the scantiness of data. In general, it is difficult to collect social network data 
and defection data at the same time. Not to mention that detecting customer churn is 
even harder, especially in a non-contractual setting.  
 Nitzan and Libai (2011) use hazard model and cell phone communication data 
to investigate whether there are social effects on customers’ churn behaviors. They 
find that a customer is more likely to churn if customers communicating with her have 
churned. 
 In Chapter 2 this issue is addressed with a tie strength model and a defection 
decision model, jointly estimated with online gaming data. It is found that customers 
with frequent and recent interactions are more likely to have strong relationship. And 
customers with strong relationship have stronger impact on each other’s defection 
decisions. 
 A lot of work remains to be done in this area, especially in the non-contractual 
setting. Nitzan and Libai (2011) discuss a contractual situation (cell phone service). In 
contrast, Chapter 2 models customer defection in a non-contractual scenario. Due to a 
unique situation in online video games, it is possible to detect a customer’s true 
defection, even in a non-contractual setting. However, in reality most of the defection 
cases occur in non-contractual situations. Modeling defection in such situations 
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becomes very difficult because defection itself cannot be directly observed.  
 One solution is to use the approach proposed by Reinartz and Kumar (2000). 
In their paper the authors first use probability models to estimate the probability that a 
customer is still “alive”. They then calculate various expected values with estimated 
probabilities, and use these expected values as covariates to model customer’s life 
time value. This approach is also suitable for using hazard models to analyze 
customers’ length of relationship with companies. 
Another solution is simply using some rule of thumb to decide whether a 
customer is still alive (e.g. a customer remaining inactive for a certain period is 
considered churned). This approach is widely used in industry (Reinartz and 
Venkatesan 2008). With this approach, the idle period itself can be considered as a 
covariate in the models as well. By jointly estimating this covariate an optimal 
judgment rule can be searched, along with the investigation of social impact on 
customers’ defection decisions.            
Satisfaction and Retention within a Social Network 
 It has been well established that satisfied customers are more loyal than 
unsatisfied customers (e.g., Rust and Zahorik 1993, Bolton 1998, Gustafsson et al. 
2005). However, it is still not very clear how customers influence each other’s 
satisfaction through their social connections. This is due to the difficulty of 
continuously monitoring customers’ satisfaction, let alone monitoring customer 
satisfaction within a social network.  
Despite above difficulties, researchers have made several attempts. For 
example, Anderson (1998) points out that unsatisfied customers are more likely to 
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engage in WOM than satisfied customers. Fowler and Christakis (2008) find that 
happy people tend to cluster together within a social network.  
If data is available, it will be interesting to investigate the mechanism through 
which customers influence each other’s satisfaction. According to service quality 
theory (Oliver 1980, Rust and Oliver 1994), a customer’s satisfaction/dissatisfaction 
comes from the gap between her expectation for the service and her actual perception 
of the service (e.g., Woodruff et al. 1983, Zeithaml et al. 1990, Boulding et al. 1993). 
Therefore, for each customer within a social network her expectation and perception 
can be modeled as a function of her own characteristics and her social ties’ 
expectation and perception. Therefore, it is possible to capture the impact of WOM on 
customers’ satisfaction.   
Service Failure and Recovery within a Social Network 
 Due to intensifying competition, service failures could be devastating to 
service providers. Most recent examples include the service interruption of BlackBerry 
in 2011 and Netflix in 2012. With the growth of social network websites customers are 
becoming more closely connected. This makes the service failure issue even more 
critical. Negative word-of-mouth could spread very fast through social connections 
and a large scale customer defection could occur in the aftermath of a service failure. 
On the other hand, however, with appropriate service recovery actions, companies 
might be able to leverage the influence from social networks to retain their customers. 
 Because it is difficult to collect service failure data, so far most of the service 
failure/recovery literature uses survey, experiment, or simulation to investigate 
customers’ reaction to service failures (e.g., Bolton 1998, McCollough et al. 2000, and 
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Zhu et al. 2004). Findings from these papers are similar: Excellent service recovery 
actions can raise customer satisfaction and increase re-patronage intensions. However, 
it is risky to completely rely on superior service recovery. The best strategy is to 
prevent service failures from happening. 
So far no literature has combined service recovery research and social network 
analysis together. To do so, attempts can be made at group level and individual level. 
First, customer groups’ reaction to service failures can be modeled. These 
models can tell us whether groups with different network characteristics respond 
differently to service failures. For instance, it would be interesting to know whether a 
closely-knitted group is more likely to stay or churn. Regression models with 
covariates of network characteristics can be used.  
Second, individual customer’s reaction to service failures can be investigated 
with hazard models, such as the one proposed by Iyengar et al. (2011). One important 
purpose of individual level modeling is to identify influential customers. If influential 
customers can be identified, when a service failure occurs a company can allocate 
resources on these influential customers and persuade them to stay. As a result, 
customers connected with them will be more likely to stay. 
Social Network Value and CLV 
 The heart of CRM is to identify and retain high value customers and generate 
more profits. High value customers can be identified with their CLV. Numerous 
papers have been published on estimating CLV and using CLV to optimize a 
company’s CRM strategy. Most of these papers treat customers independently, 
ignoring the influence among connected customers. However, a customer with low 
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CLV might have strong influence on customers with high CLV. Apparently these 
customers are also valuable and deserve attention from the company. Hence, the CLV 
of a customer within a social network should have two components: an intrinsic value 
(the conventional CLV) and a social network value. 
 A customer’s social network value can be defined as the expected lift on other 
customers’ monetary contributions due this customer’s social influence (Domingos 
and Richardson 2001). The estimation of social network value is not easy, because it is 
difficult to separate a customer’s monetary contribution due to other customers’ 
influence from the one due to her intrinsic reasons.  
So far researchers have tried to investigate social network value in several 
specific scenarios. Gupta et al. (2009) measure the value of the direct network effects 
(buyer to buyer) and indirect network effects (buyer to seller) in a context of job 
posting website. Job seekers are welcome to register with the site for free (“free” 
customers). And because of the existence these job seekers recruiters are more willing 
to pay for the advertisements on the site. Therefore, “free” customers are also valuable.  
Domingos and Richardson (2001) model customer’s social network value in a 
setting of new product adoption. If a customer adopts a new product because another 
customer who is connect with her has adopted it, then the monetary contribution from 
this adoption can be considered as that influential customer’s social network value. 
In Chapter 2, an effort is made to measure a customer’s social network value 
from her influence on other customers’ defection decisions. First, customers’ defection 
decisions within a social network are modeled. With this defection decision model the 
incremental impact of a customer’s decision (stay/leave) on other customers’ defection 
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decisions can be measured. If those customers churn, then all the expected monetary 
contribution from them will disappear. By combining the information of an influential 
customer’s incremental impacts other customers’ churn and the expected contributions 
from those customers; it is possible to measure the value of an influential customer’s 
social influence. .    
It still remains a challenge to measure customers’ social network value in a 
more commonplace scenario such as repeated purchase. There is more work to be 
done in this area. 
 
3.5 Grow Customers within a Social Network 
 These days, growing customers has received more attention. Customer growth 
is defined as the expansion and growth of firm-customer relationships to increase both 
revenue and profits (Reinartz and Venkatesan 2008). With more customer data 
collected at individual level, it is possible to target individual customers, cross- and 
up-selling products to them (Reinartz and Venkatesan 2008).   
 This section discusses research opportunities in customer growth within a 
social network, focusing on three cross-selling scenarios: introducing brand-new 
products, promoting sequentially-purchased products, and increasing repeated 
purchase.  
Brand-New Products 
 Introducing a brand-new product to a social network is indeed a new product 
diffusion/adoption issue. This issue has been well studied in social network literature. 
Two major categories of models have been used: diffusion models (e.g., Toubia et al. 
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2011) and linear models (e.g., Nair et al. 2010, Iyengar et al. 2011). 
 On the basis of these researches, the promotion strategies within a social 
network can be further analyzed. It would be interesting to know: (1) how influential 
customers react to the promotion messages; (2) how other customers adopt the new 
product under the influence from influential customers; (3) how to broadcast new 
product information to a social network. Are there any “hubs” in the network, which 
will facilitate the spread of the information about new products? 
Sequentially-Purchased Products 
 Recently, most of the literature on the cross-selling of sequentially-purchased 
products has concentrated on financial services (e.g., Kamakura et al. 1991, Reinartz 
and Kumar 2000, Li et al. 2005). The main focus of these researches is to identify 
potential targets for direct marketing. Most researchers use customers’ own purchasing 
history to find customers who are more likely to buy the promoted products (e.g., 
Rossi et al. 1996, Knott et al. 2002, and Kumar et al. 2008).   
 If customers’ purchasing history and their social connections within a social 
network can be observed, a customer’s social connections’ purchasing history can also 
be used. Especially in the case of sequentially-purchased products, a customer’s 
friends’ purchasing pattern can serve as a good indicator for that customer’s 
purchasing intention.  
This can be verified with the approach proposed by Kumar et al. (2008). 
Friends’ purchase patterns (e.g., the timing and quantity of purchases) might be a 
driver in the cross-buying model and the impact can be measured.  
It could be interesting to investigate how to use friends’ purchase as a 
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promotion message. These days when a customer makes a purchase on a website, a 
button labeled “Like” or “Share with Friends” might appear on the webpage. If 
customer pushes the button, her friends will receive a message saying: “Your friend 
has purchased (or likes) this product”. Customers’ reaction to this type messages can 
be modeled and the effectiveness of messages on a customer’s purchase intention can 
be measured.  
To begin with, lab experiments or field experiments can help observe 
customers’ reaction to these messages. If these messages are effective then modeling 
approach can be used to quantitatively gauge the effectiveness. As mentioned by 
Venkatesan et al. (2007), investigation can start with checking the existence of a “U-
shape” relationship between the amount of information sent and the purchase intention 
of customers who receive the information. Firms can use the findings to optimize their 
promotion strategy.   
Repeat Purchase 
 Modeling social influence in a repeat purchase setting is a challenge, because it 
is difficult to “filter out” the impact of social influence. Also, unlike the “one-to-one” 
influence discussed in Trusov et al. (2010) and Iyengar et al. (2011) (e.g., an opinion 
leader’s influence on her followers), in a setting of repeat purchase “group-to-one” 
influence is more common. In other words, when a customer is considering a purchase, 
she is immersed in the influence from a group of customers who are connected to her.  
 As an attempt to address this issue, in Chapter 1 the impact of group-to-one 
social influence on each customer’s repeat purchases is modeled with the data 
collected from an online video game. In particular, the influence from strong ties and 
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weak ties in the network is compared. It is found that as a whole, weak ties are more 
influential than strong ties. This is because: (1) weak ties are much more widespread 
than strong ties; (2) information (especially new information) disseminates much 
faster through weak ties than through strong ties.  
 The impact of product sharing on customers’ purchasing behaviors is also 
investigated. It is found that if sharing is allowed, customers are more willing to buy 
new products. This is because customers are more willing to take risks when they 
know that if they are not satisfied with the product they can exchange it with their 
friends.  
 The biggest obstacle in this area is still data collection. In general, it is very 
difficult to collect data on both social connections/interactions and purchases. So far 
the only data sources used by researchers have been collected from online gaming and 
telecommunication. With more data available, more researches will be done. 
 
3.6 Capture Firm-Customer Relationship Dynamics within a Social Network 
 The ongoing relationship between a firm and its customers evolves over time. 
The relationship state depends on customers’ own characteristics, firm’s CRM 
activities, and other customers’ influence if they are connected within a social network. 
To investigate the dynamics of firm-customer relationship state, hidden Markov 
models (HMMs) are widely used. 
 With HMM, firm-customer relationship is modeled as a latent state (Pfeifer 
2000). At time ݐ, each customer stays in state ݏ (ݏ ൌ 1,⋯ ,ܰܵ) with a probability. 
Customer ݅ starts with initial probabilities described in vector ૈ௜ ൌ ሾߨ௜ଵ,⋯ , ߨ௜ேௌሿ′. 
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Starting with initial distribution, customer ݅’s state evolves as a Markov chain . The 
probabilities of transition across states are described in transition matrix ۿ௜,௧ିଵ→௧ ൌ
ሼݍ௜,௦೟షభ,௦೟ሽ	, where ݍ௜,௦೟షభ,௦೟ is the probability that customer ݅ shifts from state ݏ௧ିଵ at 
time ݐ െ 1 to state ݏ௧ at time ݐ. Transition probabilities can be homogeneous (not time-
varying) or nonhomogeneous (time-varying). In most CRM cases, transition 
probabilities are modeled as a function of time-varying covariates. By doing so, 
researchers can investigate the effectiveness of a firm’s CRM efforts intended to 
enhance its relationship with customers. 
 Because relationship states are latent, researchers can only observe customers’ 
behaviors, which depend on the relationship states. The distribution of customer ݅’s 
state-dependent behaviors is described by a state-dependent distribution ܕ௜௧ ൌ
ሾ݉௜௧|ଵ,⋯ ,݉௜௧|ேௌሿ′, where ݉௜௧|௦ is the probability of customer ݅ taking certain action 
when she is in state ݏ. Thus the three key components of a HMM are: (1) initial state 
distribution, (2) transition matrix, and (3) state-dependent distribution. If customer ݅’s 
behaviors from time 1 to time ܶ, ݕ௜ଵ,⋯ , ݕ௜், can be observed, then the likelihood can 
be calculated with the following equation (for details, see Netzer et al. 2008): 
 
 ܮ௜் ൌ ௜ܲሺ ௜ܻଵ ൌ ݕ௜ଵ,⋯ , ௜்ܻ ൌ ݕ௜்ሻ ൌ
∑ ∑ ⋯∑ ቂߨ௜௦భ ∏ ݍ௜௦ഓ௦ഓషభ ⋅ ∏ ݉ሺ௜ఛ|௦ഓሻ
௬೔ഓఛ்ୀଵ ൫1 െఛ்ୀଶேௌ௦೅ୀଵேௌ௦మୀଵேௌ௦భୀଵ
݉ሺ௜ఛ|௦ഓሻ൯
ଵି௬೔ഓ ቃ. 
(3.2) 
 
Apparently, it is difficult to calculate this likelihood. Therefore various 
algorithms have been developed to estimate HMMs. The most commonly used 
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algorithms include Expectation-Maximization (EM) and Monte Carlo Markov Chain 
(MCMC). MCMC algorithm is particularly important when the state transition is 
modeled as nonhomogeneous. Also, if we want to capture heterogeneity among 
customers, a hierarchical Bayesian model is usually used (e.g., Netzer et al. 2008), 
which is usually estimated with MCMC. Fortunately, if customers can be assumed 
independent with each other, MacDonald and Zucchini (1997, 2009) propose a highly 
simplified and tractable likelihood specification: 
 
 ܮ௜் ൌ ௜ܲሺ ௜ܻଵ ൌ ݕ௜ଵ,⋯ , ௜்ܻ ൌ ݕ௜்ሻ ൌ
ૈ௜ܕ෥௜ଵۿ௜,ଵ→ଶ ⋯ ۿ௜,்ିଵ→்ܕ෥௜்૚′, 
(3.3) 
 
where ૈ௜ is the initial distribution of customer ݅’s state; ۿ௜,ଵ→ଶ,⋯	ۿ௜,்ିଵ→் are 
customer ݅’s transition matrices, ܕ෥௜௧ is an ܰܵ ൈ ܰܵ diagonal matrix with state-
dependent distribution vector ܕ௜௧ on its diagonal. In their paper, Netzer et al. (2008) 
demonstrate how to use HMM to model the dynamic relationship between a school 
and its alumni. As an extension of this research, Montoya et al. (2010) use HMM to 
capture the relationship dynamics in a setting of new drug introduction. They then use 
dynamic programming to optimize the allocation of detailing resources. 
So far, in all HMM literature researchers treat customers independently, and 
the likelihood specification given in Zucchini and MacDonald (1997, 2009) is 
particularly popular among researchers. Tractable and simple, with this specification 
likelihood can be calculated with standard matrix computation. 
Unfortunately, this assumption of independence might no longer be applicable 
within a social network. For instance, it is quite possible that a customer’s relationship 
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with the firm is the function of her friends’ relationships with the firm. One customer’s 
transition probability among relationship states might depend on her friends’ 
relationship states as well. 
However, it is extremely difficult to specify the likelihood function when 
customers are no longer independent from each other. Researchers in computer 
science and management have been working hard to solve this problem. But so far no 
progress has been reported. Despite the technical difficulties, this topic is still a very 
interesting and carries significant managerial implications.  
 
3.7 Conclusion   
 Researches in customer relationship management and social network analysis 
have been undergoing fast growth. With increasing data availability, time is ripe for 
researchers to investigate the intersection of these two disciplines. The combination of 
CRM and SNA bring forth tremendous research opportunities. Three research areas 
merit researchers’ consideration: (1) quantitatively measuring the social influence in 
each aspect of CRM; (2) managing customers as a network; (3) capturing the 
dynamics of firm-customer and customer-customer relationships.  
Measuring Social Influence 
 Scenarios and methodology to measure social influence vary from one aspect 
of CRM to another. For instance, in customer adoption aspect, the focus is to measure 
the referral power of incumbent customers from their social behaviors, thus identify 
influential customers and encourage them to help acquire new customers through 
social media and other channels.  
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 In customer retention aspect, it is interesting to understand how customers 
influence each other’s expectation and perception of service and products. It is also 
critical to model customer churn within a network, thus companies can leverage the 
social influence to retain their customers. 
In customer growth aspect, it is important to measure the social influence 
among customers in terms of their purchasing behaviors. Particularly, it will be 
interesting to investigate the mechanism of social influence on customers’ repeat 
purchase. It will also be interesting to explore how to use customers’ social interaction 
and purchasing history to identify cross-selling opportunities.    
Managing Customers as Networks 
 Based on a thorough understanding of how customers influence each other 
within a network, companies can treat customer groups as the units for their CRM 
efforts. This will first benefit a company’s communication strategy. For instance, if a 
company wants to promote some products to its customers, it can send the message to 
the “hubs” in a customer network and encourage them to disseminate the information. 
The remaining work will be done by the WOM. 
 It will also be interesting to track the growth of customer networks. CLV of 
various customer groups can be measured and tracked. The distribution of CLV within 
the network can also be analyzed. Knowing the impact of network characteristics on 
customer groups’ value and growth would help a company find its optimal “social 
network strategy”.  
Capture Relationship Dynamics in a Social Network 
 It is challenging to model the dynamic relationships between a company and 
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its customers within a social network. However, if how customers’ relationship states 
are dependent on each other can be modeled, researchers will have a deeper 
understanding of the influence mechanism within a social network. This will require a 
breakthrough in methodology, but it is definitely a rewarding direction.  
In sum, a thorough understanding of social influence mechanism among 
customers will enable companies to leverage the power of social network to acquire, 
retain and grow high value customers, and enhance firm-customer and customer-
customer relationships. This cross-disciplinary area deserves more attention from 
marketing researchers.  
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